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Abstract 
As a regional organisation, the Gulf Cooperation Council is a some-
what unique experiment in the contemporary Middle East and in the Arab world 
in particular. It is the first regional organisation in the modern Arab nation-state 
system, aside from the Arab League, formed in 1946, that has epoused a func-
tional approach to cooperation, while at the same time preserving the political 
sovereignty and independence of the member states. Since its founding, the GCC 
has been the focus of debate regarding its nature and functions. Intentionally 
or not, it has become a major media event, a fact that has contributed to the 
credibility gap between rising expectations based on public pronouncements and 
real achievements. 
This thesis is an inquiry into the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
in the economic development of the participating countries. The study comprises 
seven chapters, detailing both the scope and purpose of the study, and the criteria 
employed in the research. The main chapters examine the relative contribution of 
physical and human resources involved in cooperation between the Gulf countries. 
In addition, the contribution of agriculture and fisheries, as well as industrial 
development, to the G.C.C. countries are expounded. The services in the G.C.C. 
countries are specified. External trade and migration in the G.C.C. countries is 
discussed in detail. The conclusion describes the role of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council in economic development and includes suggestions and recommendations 
for the future. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 Context 
In reviewing the short history of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
we should make four initial comments. First, the GCC came into being as a 
response to serious security-related developments in the Gulf, such as the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the Iraq-Iran war. 
Second, although Gulf official pronouncements have highlighted the economic, 
cultural, and educational goals of the GCC, and the GCC was initialy presented 
as another step along the already established road of cooperation among family-
ruled states, it has been unable to make much impact as a regional organisation 
except for supporting security arragements. Thirdly, the security function of the 
GCC has been even more important because of the rising wave of terrorism in 
the region. In the Gulf context, this regional terrorism has been viewed as an 
attempt to replace the existing regimes with pro-Iranian ones. The unsuccessful 
plot in Bahrain in December 1981, the bombings in Kuwait in 1984 and 1985, and 
the assasination attempt on the Amir of Kuwait in May 1985 were all interpreted 
by Gulf governments as concerted moves to disrupt their countries from within. 
In commenting on the explosions in Kuwait in July 1985, Gulf newspapers saw a 
more ominus threat directed against both the GCC and democratic experiment in 
Kuwait itself. (Kuwait was the only GCC state with an elected national assembly 
and a relatively free press.) 
Fourthly, since its founding twelve years ago, the GCC has increasingly 
become a media event; coverage has been promoted both by Gulf governments 
and by the GCC secretary-general. GCC summits have also been heavily publi-
cised through official government publications, news releases, and intensive media 
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reports. For example, over 250 GCC-related news articles appeared in the region's 
media between 1981 and 1985, as reported in the Foreign Broadcasting Informa-
tion Service Daily Report. Almost 40 percent of these articles dealt with security, 
25 percent reported on GCC meetings, 20 percent focused on cooperation, and 15 
percent discussed the efforts of the GCC to mediate the Iraq-Iran war. The dif-
ferent ministerial meetings, particularly those of foreign affairs and defence, have 
also been covered in the press, ( Nakhleh,E.1986 ). 
Since 1984, the added concern with security as a result of increasing 
terrorism has led to more contacts among the interior ministers of the GCC. 
This too has been heavily publicised in the Gulf press. Consequently, a gap has 
developed, at least in the people's perceptions, between the media coverage and 
the actual achievments of the GCC, even in the field of security. For example, 
in spite of the council's preoccupation with security, at least as evidenced by the 
press coverage, the security agreement that Saudi Arabia has promoted since 1981 
has not yet been signed by the member states. Kuwait still finds the agreement 
objectionable. In newspaper interview in London in mid-July 1985, the Bahraini 
Minister of Information stated that security cooperation among GCC was taking 
place with or without a written agreement, ( Nakhleh,E.1986 ). This is also 
the case with economic cooperation . Although the GCC's Unified Economic 
Agreement went into effect in 1983, its impact on the life of GCC citizens has yet 
to be felt. 
To many of the Gulf's policy-oriented elites, the GCC came into be-
ing primarily as a reaction to regional threats in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
They believe Western democracies, particularly the United States, have supported 
the establishment of the GCC because they saw in it an anti-Communist front 
and a potential lucrative market for Western-produced weapons and defence re-
lated technology. With the international oil glut, the reduction in oil production, 
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and the diminishing oil revenues, Gulf governments must become more account-
able to their peoples, particularly in terms of distributing the economic benefits. 
The Kuwaiti National Assembly has already raised serious questions about the 
country's international long-term financial commitments. Indeed, the National 
Assembly has decided in 1985,to eliminate the $ 300 million annual subsidy to 
Jordan, Syria, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The tighter the finan-
cial situation becomes in the Gulf, the more questions will be raised and the real 
contribution of the GCC to economic development examined. 
1.2 The Formation of the GCC 
On 25th May, 1981, the leaders of the six Gulf states met in UAE, to 
convene the first Summit Conference to sign the Charter of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. The subsequent establishment of the Gulf Co-operation Council ( GCC), 
has inspired its six member countries viz, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait, 
Qatar and Oman, to create and develop the appropriate institutions capable of 
carrying out their objectives for co-operation and regional integration. 
The communique also indicated that the GCC charter was the culmina-
tion of many previous meetings and contacts among the heads of state and the 
foreign ministers of the six Gulf states. The establishment of the GCC, according 
to this communique, rests on four major assumptions: 
(1) Cooperation among these states is natural and has existed for many years. 
(2) Gulf states would be able to protect their interests much better as a regional 
organisation than as individuals. 
(3) The security of the Gulf is the responsibility of its peoples and states; any 
foreign intervention must be rejected. 
( 4) Stability in the Gulf is linked to peace in the Middle East and to a just 
resolution of the Palestine conflict, which would guarantee the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people in the context of an independent state. 
3 
The announcement on May 26th was preceded by intensive contacts and 
meetings. Some of these contacts date back to the late 1970s. In a series of visits 
to the lower Gulf in December 1978, the Amir of Kuwait strongly advocated the 
theme of regional cooperation, as if evident from the following summary of those 
meetings. 
December 6th, 1978. A communique following a meeting between the 
Amir of Kuwait and the King of Saudi Arabia emphasised the two rulers' "belief 
in working for cooperation among the two states in all fields and in keeping the 
region secure and stable and away from international struggle" ( Nakhleh, E. 1986 
). 
December 9th, 1978. A communique following the meeting between the 
Amir of Kuwait and the Amir of Bahrain called for "continued efforts for more 
cooperation and coordination among the states of the region through a unified 
and a comprehensive political, economic, social and educational plan" ( Nakhleh, 
E. 1986). 
December 12th, 1978. A communique following the meeting between the 
Amir of Kuwait and the Amir of Qatar stated that "the sensitive situation present 
in the Gulf makes it imperative for the Arab states of the Gulf to intensify their 
efforts for a unity agreement among themselves" . 
December 16th, 1978. A communique following the meeting between the 
Amir of Kuwait and the Amir of Abu Dhabi stated that "the common national 
and religious ties and the common aspirations of the Arab peoples of the region 
dictate that the states of the region should unify themselves". 
December 20th, 1978. A communique following the meeting between 
the Amir of Kuwait and the Sultan of Oman stated that "in the light of the new 
circumstances in the region, it is imperative that the Gulf Arab states arrive at the 
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strongest cooperative agreement possible among themselves - cooperation dictated 
by their common Islamic faith, historical relations and their peoples' aspirations 
for the realisation of more progress and prosperity" . 
Indeed, following the meeting of the Gulf foreign ministers in Kuwait on 
February 5th, 1981, the Saudi foreign minister pointed to his Kuwaiti counterpart 
before the press and said "Here is the father of the GCC project". 
Several meetings were held in 1981 in preparation for the creation of the 
GCC. The first meeting was held February 4th, 1981 in Kuwait and was attended 
by the foreign ministers of the six states which later formed the GCC. At the 
conclusion of the meeting, they issued a communique declaring that in the light of 
their similar systems, Islamic belief, and social, economic and demographic struc-
tures, they had agreed to establish a cooperation council. The foreign ministers 
also stated in the same communique that they would meet a month later to follow 
up on the specific structure and goals of the cooperation council. 
Following this meeting, a committee of experts from the six states met 
twice: in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on February 24th, 1981 and in Muscat, Oman in 
March 4th 1981. The purpose of those meetings was to develop a draft charter 
and bye-law which would be reviewed and agreed upon by the foreign ministers. 
At the conclusion of the Muscat meeting on March 18th, 1981 the committee of 
experts had agreed on a draft charter that included three structures: a supreme 
council, a ministerial council and a secretariat-general. 
On Monday, March 9th, 1981, the foreign ministers met in Muscat and 
approved the basic structure and the draft charter which had been prepared by the 
committee of experts with only minor changes. Specifically, the foreign ministers 
approved three documents: the bye-law of the Cooperation Council, the bye-law 
of the Supreme Council, and the bye-law of the Ministerial Council. The ministers 
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also made four recommendations: (1) to hold a meeting of the Supreme Council 
in May and in November of every year, (2) to hold the first session of the Supreme 
Council in Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates) on May 26th- 27th, 1981, {3) to 
hold a meeting of the committee of experts in Abu Dhabi on May 20th, 1981 to 
finalise the bye-law of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes, ( 4) to agree in 
principle that the Secretary-General of the Cooperation Council should be from 
Kuwait. 
The committee of experts met in Abu Dhabi on May 19th- 20th, 1981 
to prepare for the GCC summit and to discuss the bye-law of the Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes. This two-day meeting was followed by a meeting of the 
foreign ministers in Abu Dhabi on May 23rd, 1981. At that meeting, the foreign 
ministers approved the bye-law of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes, 
nominated Abdullah Bishara as Secretary-General of the GCC and prepared the 
agenda for the impending GCC summit. 
The first GCC summit was held on May 25th- 26th, 1981 in Abu Dhabi. 
The meeting was indeed ahistoric occasion for the family-ruled states of the Gulf. 
It was the first time they had assembled as independent states to discuss issues 
that were of particular concern to them as Gulf states. Secondly, the assembly 
reflected both a desire that these concerns could and should be addressed in a 
cooperative framework and a determination that the stability of the region would 
be their primary responsibility. 
Each delegation of the six member states included the head of state, a 
special advisor to the head of state, the foreign minister and the finance minister. 
On the second day of the summit, a "working paper on joint Gulf action" was 
presented. Highlights of the working paper included the following points: 
(1) The establishment of the GCC, coming at a most propitious time, 1s a 
response to the current historical, social, cultural, economic, political and 
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strategic environment. 
{2) The GCC is a natural culmination of a long history of cooperation. 
( 3) The many serious challenges - economic and political - presently facing the 
Gulf have made joint action imperative. Regional cooperation has become 
vital in the present era for the preservation of stability, security and progress. 
(4) Arab unity has been the dream of all Arabs since World War II, and insofar 
as joint Gulf action brings Gulf states together, it provides a solid step toward 
the realisation of this dream. 
(5) The biggest challenge facing the oil-producing Gulf states today is the need 
to utilize oil-generated wealth for development. Joint action within the GCC 
would help Gulf societies meet this challenge. 
Based on these points, the summit agreed to set up five ad hoc commit-
tees, headed by appropriate ministers, for social and economic planning, economic 
and financial cooperation, industrial cooperation, oil, and social and cultural ser-
vices. The summit concluded on May 26th, 1981 with a summit communique 
announcing the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Hundreds of GCC meetings have been held throughout the six states since 
that founding in 1981. These meetings have involved foreign ministers, interior 
ministers, chiefs of staff, directors of immigration, health ministers, directors of 
customs, finance ministers, oil ministers, directors of scientific research institutes, 
education ministers and transportation ministers. Meetings have also been held 
by deputy ministers, who are charged by their respective governments with the 
responsibility of pursuing cooperation in the GCC in their respective areas. The 
five committees that were originally established have also held innumerable meet-
ings and have generated an impressive volume of recommendations. As a result 
of this activity, practically every facet of government operations in the member 
states has been touched by the GCC. Consequently, the secretariat has expanded 
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significantly in staffing, in activites, and in expertise. Numerous studies have 
been commissioned or completed, on topic ranging from power consumption to 
the introduction of a new mathematics curriculum. 
1.3 Charter of the CGG : Objectives and Structure 
At their first summit in Abu Dhabi in May 1981, the heads of the six 
Gulf states approved four major documents: the Charter of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, the Bye-law of the Supreme Council, the Bye-law of the Ministerial 
Council and the Bye-law of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes. Less than 
a month later, the six governments approved the Joint Economic Agreement. 
The Charter of the GCC consists of a preamble and 22 articles (see 
Appendix A). In the preamble, the signatories sought to highlight the common 
characteristics of the member states - this commonality was felt to constitute 
the cornerstone of the GCC. According to the preamble, the GCC Charter is 
based on the following factors: the existence of common bonds, special relations, 
similar regimes, and the Islamic religion among the member states, the belief 
that the peoples of the Gulf have a common destiny and a unity of purpose, 
and the conviction that cooperation and coordination among the member states 
would serve the long-term interests of the Arab nation. It is also in accordance 
with the Charter of the Arab League. The 22 articles are divided into 6 topics: 
(1) basic information (Articles 1,2,3,5), (2) objectives (Article 4), (3) structure 
(Article 5), (4) functions of the main bodies within the GCC (Articles 7-16 and 
18), (5) privileges and immunities (Article 17), and (6) charter implementation, 
amendment, and deposition (Articles 19-22). 
Articles 1,2,3 and 5 state that the name of the new regional organization 
is the Gulf Cooperation Council, that its headquarters shall be in Riyadh, that 
it shall hold meetings in any member state, and that it shall consist of six states: 
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Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. 
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1.3.1 Objectives of the GCC 
The basic objectives of the GCC are defined in Article 4 of the Charter. 
They are: 
(1) To achieve cooperation among the member states in all fields as a prelude to 
unity. 
(2) To strengthen the limits of cooperation among the peoples of the member 
states in different fields. 
(3) To establish similar systems among the member states in all fields, including 
economics and finance, commerce, customs and communications, education 
and culture, social welfare and health, information and tourism, and legisla-
tion and administration. 
( 4) To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of indus try, 
mineralogy, agriculture, and marine and animal resources. Also, to establish 
common projects, and to encourage the cooperation of the private sector for 
the common good of the peoples of the member states. 
1.3.2 Structure of the GCC 
In order to achieve the objectives stated in Article 4, the heads of state 
decided at their first meeting to establish the following five technical committees: 
(1) Social and Economic Planning Committee: The basic function of this 
committee is to develop areas of common action in social and economic plan-
ning, to coordinate the national development plans of the member states, 
and to devise future plans for social and economic coordination among the 
six states. 
(2) Economic and Financial Cooperation Committee: This committee is 
charged with four major responsibilities: currency and financial cooperation, 
the movement of capital and people and the practice of economic activity 
among the member states, commercial exchange, and transportation and 
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communication. The committee was given the following specific responsi-
bilites: 
(a) To unify investment rules and regulations in an attempt to develop a cohesive 
investment policy. 
(b) To coordinate currency and banking policies and to increase the coordination 
among currency and banking institutions, eventually creating a common Gulf 
currency. 
(c) To coordinate foreign financial and currency policies, particularly as they 
pertain to regional and international economic and development aid. 
(d) To establish new regulations that would guarantee citizens of all GCC states 
equal treatment in terms of freedom of movement, work and residency, free-
dom of property ownership and inheritances and freedom of economic activ-
ity. 
(e) To attempt to remove hindrances blocking the free movement of resources, 
capital, and other means of production and to coordinate and unify cus-
toms duties and financial and commercial regulations so that citizens of any 
member state would be afforded the same treatment in any of the six states. 
(f) To remove tariff barriers among the member states regarding national prod-
ucts and to attempt to create a unified customs levy among these states and 
between them and the outside world. 
(g) To coordinate the export, import, and food-reserves policies of the member 
states. 
(h) To create a collective negotiating power in the field of exports and imports. 
(i) To cooperate in the field of sea, land and air transportation and communi-
cations and to coordinate the building of the necessary infrastructure (for 
example, ports, airports, roads, power and water stations). 
( 3) Industrial Cooperation Committee: The responsibilities of this commit-
tee include the following: 
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(a) To coordinate all industrial activity by proposing policies that would indus-
trialize these states on a basis of complementary and mutual benefit. 
(b) To study the standardization of industrial legislation and systems among the 
member states. 
(c) To encourage local institutions to increase their industrial output and fill the 
needs of the member states. 
(d) To prepare procedures governing the importation of technology appropriate 
to the development needs of the member states. 
(e) To distribute industrial production among the member states by establishing 
complimentary industrial projects. 
(f) To establish unified programmes for vocational and industrial training. 
( 4) Oil Committee: Composed of GCC ministers for foreign affairs, oil and 
finance, this committee is charged with two major responsibilities: 
(a) To coordinate all aspects of policy planning for oil and petrochemicals, includ-
ing oil production, refining, marketing, pricing and shipping, the production 
of natural gas and the development of energy resources. 
(b) To establish a unified oil policy toward the outside world and international 
organizations. 
(5) Social and Cultural Services Committee: The major responsibilities 
of this committee is to define the common areas of activity in education, 
culture, health, labour and social welfare and to establish common policies 
in these areas. 
The GCC Charter established three permanent bodies and one ad hoc 
commission (Article 6). They are the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council 
and the Secretariat. The Commission for Settlement of Disputes, which can be 
instituted when necessary, is attached to the Supreme Council (Article 10, Section 
1 ). The Commission is a recommending body only and operates at the pleasure 
of the Supreme Council (Article 10, Section 4). 
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Voting in both the Supreme Council and the Ministerial Council is based 
on unanimity on substantive issues and on a majority for procedural matters (Ar-
ticles 9 and 13). The unanimity requirement is potentially crippling, since major 
resolutions can be vetoed by any member. It would therefore be very difficult for 
any substantive agreement to emerge in any area, from regional security to tariffs, 
if any state were in opposition. The Supreme Council meets regularly once a year, 
special sessions may be called if requested by any one member and seconded by 
another (Article 7). 
The Supreme Council is the highest body in the GCC. It consists of the 
heads of the six member states. As the major policy making structure in the 
organisation, the Supreme Council is given ten specific responsibilities (Article 8). 
(1) To review matters of interest to the member states. 
(2) To establish major policy goals and broad policy outlines. 
(3) To review the recommendations, reports, studies and projects that are sub-
mitted by the Ministerial Council for approval. 
( 4) To review the reports and studies that the Secretary-General is charged with 
preparing. 
( 5) To approve the basis for dealing with other states and with international 
organizations. 
(6) To approve the Bye-Law of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes and 
to appoint its members. 
(7) To appoint the Secretary-General. 
(8) To amend the Charter of the GCC. 
(9) To approve the budget of the Secretariat-General. 
Article 11 and 12 of the Charter discuss the formation and functions of 
the Ministerial Council. It consists of the foreign ministers of the six member 
states. The Council meets every three months, and its presidency rotates in an 
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alphabetical order of the member states (Article II). The Ministerial Council is 
charged with performing eleven major functions (Article 12): 
( 1) To propose policies and prepare recommendations to further co-operation 
among the member states. 
( 2) To encourage cooperation among the member states in all fields and to rec-
ommend related policies to the Supreme Council for approval. 
(3) To submit recommendations to the appropriate ministers for implementation. 
( 4) To encourage cooperation among all segments within the member states, 
particularly the private sector, to expand cooperation among the member 
states' chambers of commerce and industry, and to facilitate the movement 
of indigenous workers among the member states. 
( 5) To refer any issue pertaining to cooperation to one or more technical and/ or 
specialised committees for further study. 
(6) To review any proposals related to amending the Charter and to refer such 
proposals to the Supreme Council for action. 
(7) To approve its own bye-law, as well as the bye-law of the Secretariat. 
(8) To appoint, upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Assis-
tant Secretaries-General for a renewable three-year term. 
( 9) To approve periodic reports and regulations relating to financial, monetary, 
and administrative affairs proposed by the Secretary-General and to submit 
the budget of the Secretariat to the Supreme Council for action. 
(10) To arrange for the Supreme Council's meeting's and to prepare thier agendas. 
(11) To review matters referred by the Supreme Council. 
The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General and sufficient staff to 
carry out the functions of the Council. The staff, who are appointed by the 
Secretary-General, must be citizens of the member states (Article 14). 
As the chief administrator of the GCC, the Secretary-General performs 
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several functions, including the preparation of studies, reports, recommendations, 
budgets, administrative procedures, and any other tasks entrusted to him either 
by the Supreme Council or the Ministerial Council (Article 15). To date, the 
GCC has had only one Secretary-General, a citizen of Kuwait, who is presently 
serving a second three-year term {1990). As members of the Secretariat, the 
Secretary-General and his staff function as regional bureaucrats with the primary 
responsibility of furthering the interests of the Gulf Cooperation Council. They 
are not representatives of their individual countries. In the performance of their 
duties, they are not to be subject to influence or pressure from any member state. 
They are also pledged not to reveal any secrets that might damage the GCC, 
either during or after their tenure in office (Article 16). 
The GCC, its bodies, official representatives and employees, including 
the Secretary-General and members of the Secretariat, are given the diplomatic 
privileges and immunities accorded to similar organizations under international 
law. The GCC has already drafted appropriate agreements between itself and the 
country where its headquarters are located (Article 17). 
In addition to the Charter, the heads of the six Gulf states have approved 
bye-laws for the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council, and the Commission 
for Settlement of Disputes. The bye-law of the Supreme Council, consisting of 19 
articles, focuses on the nature of the Council, the conduct of the meetings, the 
agenda of meetings and voting. The bye-law further defines the responsibilities 
assigned to the Supreme Council under the Charter. The bye-laws of the Ministe-
rial Council consists of 39 articles. Again, they focus on the internal procedures of 
meetings (agendas, voting, debate and resolutions), the appointment of technical 
committees and cooperation with the Secretary-General. The Ministerial Council 
lays the groundwork for the Supreme Council. The bye-laws of the Commission 
for Settlement of Disputes consist of 13 articles and focus on the structure, re-
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sponsibilities, meetings and deliberations of the Commission. For example, the 
Commission is to be headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The jurisdiction 
of the Commission falls into two areas: disputes among member states and dis-
putes pertaining to interpreting or implementing any articles of the GCC Charter 
(Article 3). Being ad hoc in nature, the Commission ceases to exist whenever it 
submits its recommendation on a specific dispute to the Supreme Council (Article 
4 ). 
1.4 Purpose and Methodology of Study 
1.4.1 Purpose of Study 
The study has the following purposes :-
1. To describe briefly the reasons for the existence of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and summarise its structure and objectives. 
2. To identify and throw light on the economic sectors in the region; agricul-
ture, industry, services, external trade and migration and, specifically, their 
development over the last ten years. 
3. To analyse the strategies and procedures of econmic sectors and the role of 
government in their development. 
4. To throw light on the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council in economic 
development and evaluate the cooperation among the Gulf states in each 
field. 
1.4.2 Methodology of Study 
The method followed in order to answer the thesis questions was: 
(a) To classify and abstract the data obtained from published and unpublished 
statistics and up-to-date surveys and fieldwork. 
(b) To compare, contrast and analyze the above for various years and by so doing, 
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put into their proper perspective and, where possible, answer the research 
questions asked. 
This is a descriptive analytic study. The data collected was based on the 
following: 
1. Most of the general data came from various government department publi-
cations as the statistical abstracts, and general reports on the Gulf states 
economy. 
2. Books, reports,and studies; most books that have been written concerning 
the development of economic sectors in the Gulf states during the last fifteen 
years. 
3. The researcher carried out a number of fieldwork trips to the Gulf states to 
find some answers to questions required by this study. The greatest value of 
these visits was the opportunity to visit many individual ministries in each 
state in order to collect all the statistics and information relating and useful 
to my study, times during which the greatest allocation of time was given to 
interviews with as broad a cross section of the government authorities, the 
banking community and businessmen as possible. A random sample of these 
groups was not possible since the universe occupied by them is difficult to 
define, but every effort was made to question all those senior officials of the 
government involved in any way with policies towards the economy, leaders 
of the banking groups and a selection of citizens engaged in private sector 
activities. These interviews focused on their views regarding the reason for 
the establisment of the GCC, the achievements of the Council, and the degree 
of cooperation or integration within the GCC Countries in the economies 
sectors. 
The production of this thesis had four principal stages:-
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1. A review of the literature concerning international economic integration 
which allowed the identification of the key issues that would be relevant to the 
GCC. 
2. The collection of indicators of change in the GCC states from both official 
sources and a range of other bodies. 
3. A programme of interviews with leading government officials in the GCC 
states and the GCC secretariat. 
4. The evaluation of the information obtained in light of the theoritical and 
political expectations of the GCC. 
Problems of the Study 
The researcher and interviewee were both familiar with the subject and 
the data. However, one main problem was the lack of recent information. In 
addition most of the reports and data collections carried out on the Gulf states 
, were conducted for particular ministries or departments . As a result, most of 
these reports are unpublished and there is little indication of their existence. For 
example, reliable population statistics about the national and expatriate in the 
Gulf Arab states are difficult to come by. Despite sensitivity surrounding rela-
tive shares of national and non-national in the population because of the implied 
political exposure and economic dependence, considerable detailed demographic 
examination does exist in the Gulf states. Some Gulf countries, notably Kuwait, 
have amongst the best census-taking records outside the OECD. Census informa-
tion is published and demographers have conducted extensive research on the basis 
of this data series. The UAE's performance at enumeration has also been good, 
culminating in the enumeration of December 1985. Elsewhere, census-taking has 
been of a lower priority. Saudi Arabia's census of 1974 has never been fully pub-
lished, but is updated by sample household surveys for the use of planners. Qatar 
held a full enumeration in December 1985, but results have not been analysed yet. 
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Bahrain's population has not been fully enumeration since 1981. The Sultanate 
of Oman has not held a census, but maintains a rolling soda-demographic survey 
for utilisation by planners. These various sources have been drawn upon by the 
United Nation Economic and Social Commission for West Asia ( ESCWA ), to 
produce a rationalised picture of the recent ( 1984, 1985, 1986 ) demography of 
the Gulf. The tracking down of such reports, therefore, involved the researcher in 
considerable additional work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Physical and Human Resources 
2.1 Geographical Features 
The six Arab Gulf States included in this study cover an important geo-
graphic and strategic area. The area extends to the Arabian Gulf in the East, the 
Shatt Al-Arab in the North, the Red Sea in the West and the Arabian Sea and 
Indian Ocean in the South. The Gulf States in this study are geographically con-
tiguous. The Gulf region is very rich in oil resoures and its geographical location 
makes it an international artery for petroleum. Oil has played the predominant 
role in shaping the Gulf States political and social features. 
These six states, if considered individually, have only a small area, but 
taken together, the six states cover a reasonably sized territory which can support 
a significant economic structure. The six Gulf States together cover an area of 
2,976 thousand square kilometres, which represents 18.3 per cent of the total 
Arab area (13,624 thousand square kilometres). The density of population in 
the Gulf States taken together is five persons per square kilometre, and the total 
population of the six states is about 15.79 million in 1986. Saudi Arabia has 
the largest population and area (fig 2.1) and Kuwait follows in population size, 
but Oman is the second largest in area, although it comes third when ranked by 
population size. 
In Bahrain, the density of population is high because of its large popula-
tion size and small area, and it has the highest density of population per square 
kilometre among the Gulf States. Its density is one of the highest in the Arab 
World, and contrasts with a population density of about four persons per square 
kilometre in Saudi Arabia and Oman, and about ten persons per square kilometre 
in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Only Kuwait approaches Bahrain in the 
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Figure 2.1 Relative Size of the Arab Gulf States by Area 
density of its population at about 80 persons per square kilometre. 
These Gulf States together form a coastal region of the Arabian Peninsula. 
This coastal region has been described by Professor W.B. Fisher (Arika.t,H.1987) 
as follows: 
The coastal region is everywhere below 200 in altitude and consists for the 
greater part of an undulating plain, diversified very occasionally by low hills, often 
anticlinal. Much of the surface is sand or gravel covered, and some drifting sand can 
be traced by its lithology to the regions of origin within various areas of inner Arabia. 
From this interior reservoir sand is carried by the frequent strong winds towards the 
east, where it may accumulate in mobile dunes, or as a sheet. Even hillsides may 
be thinly covered by .sand blown from elsewhere. In other areas lie flatter zones of 
gravel, diversified by shallow Wadi beds. These Wadis, like the plains, may have 
local deposits of silt or alluviums. The coastline being one of oscillation (with the 
current phase one of gentle and irregular subsidence), is fairly shallow, and fringed 
by extensive coral reefs. Lagoons and spits are also frequent features, with intricate 
creeks and salt flats. In some of the localities it is difficult to distinquish sea from 
land, with a high tidal amplitude through tortuous channels and winding creeks 
further adding to the difficulty. Sebkhas (saltmarsh), some fed by sea, other by the 
evaporational water that seeps to the surface from underground sources, are another 
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prominent feature. The sebkhas are effective factors in isolating one stretch of coast 
from another." 
This coastal region had one main source of income before the discovery of 
oil resources. Most of these Gulf States used to depend upon pearl fishing, but 
especially Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The pearl 
industry was pivotal to their economy at that time and the sea was the main 
source of income. 
It is appropriate to consider these six states individually from a geographical 
point of view. Bahrain consists of a group of islands in the Arabian Gulf midway 
between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Kuwait is located in the north-eastern corner 
of the Arabian peninsula, bounded on the north and west by Iraq, on the south 
by Saudi Arabia and on the east by the Arabian Gulf. Oman is in the south-
eastern part of the Arabian peninsula and is bounded by the Arabian Sea to the 
south, with a coastline stretching almost 1,000 miles and to the south-west, Oman 
borders Yemen. The United Arab Emirates consists of seven States, formerly 
known as the Trucial States before they united in 1971, located in the eastern 
Arabian peninsula, bounded on the north by the Arabian Gulf. The Emirates 
are composed of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al- Qaiwain, Ras al-
Khaimah and Fujairah. Abu Dhabi is the largest of these Emirates, representing 
about 87 percent of the total area of the United Arab Emirates, followed by Dubai 
which represents only five percent of the total area. Saudi Arabia occupies about 
four-fifths of the Arabian peninsula. It is bounded on the north by Jordan, Iraq 
and Kuwait, on the south by Yemen, on the west by Red Sea and the Gulf of 
Aqaba and on the east by Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and the 
Arabian Gulf. 
2.2 Population Size and Growth Rate 
The six Gulf States had an estimated total population about 15.79 million 
in 1986 spread over an area comprising some 2,487 thousand square kilometres. 
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It ranks very highly in population density per Km compared internationally with 
developed countries in Europe (Belgium 322, Netherlands 412). At the opposite 
extreme there are other countries, such as United Arab Emirates and Oman, which 
are very sparsely populated. 
The history of population growth for the countries may be divided into two 
periods: the period prior to oil and the period after the discovery of oil. In the first 
period, the pre-oil period, there are no accurate figures on growth rates available 
except that a figure for 1941-1950 showed the annual growth rate for that period 
was 2.5 percent. For these six Gulf States data is available for growth rates of 
their population since the discovery of oil. The six Gulf States are characterised 
by a high rate of population growth. The annual population growth rates in 
these states are due to the tremendous migratory movement from other Arab 
countries and Asian countries, attracting large groups of expatriates to work for 
relatively high pay. In addition to this, an important factor in the high rate of 
population growth is a decline in the death rate among the newly born due to 
the developments in the health sector. The high fertility and declining mortality 
rates were responsible for the extremely high growth rate of the region's national 
population, averaging around 3.5 percent for the period 1975-1985. 
2.3 Population by Age, Structure and Sex 
The social aspects of a nation's population include its structure or age and 
sex characteristics, as well as it composition. Population distribution by age 
has important implications for education, health and other social services, as 
well as for the labour force. The distribution by age group clearly discloses the 
extreme youth of the population in most of the Gulf States. In Saudi Arabia about 
45.1 percent are aged between 0-14 years, the percentage for Kuwait, Oman and 
Bahrain is 41.9 percent, 41.7 percent and 39.5 percent respectively. To take an 
example of a population in a developed country, Sweden, the proportion of the 
age group 0-14 years is as low as 20 percent. Only Qatar and the UAE compare 
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with this at about 28.6 and 28.1 percent respectively.( Arikat.H.1987 ). 
The population of active age (comprising the age group 15-59) is quite size-
able too. For all Gulf countries, more than 50 percent of the population belong 
to the active age group- in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and 
the UAE the percentage is 50.2, 55.6, 54.7, 57.4, 68.8 and 69.3 respectively, and 
in Qatar and the UAE almost two-thirds of the population are in the active age 
group. However, levels of economic activity amongst this age group are relatively 
low. This is due to the fact that women in these states do not work on a large 
scale except in a limited number of professions: teaching, nursing, and in certain 
women's organizations. There is also the effect of recent expansion of secondary 
and university education in the Gulf region, which has been to hold within the 
education system boys who would otherwise have entered the work force at the 
age of eighteen. 
Naturally, population in the age group 60 or more is a tiny proportion of the 
total, and nowhere exceeds 4.7 percent (Saudi Arabia), with the lowest proportion 
of 2.5 percent in Kuwait, followed by Qatar and the UAE which have figures of 
2.6 percent. 
There is a higher percentage of males than females in the Gulf, with around 
60 percent of the region's total population being males. Most of the expatriates, 
especially the larger number of unskilled labour, are single men whose families do 
not accompany themn during their stay in the region. The ratio of males in the 
total population differs from one country to another. It is as high as 68 percent 
in the UAE, 65 percent in Qatar, 60 percent in Saudi Arabia, while it is lower 
in Kuwait and Oman, at around 57 percent. Nationals exhibit a more balanced 
population structure with the percentage of males close to a world wide average 
of 50 percent. 
2.4 Proportion of Economically Active Population by Economic Sector 
This section deals with the distribution of the economically active population 
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according to major economic sectors (for more detailed discussion see chapter 3-5 
below). For 1980, the figures in these sectors show that most of the employed 
population of the Gulf States (over 50 percent) was engaged in services. The 
highest proportion engaged in services is in Kuwait, 73 percent, and in Qatar, 
68 percent, while in the rest of the Gulf States, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the 
U.A.E. it is 55 percent, 55 percent and 50 percent respectively (table 2.1). Oman 
has the lowest share of economically active population in the services sector. 
The agricultural sector seems to be small in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar and the U.A.E. with 24, 2, 3, 3 and 2 percent of the population respectively, 
largly due to limited agricultural potential in the Gulf region. However, Oman 
has over 50 percent of its workers in this sector. 
The industrial sector takes second position in most of the Gulf States, with 
the higher proportion belonging to the U.A.E. (about 48 percent) followed by 
Bahrain with about 39 percent. In the other four Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar, the economically active population in the industrial 
sector does not exceed 30 percent. 
The total size of the labour force in the six GCC states was estimated at 
around 5.5 million in 1986, 62 percent of which were believed to be expatriates 
(Table 2.1). 
Nationals predominate in the traditional sectors of the economy, namely agri-
culture and fishing, especially in Saudi Arabia and Oman where close to 24 percent 
and 18 percent respectively of the national workforce are found. The proportion 
of nationals engaged in the community and personal services sector has also been 
high ranging from around 75 percent of the total national workforce in Kuwait and 
UAE, to 62 percent in Qatar, 44 percent in Bahrain and 32 percent in Saudi Ara-
bia. This sector is especially important as it indudes public sector jobs where em-
ployment for nationals are almost guaranteed and personal business where many 
nationals are self employed (e.g. drivers, guards, as well as private business). 
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Table 2.1 Distribution of Economically Active Population by Sector 
(The Year 1986; Values in Percentage) 
Country Sau<li Arabia Kuwait U.A.E Oman Bahrain Qatar 
Sector Na. Non. T. Na. Non. T. Na. Non. T. Na. Non. T. Na. Non. T. Na. 
~x~ % % % 'Yr, % % % % % % % % % % % 
Agriculture 
& Fishing 23.5 4.3 14.3 ~.1 1.9 1.9 5.9 4.9 5.0 18.3 3.0 23.3 3.4 0.9 2.0 0.1 
Industry 
Mining 2.4 0.7 1.6 2.0 0.8 1.1 1.7 2.1 2.0 - - 2.1 6.1 1.4 3.5 4.9 
Manufacturing G.5 11.9 10.0 3.8 8.4 7.5 1.1 6.9 6.4 - - 1.1 6.5 8.9 7.8 2.4 
Utilities -1.6 2.1 3.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 2.7 1.8 1.9 - - 0.1 3.2 1.3 2.1 19.8 
Construction 
Services 9.5 28.5 18.6 1.1 22.5 18.3 1.6 27.0 24.8 - - 27.5 5.0 33.7 21.0 1. 0 
Trade 14.0"' 16.9* 12.3 4.9 12.8 11.3 7.0 14.3 13.6 - - 26.4 9.8 16.4 13.5 8.1 
Communication 7.9 5.8 6.9 6.0 5.4 5.5 3.9 7.7 7.4 - - 1.3 16.1 4.1 9.4 0.5 
Finance & 
Bus. Commu. - - 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.1 2.0 3.2 3.1 - - 1.7 6.3 2.5 4.2 0.9 
Personal 31.6 27.8 29.8 75.6 44.0 50.1 74.0 32.1 35.7 - - 16.5 43.6 30.8 36.5 62 .3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 - - - 100 100 100 100 
Labour Force @ 1575 1457 3032 137 574 712 78 812 891 167 300 467 - - - 20 
Note: Na= National; Non.=Non-National; T=Total; * Include Finance and Business; and @ Values in 
000 
Source: Compiled from United Nation ESCWA.Demograph. ic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets, 
1987. 
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The concentration of expatriates is most evident in the manufacturing, con-
struction and trade sectors. The majority of workers in manufacturing are non-
nationals, the percentage is lower in Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia ( 64 percent and 
73 percent respectively), but higher in Kuwait (90 percent), UAE (91 percent) 
and Qatar (98 percent). The dependence on expatriates is even more pronounced 
in the construction sector, where it is estimated that in 1986 more than 85 per-
cent of all construction workers in the Gulf were expatriates. Non-nationals also 
constitute a majority in the trade sectors of the various Gulf states, reaching as 
high as 96 percent in the UAE and Qatar, 92 percent in Kuwait and 55 percent 
in Bahrain (table 2.1). 
Nationals in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have a more balanced distribution 
by economic sector than in the other Gulf States. The dominance of expatriates 
is apparent only in construction and to a lesser degree in manufacturing and 
trade. Nationals of the two countries constitute a majority in the mining sector 
77 percent and 79 percent respectively, in the utilities sectors 68 percent and 
70 percent respectively, in community and personal sectors 54 percent and 55 
percent respectively, and 67 percent and 60 percent respectively in transport and 
communication sectors. 
Considering the economically active population by occupation, the Gulf coun-
tries' national labour force has been concentrated in three main occupational cat-
egories: "clerical workers", "service workers" and "production workers". The low-
est percentage of nationals is found in such occupational categories as "managerial 
workers", "professional and technical workers" and, with the exception of Saudi 
Arabia and Oman, in "agricultural workers" (GIB, 1988). The high percentage 
of clerical workers, which ranged from 27 percent of total national workforce in 
Kuwait to 23 percent in the UAE, 22 percent in Bahrain, 22 percent in Qatar 
and 9 percent in Saudi Arabia reflects the expansion of government sectors giv-
ing priority to the recruitment of nationals. There has been a noticeable rise in 
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the percentage of nationals working in professional occupations over the period 
1975-1985. The percentage has also been higher for nationals working in manage-
rial, services and sales occupations, reflecting a maturing occupational structure 
of Gulf labour force. 
2.5 Literate Population and Literacy Rate 
Literacy is a good indicator of the degree of development in a country. In the 
Arabian Gulf States, the literacy rate is very low compared with the industrialised 
countries in which the literacy rate exceeds 97 percent. The highest literacy rate 
in the Gulf States to be in Kuwait at 68 percent, next comes U.A.E. with 66 
percent, Qatar with 59 percent, Bahrain 50 percent, while in Saudi Arabia it is 
only 34 percent and Oman only 38 percent. 
The high rates of literacy in some of the Gulf States like Kuwait and the 
U.A.E. are because these States have experienced modern education. However, the 
development of human resources in the Arab Gulf region is no longer constrained 
financially. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States have devoted themselves 
heavily to the development of their human resources in order to improve their 
literacy rates. 
Literacy rates for nationals have been on the rise in the various Gulf countries. 
In 1986, over 75 percent of national men is were literate compared to around 55 
percent for women. Female illiteracy rates have decreased considerably with the 
advance of education for girls in the various Gulf states. However, the relatively 
high female illiteracy rates are inflated by the lack of education in the older age 
groups. 
2.6 Geographical Distribution Of Population 
2.6.1 Kuwait 
Judging by available indication, Kuwait has a relatively high total popula-
tion concentration. In a previous study of the degree and extent of population 
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distribution in Kuwait, the density of population based on 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 
census results was analysed (Al-Sabah, 1988). The pattern of densities was traced 
through a series of maps which show the distribution and population of the coun-
try in each year. It was shown that the density has increased from 44 persons per 
square kilometre in 1970 to about 59 in 1975, 80 in 1980 and to 100 persons in 
1985. 
Administratively, Kuwait is divided into four governments, the capital, Hawalli, 
Ahmad and Jahra. These governments as subdivided into a number of localities 
ranging from 5 in J ahra to 25 in Hawaii. The total number of localities according 
to the 1985 census in 58. 
In 1985, the density of population in the capital and Hawalli governorates 
was 1,707 and 2,638 per square kilometre, respectively, while that in the Ahmadi 
governorate was 50 and in the Jahra governorate only 25. The localities vary in 
population size and the density in some was as high as 15,000 to 20,000 persons 
per square kilometre (figure 2.2). Some of the low-density localities in 1980 have 
been shifted by larger ones in 1985. A major reason was the removal of Al-Ashish 
dwelling area (two main localities, namely Al-shedadiah and Sahiad al-awazim) 
and redistribution of their inhabitants into new planned areas in the Hawalli and 
Jahra governorates. These two localities contain temporary dwellings and it is 
possible that some of them were formerly inhabited by Bedouins who moved into 
government housing. However, since social and economic development had to 
take place in certain spatial nodes, and required settled population, nomadism 
was considered as a negative component in the ecological structure, and therefore 
had to be abolished. In this connection several actions were taken by the author-
ities, all of which had a direct impact on the urban patterns and urban structure. 
The majority of non-Kuwaitis live in the immediate vicinity of Kuwait City: in 
the Jahra governorate, where 31.4 percent of all Kuwaiti nationals lived in 1985, 
they are in the majority, comprising 76.4 percent of the governorates population. 
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Hawalli is the main dormitory town for foreign workers: it is home for 67.5 per-
cent of all non-Kuwaitis in the country, and they comprise 72.6 percent of the 
governorate's population. The population is relatively young - 58.3 percent are 
under 25 years old and highly urbanised, with 91 percent of the population living 
in urban areas in 1982. 
2.6.2 Oman 
The resident national population was estimated at 816,000 in 1986 (Unes-
cuar), mainly concentrated on the Batinah, in the Hajar valleys, round the capital 
and in the Southern part of Dhofar. In addition, the 1986 immigrant population 
was estimated at around 494,000, bringing the total population to around 1.31 
mn in that year. Mid-1988 estimates put the total population at 1.33 mn with 
64 percent accounted for by nationals. The Muscat-Matrah-Seeb area has grown 
rapidly and is now inhabited by over 350,000 persons. Other towns of importance 
are Salalah in Dhofar-Sur in the extreme east, Sohar in the Batinah, north of 
Muscat, and Nizwa in the interior. In the Muscat-Mat1ah area there are substan-
tial minorities of Indians, Pakistanis and Baluchis, providing skilled workers and 
professionals, and some Europeans. In all, non-nationals in 1987 made up the 
majority of the population in the capital area. Indian and Pakistani immigrants 
have penetrated into even the smallest mountain villages. 
2.6.3 Bahrain 
About 66 percent of the population are Bahraini, the rest are expatriates 
mainly from the Indian sub-continent, Iran, Oman and the Far East. The popu-
lation was estimated at 457,000 in 1989, and average population growth has been 
3.3 percent per year since 1979. 34 percent of the total population is under the 
age of 15. 
Bahrain consists of 33 islands in all, but over half the population lives in the 
capital, Manama, on the main island, and in Muharraq, the second island, which 
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is linked to Manama by a causeway. Plans to build a second causeway linking 
Manama and Muharraq are being implemented. 
2.6.4 Qatar 
The population of Qatar grew from some 70,000 in the late 1960s to 260,000 in 
1980, and is currently about 300,000. The indigenous Qatari population numbers 
around 84,000, equivalent to 28 percent of the total population. The majority 
of immigrants, who have moved to Qatar over the past decade, are from the 
Indian subcontinent, the Arab world and increasingly, the Far East and South 
East Asia. In the early 1980s over 50 percent of the immigrant population was 
Pakistani, but the proportion may have changed since 1983, when an estimated 
60,000 expatriates left the country in a single year. It is estimated that almost 50 
percent of the population is under 15 years of age. 
2.6.5 United Arab Emirates 
Two outstanding aspects of the UAE's population are the preponderance of 
foreigners and the preponderance of males. The total population increased by 86 
percent between 1975 and 1980, as a result of the massive influx of immigrant 
workers after the 1973-74 oil boom. Many expatriates left when the recession 
set in during 1982-83 but the census in 1985 found a population of 1.62 mn. 
(Compared with 1.04 mn in 1980), some 68 percent of which was male according 
to UN statistics published in 1987. 
The total area of the federation is officially about 83,600 Km2, or 77,700 
Km2 excluding islands. Abu Dhabi, the westernmost emirate, is by far the largest 
with a coastline of 480 Km stretching from the base of the Qatar peninsula in 
the west to Dubai in the east. This emirate includes a number of islands, of 
which the most important economically are Abu Dhabi island itself, Das, Sadiyat, 
Umm al-Nar and Zirku. Abu Dhabi is tribally the most complex of the emirates, 
dominated by the Bani Yas tribe of which the Al-Bu Falah is the most important 
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section, including the ruling Al-Nahayan family. Dubai, essentially a city state, 
was founded in 1833 by a breakaway group, the Al-Bu Falastiah, to which the 
ruling al-Maktum family belongs. Dubai occupies about 70 Km of coast, extends 
inland for approximately the same distance and is likewise mainly desert. Sharjah, 
the third largest emirate, is made up of areas on both sides of the Ras Musandam 
peninsula and in the interior. About three quarters of this emirate's population 
live in Sharjah city, only 14 Km north of Dubai. Ras al-Khaimah, the next in size 
with a coastline of 65 Km, is the most northerly emirate of the U AE on the west 
side of the Musandam peninsula. Next comes Fujairah, which consists of coastal 
and other areas on the east side of the Musandam peninsula and is the only state 
with no territory on the west side. U mm al-Qaiwain consists mainly of a town 
of that name, situated on a small coastal strip about 30 Km long and extending 
inland about 50 Km. Ajman, the smallest emirate, consists of Ajman town on the 
coast and some territory in the interior which possesses water. 
2.6.6 Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia covers about four fifths of the Arabian peninsula and has an 
estimated area of 2.15 mn Km2. The country is divided into four regions: Hejaz 
(north west), Asir (south west), Nejd (central plateau) and Al-Hasa (known in En-
glish as the Eastern Province). The main cities of Saudi Arabia (with 1974 census 
populations in brackets) are Riyadh, the administrative capital (666,840), Jed-
dah, the main business centre (561,104), Makkah, the religious capital (366,801), 
Taif (204,857), Madinah (198,186), Dammam (127,844), Hofuf (101,271), Tabuk 
(74,825), Buraida (69,940), Al-Mubarraz {54,375), Khamis Muzhayt(49,581), Al-
Khobar ( 48,817), Najram (47,501), Hail (40,502), Jizan {32,812) and Abha {30,150). 
Urban growth rates maintained a phenomenal pace throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, between 1970 and 1975 the urban population of the region grew at an av-
erage of 5.2 percent per annum, while in the last decade smaller Saudi towns like 
Taif, Madinah and Hoful have more than doubled in size. Satellite towns have 
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sprung up around the main urban centres, and the Saudi authorities have had to 
tackle the social implications and administrative difficulties of such an urbanisa-
tion boom. Even so, Saudi academic estimates maintain that 50 percent of the 
population remains outside urban centres, 20 percent still living as nomads. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Agricultural Development in GCC Countries 
3.1 Introduction 
The GCC Countries have mounted an aggressive campaign to improve 
their agricultural sector, which so far has played a limited role in the region's 
economy. The contribution of this sector to gross domestic product is still very 
low, ranging from 4 per cent in Oman to 2.5 percent in Saudi Arabia and to less 
than 0.04 percent in Qatar. The reason for such a marginal role include deficiency 
in the soil, scarcity of irrigation water, climatic conditions of the desert (including 
low annual rainfall) and the limited supply of manpower trained in agriculture. 
Despite these limitations, efforts are now being intensified to improve agricultural 
performance and cultivate a new image for the agricultural sectors. 
Agricultural self-sufficiency is continuously being called for at all levels in 
the various GCC countries. A recent study by the Federation of Gulf Chambers of 
Commerce, Industry and Agriculture {1987) warns of a serious shortage of food in 
the Gulf region if no immediate measures are taken to achieve self-sufficiency. The 
study recommends reclamation of additional land, encouragement and incentives 
to the private sector, increased use of advanced scientific methods to deal with 
the region's harsh climate, and establishment of local fertilizer and insecticide 
industries. The study expects that by the end of the century, the countries of the 
region would have achieved, as a group, self-su:fficiencey in wheat, maize, poultry 
and other various agricultural and dairy products. 
3.2 QATAR 
Qater is a peninsula covering some 11,437 square kilometres. The land 
is flat and arid, with salt flats and sand dunes in the south but some natural veg-
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etation in the north. Although there is no surface water, wells and the existence 
of silt and sand depressions have permitted a remarkable level of agricultural de-
velopments. Studies show that the amount of arable land may total as much as 
28,000 ha, of which about 7,000 ha are already cultivated. All agricultural land 
is owned by the government which is keen to encourage agricultural production. 
Although the number of small farms increased from 338 in 1975 to about 500 
in 1985, most farmers are absentee land lords and Qatari agriculture is mainly 
sustained by the work of immigrants. According to a study by the Arab Organi-
sation for Agricultrual Development {1986), Qataris are unwilling to invest much 
in agriculture, despite government incentives. 
Developing the agriculture in Qatar is now one of the principal priori-
ties of the government. Modern methods and techniques are being used and new 
agricultural technologies have been introduced with a view to rationalizing use 
of water resources. These intensive efforts rely on using modern agricultural ma-
chinery and equipment and fertilizers. Agricultural plans have also necessitated 
expanding the country's cultivable land areas and depending upon glasshouse cul-
tivation, where possible. 
3.2.1 Crop Production: 
Table 3.1 summaries recent trends in the production of the major crops. 
The general expansion means that Qatar is now 70 percent self-sufficient in sum-
mer vegetables and more than 40 percent in winter vegetables. Cereal production 
is increasing but is still minimal, as cereals form 50 per cent of the Qatari diet. 
Reliance on food imports is high. These rose from QR 614 mn in 1982 to a record 
of QR 792 mn in 1984, before falling to QR 706 mn in 1987 due partly to a 
reduction in the expatriate work force. 
3.2.2 Meat, Fish and Related Production 
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Table 3.1: Production, Area and Yield of Different Crops,(Tons) 
Crops 1982 1984 1986 1987 
Cereals: 1368 1027 1977 3020 
Vegt. & other crops 17879 16539 19195 19370 
Fruit a.nd dates 9534 8648 7692 8021 
Forage 42003 47568 55628 69991 
Sources: (1) Annual Statistical Abstract 1985, 1986, 1987. (2) Ministry of 
Industry a.nd Agriculture. 
The output of red meat has increased in the past decade, though a.t rate 
from 923 tons in 1982 to 1,500 tons in 1987. 
There has also been a. considerable increase in the number of livestock, 
particularly sheeps, goats a.nd camels. In Qa.ta.r the sheep is the dominant a.nima.l 
a.nd the number of cows is falling. 
Egg production averages lmn a. year, enough to meet 80 per cent of local 
demand, while the production of chickens totals 10 mn per year. There a.re plans 
to treble output of both. Dairy production has risen impressively, from only 6,208 
tons in 1982 to 18,727 tons in 1987. 
The Qa.ta.r National Fishing Company was formed in 1966 a.nd nation-
alized in 1980. In 1985 it opened a. processing plant, which can handle 7 tons of 
shrimps a. year. There are plans to build two new harbours to compensate for the 
fa.ll in catches that have a.ccured due to pollution in the Gulf. Catches fell from 
2,690 tons in 1979 to 2,115 tons in 1983, (which was enough to supply about 80 
per cent of local demand) a.nd have since grown to 2,678 in 1987. 
Within the framework of its agricultural development plans, the state 
ha.s carried out two key projects, which ca.n be summarised as follows:-
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(1) Qatar Poultry Corporation (QPC):-
In addition to the supply of chicken and eggs, QPC produces chicken 
feed and egg packages. Steps have been taken by the Ministry of Industry and 
Agriculture to boost the output of this project to 2.5 million chickens and 25 
million eggs every year. 
(2) Abu Samra Sheep Project:-
This project supplies the local market with approximately 5,000 head of 
sheep. It now has a total of 12,000 head and there are plans for increasing the 
capacity of this farm. The area of the farm will be enlarged for growing fodder 
and artesian wells will be drilled. A veterinary centre and laboratory have been 
established to undertake the inoculation of livestock. 
3.3 KUWAIT 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The growth of agriculture and fishing has been impressive in recent years, 
with the total value of production doubling between 1983 and 1988, but its con-
tribution to non-oil GDP remains insignificant at 1. 7 percent in 1988. In 1988 
the sector employed 1.3 percent of the labour force, compared with 0.6 percent in 
1983. Only 0.4 percent of Kuwait's land areas was cultivated in 1985/86, about 
4,500 ha being used for vegetables and 2,200 ha for fruit trees and timber. Hold-
ings numbered 1,886 in 1985/86. Yields are held down by the shortage of good 
quality irrigation water and the poor desert soils. 
3.3.2 Production, Area and Yield of Different Crops 
The traditional winter crops until the mid-1980s were tomatoes, cucum-
bers and alfalfa. Since 1984, however, there has been a spectacular increase in 
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greenhouse crop production, which by 1985/86 accounted for 270 ha of land with 
total crop production of some 32,300 tons as compared with the winter vegetable 
crop of 7 4,500 tons. Tomatoes and cucumbers are the major locally produced 
agricultural crop, accounting for 49 percent of total output in 1987/88. 
Table 3.2: Agricultural Production {000 Tons) 
Crops 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Tomatoes 14 30 37 38 39 
Vegetables and Melons 36 77 113 117 119 
Fruit 2 1 1 1 2 
Dates 2 2 1 1 1 
Source:- EIU - Country Profile 1989-90. 
3.3.3 Meat and Fish Production 
As one of the few industries native to the country, together with pearling, 
fishing still meets about 60 percent of total demand, with the annual catch esti-
mated at about 4,000 tons in 1986. It is the subject of research at the Kuwait 
Institute for Scientific Research, which is investigating the viability of fish farm-
ing. Fish farms are mainly concentrated on the islands of Bubujan and Failaka. 
There has been rapid growth in the shrimping industry as the United Fisheries 
Company has been exploiting this field with modern ships. The total shrimp catch 
increased from 278 tons in 1981 to 484 tons in 1983, although catches have since 
declined as a result of increasing levels of oil-related pollution in coastal waters. 
3.3.4 Livestock 
In 1988 livestock numbers were estimated at 26,000 cattle, 300,000 sheep, 
20,000 goats and 28 mn poultry. There are also around 8,000 camels, as well as 
other stock, which are kept by nomadic tribes and are not included in the official 
statistics. The most rapid growth in recent years has been in the numbers of 
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cattle (mainly dairy) and poultry. Wool production has been encouraged and 
increased to a peak of 473,000 tons in 1988, although it was halved the following 
year. Output of fresh cows milk was estimated at 4,000 tons in 1988, while egg 
production reached 17,500 tons. 
The government remains keen to encourage agricultural development and 
provides free pesticides and veterinary services, as well as subsidising seed, machi-
nary and fertilizers. 
3.4 BAHRAIN 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Cultivated land in the state of Bahrain covers less than five percent of 
the country's total area of 660 square kilometers. This, according to a statement 
by Bahrain's Ministry of Trade and Agriculture, means the total area actually 
utilized for agriculture does not exceeded 50 percent of all cultivable land. 
In 1983, the country's total water consumption amounted to 165 million 
cubic meters, of which only one third was used in agriculture. Bahrain is used 30 
percent more water than they need, according to recent estimates. 
In light of the broad outlines of recent study (Agriculture Ministry,1989), 
meanwhile, the government is planning to increase the cultivated area through 
a rationlized system of water use and the introduction of modern techniques, 
including night watering to overcome problems of evaporation. 
The area of agriculture in 1985/86 increased to 7,799,88 donums com-
pared to 5,227,79 donums in 1982/83; the increase has been particularly due to 
an expansion in planting of tomatoes and potatoes. 
3.4.2 Production, Area and Yield of Different Crops 
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There was increased in production, particularly in omon production, 
which increased to 810 tons, compared to 1982/83 when the production was 552 
tons. In all some 40 types of vegetable are grown on the island. 
Table 3.3: Agricultural Production {000 tons) 
Crops: 1982/83 1985/86 
Tomatoes 3089 4413 
Cabbage 402 650 
Cauliflower 149 225 
Lettuce 524 573 
Carrots 291 233 
Onion 552 810 
Beetroot 22 56 
Thrnips 79 105 
Potatoes 26 74 
Snake Cuccumber 484 621 
Cantaloups 26 55 
Okra 49 108 
Marrow 527 778 
Pumpkin 46 152 
Others 480 780 
Source : Annual Statistical Abstract 1984,1985, 1986. 
By far the most prolific is tomatoes, which is grown on 188 ha. The 
government is making efforts to improve yields and boost what is considered 
as strategic crops. Local production provides approximately 15 percent of fresh 
vegetables, 86 percent of egg and 51 percent of poultry sales. In spite of the 
promotion of the agricultural sector, Bahrain's food import bill increased in 1988 
to BD 82.1 mn from BD 74.4 mn in 1987. To meet the needs in the future, the 
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government is taking steps to improve agricultural production, e.g. usmg new 
techniques, modern equipment. 
3.4.3 Meat and Fish Productions 
Bahrain's per caput fish consumption is 25 Kg a year, one of the highest 
levels in the world. Bahrain's fishing industry declined during the 1970's largely as 
a result of pollution in the Gulf which decimated the shrimp population, and the 
Bahrain Fishing Company closed in 1979. However, the government has strongly 
encouraged its revival and outlined plans for modernising the industry, providing 
training and developing deep water fishing in its 1983/87 development programme. 
A new fishing port was opened at Muharrag in 1984 and work is progressing on 
a second one at Sitra. The annual catch has exceeded 6,000 tons in recent years. 
Incentives for shrimp fishermen have also been increased to provide work for dhow 
seaman displaced by the new road link to Saudi Arabia, and moves are under way 
to expand the export potential as well. The UN has agreed to help in setting 
up a marketing information service aimed at improving export to the other Gulf 
states and plans have been discussed with the UN for assistance in expanding fish 
farming. 
3.4.4 Eggs, Milk and Dairy Production 
Local production provides approximately 86 percent of egg and 51 percent 
of poultry sales. An abattoir was opened in mid-1984, a date processing plant has 
been built and there are plans for a national dairy pasteurisation plant. The 
government runs several experimental farms, and in 1985 provided 15 percent of 
the equity to open a new dairy plant. In spite of the promotion of the agricultural 
sector, Bahrain's food import bill increased in 1989 to BD 84.1 mn from BD 82.1 
mn in 1988. 
3.4.5 Livestock 
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As there is only one census (for 1980), I could not make comparison 
between a number of years. The number of cattle, goats and chickens are very high, 
which means those types of animals are very important for the people in Bahrain. 
The ministry is offering a 40 percent subsidy on mainly imported animal feed, 
which indicates its determination to increase production of livestock. Currently 
there are approximately 6,000 head of cattle on the island. These improvements in 
the agricultural and fishing sectors resulted in their increased contribution to the 
(GNP). Combined, the two showed an increased contribution from BD 14.9 million 
in 1980 to BD 20 million of the GNP in 1986. In the near future, agriculture and 
fishing are expected to play an even more important role in boosting the country's 
GNP, as interest in their development continues to grow. 
3.5 OMAN 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Oman enjoys warm sunny winters, with few rainy days, but endures very 
hot, dry summers which are also very humid in coastal areas. In Dhofar the 
summers are kept relatively cool by the thick monsoonal mists (Kharif) which 
enshroud the plains and the mountains facing the sea. The main agricultural 
area is the Batinah coast, accounting for about half the total cropped area of 
approximately 41,000 ha, but there are also a scattering of small agricultural 
villages in the eastern and western Hajar and parts of the interior. Almost all 
farms are average size ( 4 ha), with the exception of a growing number of recently 
established farms, and are privately owned. They rely entirely on irrigation from 
wells or ancient tunnel devices known as aftaj as rainfall is low and un-reliable. Use 
of diesel water pumps, tractors, chemical fertilizers and sprays is now widespread. 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries runs research and extension 
programmes. In 1981 the government set up the Oman Bank for Agriculture 
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and Fisheries (OBAF), with OR 10 mn capital, to make loans to farmers and 
fisherman. The bank, it was hoped, would help stem the migration of farmers and 
fisherman from the country-side and help to increase output. In practice, however, 
the small farmers have gained least from the OBAF. They may benefit more from 
the Public Authority for Marketing Agricultural Produce (PAMP) which opened 
its network of highly equipped collection and distribution centres in November 
1985. However, the government's policy of allowing food to be freely imported, 
with very minor tariff exceptions, tends to undermine the position of internal 
producers at a time when, in any case, they are having to face radical change in 
order to survive. Imports of food and live animals rose in 1981-87 from $245mn 
to $383mn. 
3.5.2 Production, Area and Yield of Different Crops 
The principal crops are dates (1985 area approximately 200,000 ha), al-
falfa (3,000-4,000 ha), times (approximately 2,000 ha) and, in the south, ba-
nanas. Small but increasing amounts of other fruit and vegetables, of wheat and 
maize, and of tobacco are also grown. The cooler moist summer conditions around 
Salalah support some coconut palms, together with papaya and bananas, but no 
data palms. Banana marketing now benefits from a ripening plant at PAMP's 
headquarters in the capital area. Marketing of other fruit and vegetables should 
also benefit from the activities of PAMP. Total production of vegetables rose to 
148,900 tones in the 1987/88 with compared to 97,000 tons in 1982/83, fruits to 
178,000 tons with compared to 121,970 tons in 1985/86. 
3.5.3 Fisheries 
Fishing is a traditional industry of great importance along the whole of 
Oman's long coastline. Since the 1950's the number of traditional fisherman has 
declined rapidly, particularly on the Batinah coast, but in recent years improved 
49 
Table 3.4: Production of Vegetables and Fruits from Production 
Farms. (000 tons) 
Crops 1982/83 1985/86 1987/88 
Vegetables 97000 17212 148900 
Fruits 46801 121970 178000 
Source: Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988. 
roads and freedom of travel in the peninsula have stimulated private enterprise 
to export increasing quantities of fish to the UAE and beyond. These fishermen, 
and fish traders, have been aided by government financed ice factories and ma-
rine workshops and by financial assistance to purchase better boats, engines and 
equipment. 
The government has also attempted to stimulate larger enterprises. In 
1980 the Oman National Fisheries Company was established, part government 
and part privately owned. The company also runs the Mattrah fishing complex. 
In 1988, the Oman Fishing Company was created with a subscribed capital of OR 
12.5mn in March 1989, divided into 2.5mn shares, of which only the government 
is allowed to hold more than 6,000. Its twin aims are commercial exploitation and 
employment provision. About 14 trawlers operate in Omani waters. Most fish, 
however, are still caught by traditional fishermen. Total estimated landings rose 
from 115,011 tons in 1987 to 166,077 tons in 1988 - the first time an increase of 
this scale has been achieved. Only about 18,000 tons of this was caught by the 
industrial fleet. 
3.5.4 Livestock 
In 1988 total livestock numbers were estimated at 712,000 goats, 219,000 
sheep, 136,000 cattle, 42,000 camels and 24,000 donkeys, in addition to about 
2mn chickens. Most of the goats are in the north, with some large herds in the 
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mountains. Most of the sheep are kept in small numbers in village houses, as are 
many of the cattle. But perhaps 70,000 head of cattle are reared by pastoralists 
in the Dhofar mountains. Chickens are found in many village houses, while a 
number of privately-owned intensive poultry units have been opened. The four 
largest of these produce 30mn eggs and up to 500,000 broilers annually. A new 
company in Nakhl started production in 1989 and is expected to produce 44mn 
eggs annually. 
3.6 SAUDI ARABIA 
3.6.1 Introduction 
Agriculture now employs about 23 percent of the Saudi work force and, 
despite gains in actual numbers during the last five years, agriculture's share of 
the employment market is falling. In 1985 there were 617,400 people employed in 
the sector. Only 850,000 ha are cultivated (about 0.04 percent of the total area), 
and there are about 80mn ha of good to fair pastoral rangeland. The limiting 
factor governing the cultivated are accessibility of ground water for irrigation. 
The climate rules out the possibility of rainfed agriculture except in the south 
west and even there dams are used to create more controlled watering conditions. 
Agriculture performed very strongly during the third plan (1980-1985), with a 
sizeable increase in private investment, growth in output by 8. 7 percent a year, 
expansion of the work force by 2.5 percent a year, despite a planned contraction 
at a similar rate, and the achievement of self-sufficiency in wheat. Much of the 
progress was achieved as a result of generous government subsidies at both input 
and output levels. An annual growth rate of 6 percent is forecast for the fourth 
plan ( 1985-1990), along with calls for a much closer coordination between agricul-
tural and water policies amid considerable concern at the heavy demands placed 
by farming on the Kingdoms non-rechargeable aquifers. 
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During 1960s and up to 1978/79 the development emphasis fell mainly 
on two areas of government activity. One of these was the first significant phase 
of public land distribution which followed the setting up of a Public Land Man-
agement Department in 1968 as part of a Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
established in 1953. Based on the countrywide survey of land and water resources 
carried out between 1964 and 1970, 48,000 ha of public land had been identified 
by the end of 1972 as suitable for development and distribution, of which 28,000 
ha had been dilivered to almost 4,800 applicants, the average allocation being less 
than 6 ha. The second type of development comprised large government projects. 
At Al-Hasa, $60 mn was spent in improving the irrigation and drainage system 
in the Kingdom's largest oasis. The aim of expanding the irrigated area from 
about 8,000 to 20,000 has not been achieved but the long decline of the oasis has 
been arrested and farming productivity of the 12,000 ha maximum now farmed in 
winter is rising. At Haradh there is the virgin land development first projected in 
the mid-1960s as a bedouin settlement scheme for some 4,000 ha. This has now 
become a livestock and fodder production unit. At Wadi Jisan, the first phase of 
which was completed in 1971, a major flood regulator and storage dam was inte-
gral to the planned expansion and improvement of existing state irrigation which 
support about 50,000 people. From the late 1970s onward, direct government 
involvement became more concentrated in projects of production potential, such 
as at Wadi Dawasir, and was confined mostly to expenditure on land preparation 
with the aim of encouraging subsequent private sector investment at the produc-
tion level, as at Haradh. More important still has been the linking of land grants 
with financial inducement to encourage the setting up of private food production 
units. 
3.6.2 Production, Area and Yield of Different Crops 
The total area under cultivation was estimated to have increased by 5. 7 
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percent during crop year 1986/87 to reach 854,000 hectares. Agricultural produc-
tion was also projected to have risen by 12.2 percent to 4.6 million tons. Total 
grains production was estimated to have reached 2.9 million tons during the year, 
an increase of 16.4 percent over the previous year, of which wheat production 
reached 2. 7 million tons, a rise of 15.9 percent from the preceding year. Barley 
production expanded sharply during the year to reach 162,000 tons, an increase 
of 33.9 percent. The noticeable expansion in barley production was due to rising 
domestic demand for this type of grain, especially by livestock producers. Pro-
duction of vegetables and fruits was estimated to have reached 1.1 million and 0.6 
million tons increasing by 2.7 percent and 8.1 percent respectively. 
Wheat deliveries to the Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organisation (GSFMO) 
reached 2.5 million tons in 1987/88 compared with 2.2 million tons in 1986/87, an 
increase of 15.0 percent . The grain silos have a currrent storage capacity of 1.6 
million tons and additional silos are under construction with a total capacity of 
0.8 million tons. Barley deliveries to GSFMO reached 96,471 tons in the period 
under review. 
3.6.3 Poultry, Livestock and Dairy Production 
The Kingdom's production of poultry was estimated to have reached 
317,000 tons in 1987 compared with 275,000 tons in the preceding year, a rise of 
15.3 percent (Table 3.6). Domestic production accounted for 72 percent of total 
consumption. The production of eggs was estimated to have reached 115,000 
tons and exceeded domestic consumption. Most of the surplus of egg production 
is exported to Arab Gulf states. Total domestic meat production rose by 13.2 
percent in 1987 to 533,000 tons compared with 471,000 tons in the preceding 
year. Domestic production accounted for 59 percent of total meat consumption. 
Domestic production of milk also increased by 9.9 percent in 1987 to 402, 
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Table 3.5: Agricultural Area and Production*. 
Sources 1985/86 1986/87 
Area (hect.) Production (tons) Area (hect.) Production (tons), P 
Total grains 643000 2463000 687000 2868000 
Wheat 566000 2290000 601000 2653000 
Sorghum 3000 6000 2000 5000 
Millet 38000 44000 35000 43000 
Corn 2000 2000 1000 2000 
Barley 32000 121000 43000 162000 
Total Vegetables** 87000 1093000 90000 1122000 
Tomato 24000 327000 28000 346000 
Watermelon 19000 374000 15000 323000 
Total Fruits** 78000 551000 77000 596000 
Dates 63000 457000 59000 484000 
* The data are for crop year covering the period from 1st November to end 
-October. 
** This total includes other crops not given in this table. 
P Preliminary estimate. 
Source:- Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency- 1988. 
735 tons compared with 366,123 tons in the preceding year. The ratio of domestic 
production to consumption stood at 99.7 percent. 
3.6.4 Agricultural Loans and Subsidies 
The Saudi Agricultural Bank granted 4,792 loans during 1987/88, the 
third year of the Fourth Development Plan, with a total value of R/S 841 million. 
This increased the cumulative value of loans disbursed by the bank since its es-
tablishment in 1972 to R/S 22.4 million. The Bank's loans during 1987/88 were 
divided into medium-term loans which accounted for 99.7 percent and short-term 
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Table 3.6: Poultry and Egg Production (tons). 
Sources 1986 1987 p 
Boiler chickens: 
Domestic production 275000 317000 
Imports 122000 125000 
Exports 2000 2000 
Total Consumption 395000 440000 
Ratio of domestic 
production to 
consumption 69.6% 72.0% 
Eggs: 
Domestic - -
production 138000 115000 
Imports - -
Exports 13000 15000 
Total consumption 125000 100000 
Ratio of domestic 
production to 
consumption 110.4% 115.0% 
P Preliminary estimate. 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency -1988. 
loans which accounted for the balance. Distribution of loans by purpose showed 
that R/S 247.7 million or 29.4 percent went to agricultural projects, R/S 171.2 
million (20.3) percent to well drilling and casing, R/S 137.6 million (16.4) percent 
to irrigation equipment, R/S 125.8 million (15.0) percent to farm machinery and 
R/S 114.2 million (15.0) percent to finance engines and pumps, and R/S 44.8 
million or 5.3 percent to other agriculture purposes such as green houses, silos, 
boats and fishing equipment. 
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The bank also provided a total of R/S 264/5 million as subsidies to farm-
ers during the period under review. This brought cumulative subsidies granted by 
the Bank since 1975/75 to R/S 8.4 billion. Of the total subsidies disbursed during 
1987/88, subsidies on engines and pumps accounted for the highest share (65.1 
percent) or R/S 148.5 million. Farm machinery ranked second ( 40.8 percent or 
R/S (08.0 million), followed by transport of imported cows (1.7 percent or R/S 4.5 
million), poultry equipment (1.3 percent or R/S 3.4 million), and milk production 
equipment (0.1 percent or R/S 0.1 million). 
3.6.5 Livestock 
In Saudi Arabia the goat and the sheep are the dominant animal, and 
the number of goats have increased to 25.7 percent in 1984/85 compared to 11.8 
percent in 1979/80. And the number of sheep have increased to 46.7 percent in 
1984/85 compared to 0.4 percent in 1979/80. 
In the third five year plan (1980-85), Saudi Arabia has established exten-
sive veterinary services and a network of some 40 veterinary clinics. The authori-
ties have also carried out a country-wide vaccination programme against diseases. 
The government of Saudi Arabia has established many centres to guide farmers 
on proper housing, feeding, breeding, and general husbandary methods for their 
animals. 
3.6.6 Fisheries 
Saudi Arabia is the best placed member of the GCC in terms of providing 
substantial quantities of fish due to its geographical location on both the Red Sea 
and the Arabian Gulf. In 1985, Saudi Fisheries, a company established in 1980, 
caught 5000 tons of fish and shrimp, and increased this by 1988 to 16,615 tons of 
fish and shrimps in the Red Sea and the Gulf. The fish catch met over 90 percent 
of the local demand and a good portion of it was exported to the USA and Japan. 
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With about 2,000 kilometers of coastline on the Red Sea and the Gulf, 
the Government had recognized the importance of this sector and initiated an 
adequate support system to the small fisherman in the form of supplying them 
with modern gear, advice and marketing assistance. 
3. 7 United Arab Emirates 
3.7.1 Introduction 
Agriculture in the U AE will have to continue to rely on fossil water and 
present recharge of relatively shallow aquifers deriving their water from past and 
present rainfall and run off, the latter mainly in the high land zone. Precipita-
tion rises to 150-200mm annually in the mountains and elsewhere averages about 
50mm. A Ministry statement in 1982 put the annual water requirements of the 
country at 565 mn cu.m., whilst recharge and the production of desalinated wayer 
supplied 210 mn cu.m., leaving an annual deficit of 355 mn cu.m.-roughly equiv-
alent to about 20 years of ground water. 
The United Arab Emirates is still continuining to allocate and spend 
sizeable sums for agricultural development. Abu Dhabi, the largest and richest 
of the seven Emirates, set aside 3.7 percent of its own DH k.88 billion (US $ 1.6 
billion) development budget for agriculture in 1983, whereas it underspent in all 
other sectors. The importance the UAE Government attaches to the agricultural 
sectors justifies the fast steps made towards self-sufficiency in some agricultural 
products. 
Only about half of the landholders declare that the main occupation is 
farming, and whilst some of these are the residual near subsistance traditional 
farmers of remote valleys (for example, around Masfut of the extreme north), 
some in Ras Al-Khaima and Al-Ain are truly commercial vegetable producers. 
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Table 3.7: Estimation of Total Area Under Agricultural 
Holding by District 1981-86 (Area by Donum). 
Sources Years 
1981 % 1983 % 1986 % 
Southern 76902 29.1 108731 34.2 5392 31.8 
Middle 72847 27.6 99701 31.4 4301 25.3 
Northern 81338 30.8 72933 22.9 2486 14.6 
Eastern 32444 12.3 36132 11.3 4765 28.1 
Total 263531 100 317497 100 16944 100 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (1987). 
Over one third of holdings are described as being used for domestic consumption. 
Holdings are almost small, over 1 to 1.5 ha in the central and eastern regions and 
about 3-4 ha in the north and south. Abu Dhabi is the most important emirate 
in terms of agriculture due to the abundance of water resources, particularly in 
Al-Aim where great agricultural developments were made possible. 
As Table 3.8 shows, the quantity of tomatoes have increased to 23.5 
percent in 1982 compared to 19.1 percent in 1983, and the quantity of onions 
has increased to 4.5 percent in 1985/86 compared to 3.4 percent in 1982, and 1.9 
percent for peppers in 1985/1986 compared with 0.9 in 1982. 
The current five-Year Development Plan , which is expected to increase 
egg production by 38 per cent and 234 percent in white and red meat. Four major 
poultry farms are now operating in UAE producing eggs and chickens. Two of 
these poultry farms are situated in Abu-Dhabi and the others in Ras Al-Khaimah 
and Umm Al-Quwain. 
The latest move towards achieving the goal of self-sufficiency was demon-
strated by the establishment in 1985 of an Agriculture Credit Fund. The Fund's 
aim is to assist and fund all agricultural and fishing activities. It offers loans to 
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Table 3.8: Estimation of Vegetable Products in U.A.E. 
1982- 86 (Qnty : Ton). 
Years 
Sources 1982 1983 1985/86 
Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % 
Tomato 58783 23.5 57399 19.1 44144 18.5 
Egg-plant 13899 5.5 16843 5.6 19044 8.1 
Okra 4137 1.6 5394 1.7 4209 1.8 
Beans 254 0.1 297 0.09 872 0.3 
Cow-Peas 3681 1.4 2593 0.8 2835 1.2 
Jew's Mallow 1532 0.6 2171 0.7 2061 0.8 
Chard 3015 1.2 3099 1.0 4720 2.0 
Squash 14832 5.9 16627 5.5 14215 6.1 
Cucumber 8083 3.2 6412 2.1 7683 3.2 
Cabbage 10420 4.1 26287 8.7 20797 8.9 
Cauliflower 7190 2.8 6582 2.1 11272 4.8 
Potato 2509 1.0 3283 1.0 4164 1.7 
Onion 8516 3.4 12958 4.3 10490 4.5 
Watermelon 62378 25.( 71070 23.6 33688 14.4 
Sweetmelon 25752 10.:J 34644 11.5 15792 6.7 
Lettuce 1397 0.5 2428 0.8 2966 1.2 
Radish 5098 2.0 4517 1.5 4667 2.0 
Parsley 922 0.3 1228 0.4 3431 1.4 
Carrot 2568 1.0 5299 1.7 2741 1.1 
Pepper 2469 0.9 4186 1.3 4610 1.9 
Others 11834 4.7 16747 5.5 18456 7.9 
Total 249269 100 300067 100 232812 100 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (1987). 
individuals, companies, co-operative societies and other organizations engaged in 
farming and fishing. The fund also provides subsidy in cash for the purchase of 
equipment such as pumps and boat engines. 
The most severe constraint to the expansion of agricultural activity in 
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the UAE is the availability of water. Irrigation in the country depended mostly 
on pumping out underground water. While in most places the underground level 
has dropped; in few areas the wells have dried out completely. Several steps were 
taken to alleviate this problem. The government has been consistently trying to 
educate the farming community in the efficient use of water resources. Several 
dams were constructed to collect rain water and thus recharge the underground 
reserves. Five dams with a total capacity of 15 million cubic metres a year have 
been completed and nine others are planned. Modern irrigation techniques are 
also being introduced, aimed at cutting down labour by 50 percent and conserve 
up to 60 percent in the utilization of water. 
3.7.2 Livestock in UAE 
Although livestock farming is severely constrained by the climate, with its 
high temperatures and humidity, the Damascus-based Arab Company for Live-
stock Development is joint-owner of a dairy farm comprising 600 Friesians at 
Digdagga in Ras al-Khaimah. The UAE is 45 percent self-sufficient in poultry, 70 
percent self-sufficient in eggs and over 80 percent self-sufficient in milk. 
3. 7.3 Fisheries. 
The U AE coasts are rich in fish, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
The government has assigned international and domestic experts to implement a 
number of fishing projects and agreements were concluded for the construction 
and operation of a fish research centre in Umm AL-Quwain for promoting shrimp 
culture, and that of other fish types, on a commercial basis. 
3.8 Agricultural and Fishery Cooperation Amongst the GCC States 
GCC efforts to reach greater levels of cooperation in the domain of agri-
culture have been directed primarily toward the unification of farming policy. The 
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GCC ministers of agriculture, during a meeting in January 1983, approved several 
measures in this regard and established a permanent committee to examine the 
critical issues relating to water and land utilization. The culmination of the GCC's 
efforts in agriculture of a common agricultural policy statement in February 1984 
(See Appendix B). The GCC common agricultural policy makes explicit reference 
to the ultimate aim of GCC activity in this regard- namely, "the agricultural 
integration of the GCC states [on the basis of] reciprocal and balanced benefits 
to the cooperating parties". In addition, the policy seeks to maximise resources, 
secure the greatest possible degree of self-sufficiency (particularly in basic food 
commodities), and promote the role of the private sector in the development of 
agriculture. These objectives, according to the policy, should be realised through 
the coordination of "local" (that is, national) agricultural plans, policies, and 
practices, the creation of a joint programme for food and agricultural production, 
the formulation of a common regime for the conservation of natural resources, and 
the establishment of research capacity. 
Another area of ongoing GCC activity is the development of a strategic 
food reserve. The GCC region, because of high salinity in the soil, meager water 
resources, scarcity of rain, and extremely high temperatures, is not conductive 
to extensive agricultural programmes. The significant regionwide dependence on 
imported food was a source of serious concern, even before the process of urban-
ization and the influx of large numbers of foreign workers in the 1970's expanded 
the dimensions of the problem. These factors underline the explicit reference of 
food security in Article 7 of the Economic Agreement, which stipulates that the 
member states will make arrangements to "coordinate policies for building up 
strategic food stocks". Measures under the aegis of GCC to provide a measure of 
regional food security, therefore, have been a focus of GCC activity. The GCC 
ministers of agriculture, during their January 1983 meeting, agreed to examine 
options regarding the food security issue. Among other things, they recommended 
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that agriculture be given priority in regional investment discusions and resolved to 
continue the national efforts to develope food production capabilities. In addition, 
plans for the creation of such a reserve were reviewed by the GCC commercial 
cooperation committee during its meeting on 17 July 1984 and 3-4 March 1985. 
The issue was also taken up at a meeting of representatives from GCC supplies 
directorates on 4-5 December 1985. 
The emphasis of the GCC's agricultural programme was escapulated in 
the set of development priorities reached by the GCC economic and social planning 
committee in March 1985, the "Objectives and Policies of Development Plans 
in the GCC States", which among other things provided for the encouragement 
"of investment in large profitable agricultural ventures that use machinery and 
modern technology for irrigation, and of entrepreneurs to establish companies, 
along with continued encouragement of individual investment in agriculture". It 
is clear that most of the individual GCC states have made significant strides 
in agricultural production on the basis of these objectives since the GCC was 
established. It is also clear, however, that enhanced GCC cooperation as envisaged 
in the common agricultural policy has been defined but not yet fully implemented 
among the member states. 
3.9 Summary 
The agricultural area in the Gulf states totals 6.16 million hectares, of 
which only 2.8 million hectares are being cultivated. Rainfed agriculture is pos-
sible only where the average annual rainfall is at least 200 mm, a condition only 
met in 3 percent of Saudi Arabia and 12 percent for Oman. Furthermore, the 
geographical structure means that rainfed agriculture can only be carried out in 
a small proportion of the area meeting the 200 mm criterion. 
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The countries of the region have therefore turned to irrigation, usmg 
mostly ground water. Acquifers have been tapped at ever increasing depth and 
it is estimated that by the turn of the century non-renewable water resources will 
in some regions of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain be fully exhausted if the current 
extraction rates are maintained. 
Regarding the common agriculture policy, it is still not implemented. The 
main reason why the G.C.C. countries are not willing to implement the policy is 
because of the lack of overall agriculture strategy, the slowness of the bureaucracy 
and the instability of the agricultural labour force. 
The absence of significant private investment in agriculture is noticeable 
and reliance on the government increases all the time. This is due mainly to 
the fact that many landowners consider agriculture as a social rather than an 
economic phenomenon. It is shameful, in accordance to tribal teachings, to work 
physically on the land as a farmer. This traditional attitude which unfortunately 
still exists has long made it necessary to bring foreigners in to work on the land, 
and many of these workers have no previous farming experience and are basically 
unskilled labourers. Further, even at technical and white-collar level, there is 
a shortage of native employees in agriculture, while other governmental bodies 
suffer from being over-staffed. Overall there is a shortage of skilled technicians 
and managers. For example, the Ministry of Industry and Agriculture in Qatar 
had planned the setting up of an Agriculture Training School but this has not 
been put into effect and there seems little hope of attracting Qataris into this 
kind of vocational training. 
Given their economic influence in this sector, governments in the G.C.C. 
countries could impose not only specific soils and water policies which are ap-
propriate, but also any other land use policies such as specific cropping patterns, 
methods of cultivation, etc. They could also be more selective in the free-of charge 
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inputs which they give to the farmers for implementing its policies. However, gov-
ernments would still have to add better management ( both in their Ministries 
and on the farms ) to implement its policies. The lack of experience of workers -
on and off farm - also means that a training and recruitment programme must be 
carried out in spite of all the social difficulties, as without a skilled work force no 
improvement is possible. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Industrial Development in the GCC Countries 
4.1 Introduction 
The challenge facing industrial development in the Gulf region is the abil-
ity to produce and sell competitively, in the domestic markets as well as abroad. 
The highly concentrated development effort of the region's public sectors to build 
large scale industrial schemes and the comparable hydrocarbon resources of the 
Gulf countries are leading to the creation of similar industrial bases. This would 
reduce the scope for regional trade and may increase considerably the risk of com-
petition in the export markets, whether within the region or outside it. The GCC 
countries need, therefore, to come up with a coherent industrial strategy for the 
region as a whole, that eliminates duplication, promotes complementary industrial 
projects and creates inter-industry and inter-country linkages. This does not only 
help expand the size of the domestic market but also create forward and backward 
linkages, so that investments in one industry would make investments in others 
more profitable. 
There are several barriers to rapid industrial development in the region 
that need to be addressed. These include the high cost of imported intermediate 
products, the small size of the local market, the lack of industrial management 
expertise and technical skills among the national population, the ineffectiveness of 
the existing marketing system, the non-availability of the necessary information 
base and adequate research on technological advancement, and the openness of 
the Gulf markets given the limited protection offered by the tariff system. There 
are as well, various bureaucratic constraints, limited commercial bank leading to 
industrial projects and incomprehensive industrial legal codes. Another constraint 
has been the limited entrepreneurial vigour of the region's private sectors. Gulf 
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businessmen have been geared both psychologically and economically toward trade 
and services activities, where profits are apparently easy and returns substantial 
and quick. This attitude has had a negative impact up till now on the expansion 
of the industrial sector. Private entrepreneurship has been, to a larger extent, 
shying away from industrial activities which involve more risks and long gestation 
periods for profitability. 
Set against these constraints, industry in the Gulf has the benefits of a 
skilled, non-unionized, imported labour force, wide-ranging industrial incentives 
and subsidies, political stability and reasonably consistent government industrial 
policies and regulations. The region has, as well, ample capital resources, no 
exchange controls, and state of the art infrastructural facilities, including ports, 
airports, hotels, roads and telecommunications. Furthermore, industry and all 
other parts of the Gulf economy have the benefit of the region's enormous contacts 
with the outside world and its receptiveness to modern business ideas. Most 
important of all in recent years has been the advantage that all sectors have 
gained from a fall in the cost of labour, especially at the bottom end of the 
market, and the drop in rents and real estate prices to more reasonable levels. 
To some extent, there is now industrial service back-up available in the region, 
including distribution operations, advertising agencies, maintenance and specialist 
transport companies. 
It is only very recently that Gulf businessmen have come to appreciate 
that they can profitably do business in fields other than contracting, real estate, 
importing, money exchanging, service related activities and small manufacturing 
associated with oil construction. There are many niches in the Gulf markets that 
have not yet been filled and where investments may prove quite profitable in 
the next decade. Any product which fills a local need (especially if it leads to 
import substitution) or can be exported and does not require long-term subsidies 
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and protection to become commercially viable may be considered. The principal 
comparative advantage of the region as a manufacturing base lies in the availability 
of cheap energy and the low priced local feedstock produced from petrochemicals 
and natural gas plants. There exists as well a growing market for consumer 
products with a total population in the Gulf of 16 million and with a per capita 
purchasing power among the highest in the world. From the point of view of 
foreign companies, the fall in oil revenues and social and economic changes that 
followed in the 1980's mean that the Gulf states should no longer be thought 
of purely as a consuming market. They are becoming more like other markets 
in which companies might be involved as investors or joint venture partners in 
manufacturing or service operations. Conceivably, companies might see the region 
as a manufacturing base from which they would export products to other Arab 
countries, Iran, the Indian subcontinent or even to Europe. 
4.2 QATAR 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Crude oil accounted for approximately 30 percent of GDP in 1987, be-
tween 1982 and 1986 it accounted for 90-94 percent of export earnings. A fertiliser 
plant was opened in 1978 and a major petrochemicals plant in 1980. how that 
there werewas opened in 1978, followed by an integrated steel works in 1978 and 
a major petrochemicals plant in 1980. 
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4.2.2 Industry 
4.2.2.1 Oil Industry 
Oil was discovered in 1939. The first crude shipment was made in 1949 
from the onshore Dukhan field on the east side of the peninsula, via a pipeline to 
a terminal at Umm Said. The first offshore field was discovered at ldd al-Shargi 
in 1960, and a second was found at Maydan Mahzam the same year. In 1965 a 
production complex to serve both fields was completed, using a terminal at Halul 
Island. In 1970 a third offshore field was discovered at Bul Hanine. Qatar also 
shares a small offshore field, Bundug, on a 50:50 basis with Abu Dhabi. Total 
proven oil reserves were estimated at 4.5 bn barrels at end-1988. Attempts are un-
der way to extend the life of the existing fields by secondary recovery programmes 
involving water injection. 
Qatar's oil production has fluctuated since 1980 under the impact of 
developments on the world oil market and Opec decisions on collective production 
quotas. Production capacity of the emirate's fields stands at 400,000-450,000 b/d, 
including the Qatari share of Bundug. However, Qatar was allocated a quota of 
300,000 b/d and this was further reduced to 280,000 b/d in October 1984. Qatar's 
output, after running at 280,000 b/d during the first half of 1985, rose to 300,000 
b/d in November and December of that year. Hindered by a relatively high official 
price for its crude exports, Qatar's output fell from 289,000 b/d in January 1987 
to a low of around 100,000 b/d in April of that year. Following the introduction of 
discounting, production picked up and averaged 311,800 b/d over the whole year. 
In July 1987 Qatar Dukhan crude was priced at the Petroleum Development of 
Oman (PDO) assessment price plus 10 cents per barrel, Qatar Marine at PDO 
plus 5 cents per barrel. Production in 1988 averaged 315,500 b/d, (with exports 
of 304,000 b/d) and in the first half of 1989 averaged 339,000 b/d. Qatar's quota 
for the second half of 1989 was raised from 312,000 bld to 329,000 b/d. Its final 
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quater quota was then raised again to 346,000 b/d. 
The Dukhan field was originally operated by the Qatar Petroleum Com-
pany, owned by BP, CFP, Shell, Exxon/Mobil and Partex. The state took a 25 
percent interest in QPC in 1973, increasing this to 60 percent in 1974 and 100 per-
cent in 1976, through the Qatar Petroleum Producing Authority, a wholly owned 
subsidiary ofthe Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (QSPC). The QGPS holds 
the state share in all oil, gas, petrochemical and refining enterprises in Qatar and 
abroad. In 1980 QPPA was merged with QGPC. 
Table 4.1: Oil and Gas Statistics Summary 
Sources 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Crude oil production 269.0 326.2 290.1 332.5 311.8 315.5* 
(000 b/d) 
Marketed production of 5.2 5.9 5.5 5.8 5.6 6.4 
natural gas (bn me) 
Note: * Estimate 
Source: OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1988 
4.2.2.2 Gas Industry 
In recent years the Government of Qatar has been greatly concerned 
with the discovery and exploitation of natural gas. Until the mid-1970s most of 
country's natural gas was flared off, but by 1979 this applied to only 5 percent 
of production of associated onshore gas, which had reached 12.3m cum per day. 
Recent exploration has indicated that Qatar's North Field, formerly known as 
the North-West Dome, is the largest natural gas field in the world. In 1986 
Qatar's proven gas reserves totalled 4,280,000m cum, of which 97.6 percent was 
unassociated with oil production. 
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Work on the project began in mid-1987. Work is expected to be com-
pleted by the end of 1990, with commercial production commencing during the 
first quarter of 1991. Qatar also has a network of non-associated gas pipelines 
drawing feedstock from the Khuff layer under the Dukhan fields. This produces 
fuel for small generators, for the Ras Abu Fortas electric power and desalination 
plant and the steel plant. Qatar's industries are dependent on gas and the de-
cline in oil production has meant that the amount of associated gas available to 
industry has declined. Oil production rates of under 400,000 b/d mean that there 
is insufficient gas to supply the two power stations and industry. This combined 
with the fact that Qatar's industrial and power needs were increasing up to 1986 
by 10 percent a year, made the exploitation of Qatar's extensive non-associated 
gas reserves essential. 
The offshore facilities are located 75 km from Ras Laffan and compose six 
platforms, including two well head platforms. Gas and condensates will be piped 
ashore to Ras Laffan and then on to Umm Said where they will be processed 
at the new NGL-3 plant. The first phase of the project calls for the production 
of BOOm cubic ft/d of gas and about 50,000 b/d of condensates. About 450m 
cubic ft/d of the gas is expected to be used by local industries and utilities, with 
the remainder reinjected into the Dukhan Khuff reservoir. The condensates will 
be exported. Plans to extend the project to include a gas sweetening plant and 
sulphur processing unit were announced in mid-1989. Bechtel of the USA and 
Technip of France have been jointly appointed as consultants for engineering, 
construction and procurement and are expected to manage some $850m in work 
on developing the production facilities and pipelines. The two companies will 
also receive a management consultancy contract with $70-SOm. Financing of the 
project is almost complete, with a $400m loan for QGPC agreed in late 1989. 
Qatar has also set aside the proceeds (up to $600m) from the sale of 40,000 b/d 
to part finance the project, with the balance coming from QGPC funds. The total 
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cost of the project is expected to reach $1.3bn. 
In the longer term, two additional phases are planned. The first involves 
the production of 800m cubic ft/d gas to be exported to the neighbouring Gulf 
countries where it would be used to help power a combined electricity grid. The 
second involves production of another 800m cubic ft/d of gas for export to Europe 
and the Far East. Talks have been held with Turkey's state oil and pipeline 
company, Botas, about building a pipeline to carry the gas to Europe via Turkey, 
but no decisions have been reached. BP, Total-CFP, Marubeni and Mitsui each 
hold 7.5 percent in the Qatar Liquefied Gas Company, with QGPC holding the 
remaining 70 percent. Qatar gas was set up in 1984 to export and market Qatari 
LNG to be produced from the North Field project- it has proposed constructing 
facilities to produce and export 4m t/y of LNG. 
4.2.3 Petroleum Refining 
Qatar's first major refinery at Umm Said was commissioned in 1974 for 
the National Oil Distribution Company (NODCO), which had been founded in 
1968 to manage the refining and distribution of oil products. U mm Said refinery 
had an initial capacity of 6,321 b/d, compared with the earlier refinery, built 
in 1953, which had had a capacity of only 600 b/d. Expansion of Umm Said 
increased total capacity to 12,000 b/d in 1977. A second refinery, which was 
completed in 1984 and was built by the French company Technip, is situated 
close to the original Umm Said refinery and is linked to it. The refineries are 
managed by NODCO, a wholly owned subsidiary of QGPC, which also distributes 
products. Production averaged 33,150 b/d in 1987, with local sales of products 
reaching 11,570 b/d. Exports in 1987 averaged 20,900 b/d and by mid-1989 
product exports had reached about 96,5000 bld. Local consumption of petroleum 
products is expected to rise from 15,000 b/d in 1986 to 25,000 b/d by 1995. 
Technical and engineering studies have been carried out on raising the refinery's 
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total capacity to 74,000 b/d, with the aim of increasing exports. Work on an 
isomerisation plant, to produce 5,5000 b/d of lead-free gasolines, started in mid-
1989. 
4.2.4 Petrochemicals 
The Qatar Petrochemicals Company ( Qapco) is shareholder in a plant 
opened at Dunkirk in France in 1979. This is operated by the Campagnie Petrochim-
ique du Nord, in which QGPC holds 40 percent and CdF. Chime of France 40 
percent. Its capacity is 450,000 tfy of ethylene and 300,000 tfy of polyethylene 
QPC and CdF. Chime also cooperated in setting up a petrochemicals plant in 
Qatar itself, this was commissioned in 1980 with a capacity of 280,000 tjy of 
ethylene and 140,000 t/y of low density polyethylene and 46,000 tfy of sulphur. 
Both plants have suffered from shortages of gas feedstocks since 1981 and plans 
for a new high density polyethylene plant were cancelled in 1983 due to a shortage 
of government funds, but in 1984 Qapco announced that it was building a new 
ethane feedstock plant which would raise supplies to the petrochemical plant from 
500 t/d to 1,100 tfd. The plant is now open. 
Qapco losses rose as problems over feedstock and prices mounted. The 
company's QR 156m loss 1985 was its biggest ever, followed by QR 57m in 1986. 
In 1987 cost cutting measures and stronger polyethylene prices helped turn this 
loss into a QR 85m profit. Over half Qapco's output is now sold in the Middle 
East region and India and the rest to Japan and South East Asia. 
Dukhan gas also fuels the Umm Said fertiliser plant run by the Qatar 
Fertiliser Company (Qafco) which commenced production in 1973. QGPC owns 
75 percent of the company's shares, with N orsk Hydro owning the remaining 25 
percent and providing management and export marketing. A parallel plant, which 
doubled capacity to 1,800 t/d of ammonia and 2,000 t/d of urea, was completed 
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at the end of 1979. Total production has risen to new record levels each year 
since 1981. In 1984 Qafco produced 735,000 tons of ammonia (only marginally 
down on record production of 744,000 tons in 1985) and a record 780,000 tons of 
urea. Ammonia production reached 662,000 and 682,000 tons in 1986 and 1987 
respectively with urea production totalling 746,000 and 734,000 tons in the same 
two years. India and China are the principal markets for Qafco's output. Qafco 
now plans to build a third ammonia and urea plant, with capacity of 1,500 t/d of 
ammonia and 1,800-2,000 t/d of urea. 
4.2.5 Aluminium Smelting 
The North Field project, which will exploit Qatar's vast offshore gas re-
serves, has boosted the chances of an aluminium smelter being set up in Qatar. 
The directors of the Doha based Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting 
(GOIC) approved the setting up of another Gulf smelter, and its location in 
Qatar. A memorandum of understanding was signed in mid-1989 to establish 
a 200,000 t/y capacity aluminium smelter in Qatar, and a feasibility study was 
being carried out into setting up a 230,000 tjy capacity ferro-alloy smelter. 
4.2.6 Cement Industry 
The State of Qatar, being keen on exploiting its resources of gypsum and 
limestone, established the first cement factory at Umm Bah in 1969. Although 
initially conceived to export its products, the output of the cement factory was 
just sufficient to meet local requirements. With the growth in demand for cement 
the factory was expanded several times, bringing its daily output to between 
700 to 800 tons, which covered 50 percent of the local requirements. The Qatar 
National Cement Company factory at U mm Bah on the west coast has been in 
operation since 1969 producing over 300,000 tjy. Expansion plans were cancelled 
in 1983 and sales suffered in the difficult market conditions of 1984. In 1985, 
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however, Qatar's cement consumption rose back over the 500,000 ton mark and 
the company's profits recovered to QR 20.5m. 
4.2. 7 Iron and Steel Industry 
The integrated steel complex run by the Qatar Steel Company ( Qasco) 
began production in 1978. It is 70 percent owned by the government, 20 percent 
by Kobe Steel of Japan and 10 percent by Tokyo Bolki. At the start of 1989, 
Qasco took over full management of the steel mill from Kobe Steel. It was the 
first complex of its kind in the Gulf to use natural gas in the conversion of iron 
ore into sponge iron. Output of reinforced steel bars totalled 503,000 tons in 1988 
(marginally up on 1987's output of 500,000 tons) and the company claimed to 
have recorded its first annual profit since it started operations. 
Qatar's excellent geographic position, near the Arab states importing 
iron and steel, means that the products of the plant arrive at the purchaser by 
land within a few days, without being exposed to corrosion risks as is the case 
with steel imported by sea. 
4.2.8 Other Industries 
In addition to these major industrial schemes, many other small enter-
prises have been established, mainly in Umm Said, which is now the industrial 
centre of the country. 
The Qatar Flour Mills Company began production at Umm Babin 1969, 
and by the late 1980's output had reached a level of about 700 tons per day. 
Qatar's power needs are supplied by two major power stations. One at 
Ras Abu Aboud has capacity of 210mw and 17.5m g/d of distilled water. Another, 
at Ras Abu Fontas, came into full operation in 1983 with total generating capacity 
of 1,150mw and desalination capacity of 48m gfd. Another power and desalination 
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plant is to be built at Wusail. When completed, it could provide 1,500mw of power 
and lOOm g/d of water. Work on the plan has been delayed by budget constraints 
but bids were sought in mid-1989 for the construction of an additional 250mw of 
generating capacity and 10m g/d of desalination capacity, for completion in 1991 
and 1992. Local power demand, however, was expected to have risen to 1,350mw 
by 1988, compared with 730 in 1983. 
4.3 KUWAIT 
4.3.1 Oil Industry 
Oil was discovered in 1938 by the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), then 
jointly owned by BP and Gulf Oil. Production began in 1946 and reached 1.83m 
b/d in 1962. It peaked at 3.3m b/d in 1972, at which point an output ceiling 
of 2m b/d was introduced for the purpose of conservation. Kuwait's existing oil 
wells now have an installed capacity of 2.9m b/d, with a maximum technically 
sustainable capacity of 2.5m b/d. Independent estimates suggest that this latter 
figure could be increased by up to lm b/d within a 24-36 month lead time. Proven 
reserves were 94.5bn barrels at the end of 1988, compared with 67bn barrels in 
1983, giving Kuwait the fourth largest reserves of oil in Opec. Annual additions 
to proven reserves in recent years have matched or exceeded the volume of oil 
extracted. Kuwait oil is somewhat heavier than Saudi crudes, with a higher 
sulphur content, but the geology is extremely favourable and production costs 
in Kuwait are estimated at about $0.15/b. 
After various changes in profit sharing and ownership, KOC was fully 
nationalised by 1975. In 1980 the industry was further reorganised under the 
umbrella of the Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC), which directly controls five 
major subsidiaries: KOC, which is responsible for oil and gas production out-
side the Neutral Zone, Kuwait National Petroleum Corporation (KNPC), which 
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controls refining, gas processing and product marketing, Petrochemical Industries 
Company (PIC), which manages domestic petrochemical and fertiliser production, 
Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC), which is responsible for the transporta-
tion of crude oil and LPG, and Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company 
(Kufpec) which undertakes exploration activities in overseas concessions. 
Oil production from the Neutral Zone is handled by the Arabian Oil 
Company, a Japanese concern which splits the production between Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. Since 1983 Kuwait's share of this production has been in region of 
150,000-200,000 b/d, the bulk (about 125,000 b/d) of which was sold on behalf 
of the Iraqi government until the end of 1988. After the October 1986 Opec 
conference instituted strict production control, Kuwait accepted severe output 
cutbacks which kept its production below 1.25m b/d, excluding its share from the 
Neutral Zone. However, extensive cheating by other Opec members, coupled with 
strong demand for oil, resulted in an increasingly hard line being taken by Kuwait 
in its demands for higher market share. The rupture came at the June 1989 Opec 
conference when Kuwait refused to accept its Opec quota and effectively left itself 
free to produce what the market would bear. 
Until the Opec price structure collapsed under the strains of the market 
share strategy in early 1986, Kuwait's prices had been adjusted in line with Opec 
agreements on differentials. Since the dramatic price cuts of 1986, KPC has ex-
perimented with three major types of price structure. Initially it adopted net back 
pricing, which in 1986 and early 1987 covered about one quarter of its exports. 
The "tanker war" in the Gulf put strong downward pressure on Kuwaiti crudes, 
which KPC dealt with by shifting to spot sales linked to the price of Oman and 
Dubai crudes on the spot market. With its expanding output, and in particular 
its aggressive marketing in the US market during 1989, KPC increased its term 
contracts - mostly of three month duration - which by the third quarter of 1989 
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accounted for the bulk of its exports. These contracts are substantially different 
from the old, pre-1980 long term contracts which KPC had with Western buyers, 
mainly BP, Gulf and Shell. The modern contracts have prices set by average 
spot values in the appropriate regional markets. KPC's third quarter 1989 com-
mitments were split 60 percent for its domestic and foreign refineries, European 
processing deals and Neutral Zone output sold mainly to Japan by the Arabian 
Oil Company, and 40 percent for sales to other customers under term contracts 
(comprising 19 percent to Western destination, 11 percent to Japan and 10 percent 
to other Far Eastern destination). 
Table 4.2: Oil Production, Prices and Exports {OOOb/d) 
Sources 1984 1985 1986* 1987* 1988* 
Production 1010 934 1330 1260 1395 
KOC production 
Kuwait share of 162 128 125 125 125 
Neutral Zone 
Total 1172 1062 1455 1385 1520 
Average price($ /b) 27.30 26.58 11.10 13.50 14.75 
Exports Crude oil 660 476 820 715 810 
Oil products 408 467 520 550 585 
LPG 39 41 40 40 40 
Total 1107 984 1380 1305 1435 
Note:(*) Estimates. (t) Estimates for January-October. 
Source:-
(1) the EIU-County Profile- 1989-90- Kuwait 
1989t 
1565 
175 
1740 
16.25 
1030 
585 
40 
1655 
(2) Central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, Central Bank of Kuwait, 
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin. 
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4.3.2 Natural Gas Industry 
In November 1976 the Amir laid the foundation stone for the Kuwait 
Oil Company's Gas Project. One of the largest development projects undertaken 
in Kuwait, this involves the construction of extensive facilities to utilise the gas 
associated with the output of crude petroleum for the production of LNG and 
such derivatives as propane and butane. A three-train plant for the production 
of liquified petroleum gas (LPG), together with a gas-gathering system (which 
came into operation in 1979), gathers the gas which is produced with petroleum 
at well-heads, removes LPG components and natural gasoline, then treats and 
distributes them to fuel users and to pressure-maintenance facilities. The plant 
built at a cost of over US $1,000m, has a capacity of 2.2m.metric tons of LPG 
per year (60 percent propane, 40 percent butane) at a crude oil production rate of 
1.5m.b/d. It was originally designed to take crude oil production of 3m.b/d. How-
ever, Kuwait's production of gas is limited by the absence of any known reserves 
independent of petroleum. This has meant that much of the gas produced has 
been flared to enable rapid oil production, or reinjected, to maximise the produc-
tion of petroleum by maintaining pressure in the reservoir. Gross gas production 
ran at 5,800m.cum in 1984, and commercial production at 4,100m.cum, rising to 
6,000m.cum, in 1986. However, :Haring gas has fallen from 9,330m.cum in 1973 to 
less than 65m.cum in 1984. 
The LPG plant has been forced to operate at well below capacity in 
recent years, exporting only 1.05m.metric tons of products in 1982/1983. 
Little use is likely to be made of the Mina al-Ahmadi refinery's capacity 
of 1.5m tons of LPG per year, although in 1983 the French company Technip, 
signed an agreement to construct facilities to increase the output of gas from 
the Neutral Zone and that project was completed by 1985. This project involves 
building a gas compression platform offshore, and an onshore gas treatment plant 
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at Ras Al-Zour. Gas will be carried from the Khafji and Hout Rataur oil fields at 
the rate of llOm.cu ft(3.1m.cu metres) per day, and will then travel via the new 
treatment plant, to the LPG plant at Mina al-Almadi. A gas-gathering grid to 
produce 2,500m.cum per year from the Neutral Zone was completed in 1989. 
Kuwait's natural gas reserves in1988 were estimated at 48.7 trillion cubic 
ft but are mainly in the form of associated gas. Production has therefore been 
dependent upon oil output and has fluctuated sharply in recent years. There is 
one LPG plant at Ahmadi, which was opened in 1979 using gas that was formerly 
flared and which in 1988 accounted for 16 percent of OPEC LPG production. In 
order to increase the flexibility of local gas supplied, Kuwait is now developing the 
south gas project as a supplementary gas gathering scheme, as well as importing 
gas from Iraq in order to meet the requirements of the petrochemical industry. 
However, the fall in oil prices in 1986 severely affected gas prices, with Kuwait 
forced to slash its propane and butane prices by more than half from $217 /t at 
the beginning of the year to $100/t and $95/t respectively six months later. After 
a short-lived recovery in mid-1988, prices slumped to $95/t and $90/t respectively 
in October 1988 and stayed there for the next twelve months. This has reduced 
the attractiveness of investments to upgrade the country's gas utilisation capacity. 
Table 4.3: Production of Natural Gas (mn m3) 
Sources 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Gross production 5816 5830 7440 6960 8980 
Marketed 4376 4200 5730 4780 6490 
Source: OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin. 
4.3.3 Petroleum Refining 
There are three oil refineries in Kuwait, one at Mina al-Ahmadi built in 
1946, which had a capacity of 250,000 b/d in 1985, one at Mina Abdullah, built 
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in 1958, with a capacity of 110,000 b/d, and the most recent of Shuba, completed 
in 1969, with a capacity of 195,000 b/d. 
Kuwait has the third largest refining capacity in OPEC, after Saudi Arabia 
and Venezuela, and has undertaken a major modernisation programme at two of 
its three refineries, geared to making ouput suitable for export markets. Costing 
KD 1.32bn, this increased total refining capacity from 520,000 b/d to 670,000 b/d 
at the end of 1988-comprising 270,000 b/d at Mina al-Ahmadi, 200,000 b/d at 
Mina al-Abdullah and 200,000 b/d at Shuaiba. In July 1989 a 38,000 b/d isoc-
racker unit came on stream at Mina al-Abdullah and a 1,300 b/d methylbutylether 
unit is being built at Mina al-Ahmadi. 
Kuwait's increased exports of refined products are to feed its downstream 
retail network in Western Europe. This network has supplanted other markets in 
importance, in particular Japan and Pakistan, which accounted for 42 percent of 
Kuwait's refined product exports in 1979-83. KPC's purchases of overseas interests 
began in 1981, when it acquired the US oil engineering and exploration firm, Santa 
Fe International. The following year it started buying petrol stations in Europe 
from some of the oil majors, particularly Gulf Oil. After the purchase of a signif-
icant share in the UK in October 1986 and March 1987, KPG's total European 
network exceeded 4,800 stations in Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg and UK. It also owns ex-Gulf refineries in Rotterdam and at 
Gulfhavn in Denmark, and lube oil plants in Italy and the UK. In September 1986 
KPC introduced a new brand name (Q8) for all its retail sales in Europe, where 
it is now a high profile distributor. In Denmark, for example, it is ranked second 
in terms of market share with 20 percent of the market, while in the UK its share 
is some 7 percent, based on purchases of the Hays Petroleum Services, Ultramar, 
Golden Eagle and Nafta networks. At the end of 1987 Kuwait's total overseas re-
fining and retailing operations accounted for 250,000 bld. Between October 1987 
and February 1988 the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) bought 22 percent of the 
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shares of British Petroleum on the open market (a purchase which was referred 
to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission). The British Government decided 
to put a 9.9 percent limit on the KIO's stake in BP, so that 11.7 percent was sold 
at the end of 1988, albeit at a substantial profit. However, the pace of KPC's 
European acquisitions has slowed down since 1987, and in late 1989 KPC sold the 
engineering arm of its subsidiary, Santa Fe International. KPC has other over-
seas interests, including shares in Tunisian and Turkish fertiliser complexes, and 
a major prospective plant in China. Through Kufpec it holds exploration leases 
in a number of developing countries. 
4.3.4 Petrochemicals 
The first petrochemicals industry in Kuwait was a fertiliser industry set 
up in the late 1960's by PIC, which was then a joint venture between the govern-
ment and private interests. The PIC's fertiliser division at Shuiba now operated 
three ammonia plants with a capacity of lm tjy, three urea plants with a capacity 
of 792,000 tjy, one ammonium sulphate plant with a 165,000 tfy capacity and 
one sulphuric acid plant with a capacity of 132,000 tjy. PIC also has a salt and 
chlorine division at Shuwaikh producing salt, chlorine, caustic soda, hydrochloric 
acid, sodium hypochlorite, compressed hydrogen and distilled water. However, 
with the fluctuations in Kuwait's oil production, PIC faced a shortage of gas, its 
principal feedstock and experienced considerable difficulties as a result. Accumu-
lated losses in 1982-86 were $70m, which required the injection of $108m of fresh 
capital in mid-1986. PIC's actual production from 1982/83 to 1985/86 (the latest 
year for which figures have been published) was well below capacity (in 1985/86 
its ammonia plants operated at only 57 percent of their capacity), and its sales 
for the most part failed to match even this reduced level of production. The in-
crease in oil production after 1987 has resulted in a revival in the petrochemical 
industry's fortune, with a large increase in ammonia and urea output. These 
81 
two are the only significant export products, with domestic sales accounting for 
a negligible portion of sales. There have been sporadic exports of sulphuric acid, 
sodium hypochlorite and caustic soda. In additioin to its petrochemical capacity 
in the country, PIC has interests in a number of other countries, apart from its 
indirect interests through its parent KPC's purchase of Sante Fe International and 
CF Braun in 1981.PIC holds 49 percent of three Thnisian plants -two producing 
phosphatic and compound fertilisers and a third, industrial acids. It has 25 per-
cent of a Thrkish plant to produce ammonium nitrate and diammonium phosphate 
using ammonia feedstock from Kuwait and phosphoric acid feedstock from PIC's 
Thnisian plant. In addition it has 30 percent of a joint venture in China which is 
also planned to produce fertilisers using feedstock from the Thnisian plants. 
Table 4.4: Petrochemical Output ( 000 tons) 
Sources 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Ammonia 83.0 368.6 548.3 702.5 
Urea 548.9 595.0 736.8 856.6 832.0 
Sulphunic acid 4.0 4.6 4.5 
Salt 20.3 20.5 26.2 35.3 31.8 
Chlorine 7.9 9.2 11.6 14.3 14.4 
Caustic soda 8.8 10.3 13.7 16.1 16.2 
Hydrochloric acid (mn gal) 1.9 1.8 2.2 3.3 3.5 
Sodium hypochlorite( mn gal) 1.8 1.8 18.6 25.3 22.7 
Hydrogen ( mncub) 39.1 42.6 37.7 19.7 4.2 
Source: Central Statistical Office,Monthly Digest Of Statistics. 
4.3.5 Aluminium Smelting 
Kuwait, unlike its neighbours, is hesitant to undertake other heavy indus-
trial projects, fearing for their viability and the excess of foreign labour which they 
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may demand. It has favoured, instead, joint projects with Bahrain, Saudi Arabia 
and other Gulf countries, agreeing on projects with the Gulf Aluminium Rolling 
Company and Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company to establish aluminium, 
ammonia and methanol plants of Bahrain. 
4.3.6 Cement Industry 
In Kuwait Cement Company which was established in 1968, with about 
20 percent government share, is the major producer of cement in Kuwait. During 
the ten years, 1979-1989, local production of cement supplied about 50 percent of 
total demand in Kuwait. 
From the early 1980s, the company started to export a considerable share 
of its production to neighbouring countries. The trade figures of 1988 show a ratio 
of 35 percent exports in the total domestic production of cement. By completing 
its third expansion, the annual capacity of KCC has reached 2,145,000 tons of 
normal resistant portland and white cement. 
4.3. 7 Other Industries 
The government has done much to foster the growth of other industries in 
order to diversify the economy and to provide an alternative source of employment 
to petroleum. 
During the period of the 1976-81 Five Year Plan, three industrial Zones 
were set up: at Shuaiba, Shuwaikh and Ahmadi. However, oil-related activities 
still contribute on overwhelming proportion of Kuwait's total industrial output. 
Despite efforts at diversification, petroleum's share of GDP rose from 61.1 per-
cent in 1977 to 69.9 percent in 1980, before falling to around 50 percent in 1983. 
Other industries provided only 4.5 percent of GDP, or 8.6 percent of non-oil GDP, 
in 1982. An Industrial Development Committee existed for some years but was 
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replaced in 1979 by a new body with far-reaching authority over regulating indus-
try, issuing licences and imposing protective tariffs. However, two new projects 
were approved in 1985: the construction of a 150,000 - ton capacity salt plant in 
Shuaiba, and a chlorine plant with an annual capacity of 27,000 tons. 
Several factories supply consumer requirements, such as processed food 
and salt drinks, and there is a flour milling company. Many of smaller industrial 
projects have been promoted by the Industrial Bank of Kuwait (IBK), set up in 
1973, which is 40 percent government owned. By 1984, however, four leading 
commercial banks had combined with IBK to form a more specific concern, the 
Industrial Investment Company (IIC), to make new investments. In 1983/84 these 
included a truck-assembly plant, the production of resins and paint additives, and 
the approval of schemes to produce polyvinylchloride pipes and fittings, and acrylic 
blankets. 
During 1985 the government took a further step towards assisting local 
industry when it announced the introduction of protectionist trade measures for 
local industries which satisify three criteria. Such industries should meet at least 
40 percent of domestic requirements, should have a substantial added value or 
should contribute to national income, and the consumer should not be affected by 
any possible inflationary results of tariff protection. 
4.4 BAHRAIN 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Prior to the discovery of petroleum in Bahrain, the archipelago's economy 
was one of the most prosperous on the northern shores of the Arabian peninsula. 
Traditionally, the livelihood of most of the population depended on agriculture, 
pearling and trade, and Bahrain's offshore pearl banks were reputed to be the best 
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in the region. However, with the discovery of economically expoitable petroleum 
deposits in 1932 and the simultaneous growth of the Japanese pearl trade, Bahrain 
became increasingly reliant on its reserves of petroleum and natural gas. Following 
the attainment of full independence in 1971, attempts were made to diversify 
the economy, and several large-scale industrial projects, some financed jointly 
with other Arab states through such bodies as the Qatar-based Gulf Organization 
for Industrial Consulting (GOIC), have recently come into operation. In 1981 
the government launched a five year plan to revive industry by acquiring more 
sophisticated equipment and by establishing training schemes to encourage the 
use of more productive methods. In 1985 the government also announced an 
investment of BD 20,000 to revive the pearling industry. 
4.4.2 Oil Industry 
Bahrain was the first state on the Arabian side of the Gulf to produce 
petroleum in 1932, and the archipelago's recent prosperity has grown from the 
development of its hydrocarbon reserves. By 1935 there were 16 oil wells in 
operation and a small petroleum refinery was established at Sitra. Bahrain's 
average production of crude petroleum increased from 19,300 barrels per day (b/d) 
in 1940 to 57,000 b/d in 1965, and to 76,639 b/d in 1970. Output has subsequently 
decreased steadily from an annual total of just under 25m barrels in 1984. 
Since 1968 much of Bahrain's output of crude petroleum has been sup-
plied by the Abu Safa offshore field, which lies between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, 
and the revenue from the field is divided equally between the two countries. Pro-
duction at this field began to decline in 1980, although, since the imposition of 
Opec production quotas in 1983, Saudi Arabia has supported the Bahrain econ-
omy by maintaining production levels at Abu Saafa and making compensatory 
cuts at other Saudi fields. 
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In December 1979, the government, which formerly owned 60 percent of 
the Awali field, took over the remaining 40 percent from Standard Oil of California 
and Texaco, through the Bahrain National Oil Company (BANOCO), the main 
operator at the field. Part of the output is sold to the Bahrain National Petroleum 
Company (BAPCO), A major programme to explore for new sources of oil and 
gas was launched in 1981 in the hope of discovering small, commercially viable, 
sources of oil and gas that would prolong the country's diminishing energy but 
made no significant discoveries. Production at the Awali field fell to 15.3m barrels 
in 1987, compared with 15.5m barrels in 1986. Output over the next few years 
is expected to remain at about an average of 42,000 b/d. Banoco has announced 
plans to drill some 80 wells into the field in the period to 1992 as part of a $60m 
project to maintain domestic output. 
Table 4.5: Oil and Gas Statistics Summary 
Sources 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Crude oil production(b) 41840 41890 41920 42430 42000 42000 
Gas production(mn cub) 14.4 15.2 17.4 19.9 20.4 19.9 
Sources-The Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile, 1989-90. 
4.4.3 Gas Industry 
Bahrain is becoming an increasingly important producer of non-associated 
gas. Reserves, including those of the Khuff Zone which underlies a large part of 
the Gulf, are estimated at 263bn m3, allowing output to continue for 50 years at 
present production levels. The main outlets for gas are power generation, refining, 
the Alba aluminium smelter and the gas liquids plant operated by the Bahrain N a-
tional Gas Company (BANAGAS). BANAGAS is 75 percent owned by BANOCO, 
with Caltex and the Arab Petroleum Investment Corporation holding 12.5 per-
cent each. BANAGAS profits have been falling as a result of the drop in the 
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world price of LPG but capacity at the plant has been increased. The company's 
central gas plant was fully utilized in 1988, and processed a total of 56, 783m cu-
bic feet of associated gas (compared with 56,661m cubic feet in 1987). Output 
totalled 976,175 barrels of propane, 866,849 barrels of butane, and 1.13m barrels 
of naphtha. Contracts for the expansion of the plant's capacity to 280m cubic feet 
were awarded in the third quarter of 1988. Bahrain is a partner with Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia in the Gulf Petrochemical Industries Corporation (GPIC) $400m 
methanol and ammonia plant at Sitra, which was commissioned in July 1985 with 
a capacity of 1,000 t/d of methanol and ammonia, most of which is exported to 
Europe, other parts of the Arab world and the Far East. GPIC is considering 
building an additional $100m urea plant. 
4.4.4 Petroleum Refining 
Bahrain exports oil products instead of crude and is therefore totally 
dependent on its refining c~pacity. Bahrain's own oil supplies can meet only 16 
percent of the needs of its 250,000 b/d capacity refinery at Sitra and the remaining 
84 percent is piped from Saudi Arabia. In 1981 the government took 60 percent 
participation in the Sitra refinery and its related facilities, with Caltex, the original 
owner, retaining 40 percent. A light isomate plant was added to the refinery in 
1983 but plans for a hydrocracker have been postponed due to the rapid decline 
in profits at the refinery. When crude prices were low Bahrain was able to make 
substantial profits on its processing of Saudi Arabia crude. The price increases 
of 1979-80 hit the refinery hard. Average output fell from 259,000 b/d in 1981 
to 197,000 b/d in 1982 for the first time in 18 years and in 1983 it fell again to 
175,000 b/d. In 1984 production levels were maintained around the 200,000 b/d 
mark but prices fell. In 1985 the refinery proc~ssed an average of 180,000 b/d 
of crude oil, of which about 41,000 b/d consisted of Bahraini oil, the remainder 
coming from Saudi Arabia, and in 1986 output rose to an average of 245,000 b/d 
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but profits were adversely affected by the sharp fall in prices. In 1988 output rose 
by 2 percent on 1987, averaging 242,000 b/d. 
4.4.5 Petrochemicals 
Bahrain's petrochemicals investment has revolved around gas-based am-
monia and methanol plants. The country has pressed ahead with construction of 
complex at Sitra to produce 330,000 tons ammonia and 330,000 tons methanol 
annually. It is owned by Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and operated by the 
tripartite Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company. The complex, which is already 
in operation was built by Italy's Snamprogetti. 
4.4.6 Aluminium Smelting 
The Arab world's most important aluminium smelters are located in 
Bahrain, where Aluminium Bahrain (Alba) produced its first ingots in 1971. Alba 
is now owned 74.9 percent by the government, 20 percent by Saudi Arabia, and 
5.1 percent by Breton of West Germany (the government purchased Kaiser Alu-
minium's 17 percent stake in Alba in mid 1989). Alumina is imported from 
Austalia and output is marketed by the Bahrain Aluminium Company (Balco ). 
A record 183,804 tons of aluminium ingots were produced in 1988. Most of the 
output is exported to Japan and to other Gulf countries. In April 1988 Alba 
awarded an $80m contract for the construction of the first phase of expansion of 
its Sitra smelter from 17,000 t/y to 195,00 tfy. A further expansion in capacity 
by 20,000-25,000 tfy is due for completion in 1991. In mid-1989 plans to double 
capacity to over 400,000 tfy were approved. They involve the construction of two 
new pot rooms with a capacity of 180,000 tfy. Higher world prices for aluminium 
products saw sales by Balco, the joint venture responsible for selling the Saudi 
and Bahraini shareholders entitlement to Alba ouput, soar to an all time record 
of $359.5m in 1988. 
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Secondary industries based on the smelter are: Bahrain Atomisers Inter-
national, which is jointly owned by the state and Breton Investments and pro-
duces 7,000 tjy of aluminium powder, Middle East Aluminium Cable (Midal), 
which was established in 1978 and now produces 25,000 tfy aluminium cables, 
and the Bahrain Aluminium Extrusion Company (Belexco) which is expected to 
be partially privatised in 1991 to finance the expansion of capacity from 6,000 
tjy to 14,000 tjy. An aluminium rolling mill with a capacity of 40,000 tjy began 
production in 1986. This is owned by the Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company 
(Garmco), which is a joint venture of the Gulf Organisation for Industrial Con-
sulting (Goic), which comprises GCC states and Iraq, and the Gulf Investment 
Corporation. Initial capacity of 40,000 tjy of sheet and coil aluminium has been 
raised to 50,000 tjy, most of which is exported to other Gulf states. Production 
in 1988 reached 50,000 tons. The company has yet to make a profit, recording 
losses at $13m in 1987 and $5.3m in 1988. 
4.4. 7 Iron and Steel Industry 
In 1981 the Bahrain Government attempted further to diversify the econ-
omy by forming the Arab Iron and Steel Company (AISCO), an offshore public 
shareholding company which started production in early 1985 but was closed 3 
months later because order were so short that it could not function at even half its 
installed capacity of 4 mn tjy. Production started again in July 1985 in response 
to the orders from Indian and Australian companies, but the company was put 
into liquidation in 1986 following the accumulation of some $200 mn in debts. The 
Gulf Industrial Investment ( GIIC), a subsidiary of Kuwait Petroleum Company 
purchased Aisco's fixed assets and production restarted in 1988. 
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4.5 OMAN 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Oman's traditional industries were crafts such as silver working, ship 
building and weaving. New manufacturing industries have grown only slowly and 
still account for about 2 percent of GDP, although annual growth rates during 
the 1980s have been impressive. The main constraints on development have been 
the small internal markets and free import competition. Those industries which 
now exist are small to medium scale, with the exception of heavy extraction and 
refining indus tries (oil and copper) in the public sector. 
To encourage small enterprises the government offers soft loans, cheap 
land and electricity, import duty exemption and government sponsored feasibil-
ity studies. National industrial development and trade exchange is also being 
supported by the GCC. The government, through the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries, has also funded Agro-industries, such as the Nuzwa and Rostag 
date plants and the Salalah banana packing plant. It is attempting to spread 
development by offering incentives for investment outside the capital area. 
4.5.2 Oil Industry 
Economic activity in the Sultanate of Omen. is mainly influenced by de-
velopments in the oil sector. As the petroleum sector receipts comprise the bulk of 
government revenue, oil sector developments also have a strong indirect influence 
on the growth of the non-oil sector. 
The main onshore concession is held by Petroleum Development Oman 
(PDO) which began life as Petroleum Concessions (Oman), a subsidiary of the 
Iraq Petroleum Company. From 1960 the company was owned 85 percent by 
Shell, with Partex owing first 15 percent and later 5 percent - the remaining 
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10 percent being taken up by CFP. From 1974 the shareholding was: Shell, 34 
percent; CFP, 4 percent; Partex, 2 percent; the state, 60 percent, and since May 
1980 the company has been registered in Oman. Between 1962 and 1964 PDO 
discovered three fields in the interior- Yibal, Fahud and Natih - which began to 
export in August 1967 through a 280 km pipeline and a coastal terminal at Mina 
al-Fahal north of Matrab. A fourth field, Huwaisah, came into production in 1971 
and a group of smaller fields at Gihaba in 1975. A further field, Lekhwair, has 
been producing through a spur pipeline since July 1976. 
After peaking at around 370,000 b/d in 1976 from the Central Oman 
fields, oil production declined as the need for secondary recovery increased, and 
the outlook appeared bleak. Nor did immediate relief from elsewhere look likely, 
as exploration and development in the south, in and around Marmul in Dhofar, 
had been delayed by the insurgency and by the area's isolation, as well as by the 
heaviness of the oil which had been struck. The picture changed, however, with 
rising oil prices and the attention of other international oil companies. PDO built 
a 450 km pipeline from Marmul to the main pipeline running from Qarnal-Alam 
to the Northern coast, and in 1980 the Marmul field was brought into production. 
Fields around Marmul were also developed at Amal, Birba, KawKab, Ranab, 
Qat a, and Qaharir. Other fields further north were discovered and or developed, 
ie Rasha, Rima, Nimr and Karim West. In this area 1986 saw the opening of 
three more fields: Jalmud, Jalmud North and Jawda. More oil was discovered to 
be commercially exploitable in the area to the south and south west of the older 
central fields: Elf brought its Sahma field (in the western concession) on stream 
in 1980 (producing about 44,000 b/d by 1982), and a string of discoveries in 1983 
added five fields to the list Zavliya, Wafra, Sayyala, Fayyadh and Suwayhat. The 
oil in these fields is light, at 50 API. In addition to the three southern fields men-
tioned above, four other fields were brought on stream in 1986: Barik, Fayyadh, 
Zareef and Runib. During 1987 a further eleven fields were brought on stream: 
91 
Hasirah, Warad, Simsim, Zahra, Ihsan, Jamil, Mawhoob, Dhiab, Thuleilat, Yibal 
Khuff and al-Burj. In January 1988 the Rajaa-oil field was discovered. It started 
production the same year at 2,500 b/d. Total production capacity, as a result 
of all this, is now over 700,000 b/d, boosted by the expansion of output in the 
Bahja fields (the 1983 discoveries) from 5,000 b/d to 30,000 b/d in 1988 thanks 
to improved supporting infrastructure. 
The throughput capacity of the principal oil pipeline was expanded to 
650,000 b/d by the end of 1986, with booster stations this could be raised to ll.lm 
b/d. In 1986 the storage capacity of the Mina al-Fahal terminal was increased to 
3.6m barrels, and the Nimr development was opened. The latter is the third and 
largest production area opened in PDO's concession in the south, and the largest 
engineering undertaking since the early 1980s. 
Oman now has about 57 producing oil fields- including the two main non-
PDO fields of Sahma (Elf), and Safat (Occidental/Gulf). In 1987 PDO acquired a 
48,600 Km2 onshore concession in Dhofar, and another, released in 1986 by Amoco 
Oman Oil Company, covering 25,000 square km. The latter, consisting of an area 
north of the Kuria Muria Islands and one south west of Masirah Island, is PDO's 
first offshore concession, and brings the company's total concession area to about 
217,000 km2. Mostly as a result of PDO's achievements, known reserves have risen 
rapidly. At the beginning of 1989, total proven reserves stood at 4.17bn barrels. 
The current production cost averages around $5/b. Of the other oil companies 
attached to Oman, the only ones extracting oil in significant quantities are Elf 
Aquitaine and Occidental (5,300 b/d and 5,700 b/d respectively in 1987). Japex, 
produced only about 100,000 barrels during the whole of 1987. 
Production after the dip in the early 1980's (down to 282,000 b/d in 
1982), peaked at around 600,000 b/d in the middle of 1986 and 1987. From 
February 1988, Oman declared a reduction in output to around 55,000 b/d in 
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solidarity with Opec. The move was designed to stabilise prices. The collapse of 
negotiations between Opec and non-Opec producers, however, on a joint cutback 
to help share up prices, led Oman to restore production to 600,000 b/d. Oman is 
not a member of Opec but taxation rates are parallel. Because of falling oil prices, 
the country started, in the autumn of 1985, to sell its oil to its contract customers 
at a price which was retroactively determined on the basis of average spot market 
prices for the previous month. On this basis the price declined sharply in the early 
months of 1986 to hit a low of $8.2/b. in July. The average government monthly 
retractive assessment price for the first half of 1989 was $16.08/b. Oil revenues, 
which totalled OR 458 mn in 1978, reached OR 1.5 bn in 1985 before falling to 
slightly below OR 1 bn in 1988. 
Table 4.6: Oil Revenues, Production 
Item 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988* 
Revenue (OR mn) 1277.5 1304.6 1510.0 928.9 1194.9 992.3 
production (mn b) 141.9 152.4 181.8 204.3 212.5 226.6 
Note: (*) Provisional 
Sources : Department of Petroleum and Minerals, Petroleum Development Oman, 
Development Council. 
4.5.3 Natural Gas Industry 
According to official estimates, Oman's proven reserves of recoverable 
natural gas in late 1988 were 9.25 trillion cubic feet, containing 2.40 trillion cubic 
feet in associated gas, and 6.85 trillion cubic feet in non-associated gas. Most 
of the dry gas is produced at Yibal but extraction has also started at Fahud, 
Natih and Saih Nihayda in the north and Birba in the south. In June 1989, PDO 
announced its largest gas discovery for 20 years, in the Saih Nihayda area (near 
Qam al-Alam). The field's recoverable reserves are estimated at about 10 bn cubic 
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metres. A gas pipeline from the Yibal field to the outskirts of Muscat was opened 
in 1978 and provides fuel both for the power and desalination plants at Gihubrah 
and for the industrial area at Rusayl. After upgrading in 1986-89, its capacity 
is now 550mn cubic feet/d. A branch line was opened in 1981 from Ghubrah to 
Sohar to fuel the new copper smelter. 
The Bukha field, off Musandam, discovered in 1986, can produce an 
estimated 60,000 b/d of condensate and over 400 mn cubic ft/d of dry gas. Gas 
output in 1987 was put at 4.65 bn cubic m. the utilisation rate of associated gas 
in 1987 stood at over 90 percent - up from a mere 5 percent in 1980. 
Several important gas projects were completed at the same time as the 
pipeline from the Yibal field, including a NGL plant which produces some 3,500 
b/d of gasoline liquids from associated gas. A big LPG plant is being built at 
Sohar and a smaller NGC plant has been opened at Saih Rawl. Others are planned 
for Fahud and Lekhwair. Gas is also used for oil recovery: an estimated 4,400 bn 
cubic ft will be required over the next 40 years. 
4.5.4 Petroleum Refining 
In Oman the existing oil refinery Mina al-Fahal went on stream in Novem-
ber 1982 to meet Oman's local requirements of refined petroleum products. Its 
capacity was expanded in 1987 from 50,000 b/d to 80,000 b/d. It is run by the 
Oman Oil Refinery Company with technical advice from Ashland Oil of the USA. 
The second plan calls for building another refinery having a daily capacity of 
75,000 barrels by the year 1992. 
4.5.5 Cement Industry 
In Oman, the Company's Cement Factory at al-Rusail went on stream in 
1984 with an annual output of 624,000 tons of cement. This Government owned 
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company is considered the largest industrial project carried out under the current 
Five-Year Plan. A similar project also went on stream in 1984 - the 210,000 ton 
cement factory at Raysut, near Salalah - using locally quarried limestone and 
gypsum. Whereas the Raysut works is only 20 percent government owned, the 
Rusail plant, the Oman Cement Company, is wholly government owned. 
4.5.6 Other Industries 
4.5.6.1 Building Material Company 
The Building Materials Company was incorporated with a capital of OR 
1. 7million in 1979. The company manufactures cement blocks, bricks, concrete 
products, cement pipes and prefabricated building. In 1979 the company built 
two factories, one of them for the production of lime in Quryat and the other 
undertakes the manufacture of lime bricks in Wadi Aadi. The Quryat Factory has 
an annual capacity of 70,000 cubic metres of lime blocks, 30,000 tons of ordinary 
lime and 33,000 tons of hydrated lime. The Wadi Aadi lime brick factory has an 
annual capacity of 24 million bricks. 
4.5.6.2 Readymade Clothes Company 
This fully owned Omani Company set up a factory for manufacturing 
ready made clothes at a cost of OR 700,000. The factory, situated in Al-Uthaiba 
area, was built on an area of 1,380 square metres. Its facilities have an annual 
output of 480,000 pieces, which meets local requirements, in addition to exporting 
a large proportion of its products to Europe. 
4.5.6.3 Dhofar Refreshment Company 
The site of Dhofar Refreshment Company is located on the Thamrit High-
way. Its operation started in 1980 with an annual production capacity of 184,306 
crates of fizzy drinks and 45,198 boxes of fruit juice products. The company's soft 
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drinks factory was built at a cost of OR 871,826 and its working capital amounted 
to OR 69,178. 
4.5.6.4 National Mineral Water Company 
The Company's bottling plant is situated in Tanuf, near Nizwa. It be-
came operational in 1979 and, after an expansion scheme completed in 1984, its 
annual production reached 2,400,000 cartons, each containing 12 bottles. During 
1984 the bottling plant produced 2,160,000 cartons. The company facilities cost 
OR 1,823,400 to build and its working capital totalled OR 355,300. This company 
produces Tanuf and Jabal Akhdar mineral water. 
4.5.6.5 Mining 
Oman is relatively rich in minerals. There are extensive deposits of cop-
per ore, estimated to total 12 m. tons, near Sohar, which are being developed 
at an estimated cost of $12m. by the Oman Mining Company (75 percent state 
owned) with aid from Saudi Arabia. A smelting complex capable of producing 
3,000 tons a day of ore, smelted to 20,000 tjy of pure copper, was opened in 1983 
and in 1988 some 16,000 tons were exported. In 1988 Japan committed itself to 
the funding of its own study of two new sites, together estimated to contain 3-4m. 
tons of copper ore. Preliminary surveys at lbri in 1989 established that reserves 
were at least 8m. tons. Other deposits include chrome, lead/zinc, nickel, asbestos, 
high quality limestone, manganese, phosphate and some coal (near Sur). 
4.6 SAUDI ARABIA 
4.6.1 Introduction 
The Saudi economy was originally based on subsistence agriculture, the 
livestock of the nomadic tribes and funds brought in by the annual pilgrimage to 
Makkah and Madinah. The discovery of oil irrevocably changed this situation, as 
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oil revenues became the chief source of government finance and foreign exchange, 
and oil production the dominant component of GDP. It was not until 1962 that 
the Saudi government really came to terms with its responsibilities for redistribut-
ing oil wealth, when Faisal (then crown prince) unveiled his reform programme. 
Although Saudi Arabia is deeply committed to free enterprise from a political and 
moral point of view, its economy policy has been decidedly interventionist, as the 
government has sought to persuade the private sector to move away from trade 
and craftsmanship towards industry and other sustainable productive activity. 
The development of self-sustaining private sector economic activity is proving an 
elusive objective, however, given the small size of the local market and the de-
pendence of companies in the private sector on government contracts, government 
subsidies or both. 
4.6.2 Oil Industry 
Saudi Arabia's proved recoverable oil reserves at end of 1988 were es-
timated at 252,384m. barrels, equal to just under a quarter of the world's total 
known reserves. Most of these reserves are located in the Eastern Province and its 
offshore waters where the Arabian American Oil Company (now Saudi Aramco) 
operates. Aramco's concession area in Saudi Arabia covers 220,000 square km 
in six non-contiguous "retained area". All Aramco oil production is lifted from 
the vast Retained Area No 1, which contains the world's largest producing field, 
Ghawar, and the world's largest offshore field, Safaniya. Other major fields in the 
area are at Abqaig, Ain Dar, Berri, Zuluf, Khursaniya, Abu Safah (output shared 
50:50 with Bahrain) and Qatif. In Retained Area No 5, south of the border with 
Abu Dhabi, there are two proved oil fields, Shayba and Ramla. Since 1987 Aramco 
has been encouraged by the Saudi government to explore outside its concession 
area, and in 1989 announced its first oil find in the Nejd. 
Other oil producers in Saudi Arabia are Getty Oil and the Japanese 
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Arabian Oil Company. Several international companies have been involved in 
minor exploration ventures in conjunction with the state company Petromin. They 
include Tenneco, Erap, Eni, Phillips Petroleum, Sinclair and N atomas, but the 
groups have either relinquished acreage or lapsed into inactivity. Apart from 
the Eastern Province, areas along the Red Sea and in Central Arabia have been 
surveyed. 
Saudi Aramco is responsible for 97 percent of all Saudi Arabia's crude 
oil production and all of the NGL. The companies predecessor, Aramco, began 
commercial production in 1938 and up to the end of 1988 cumulative production 
had reached 56.0 bn barrels. Saudi oil output grew rapidly during the 1970s, from 
an average 4.8m b/d in 1971 to an average 9.9m b/d in 1980, but the rise was 
not steady. The Arab oil embargo slowed this spectacular growth in 197 4 and 
output actually fell in 1975, but in 1979, in the wake of the Iranian revolution, 
output was raised to 9.5m. b/d. From early 1982 onwards a world glut of crude 
oil led to a decline in sales and production which has continued to affect Saudi 
output and marketing policies throughout the 1980s. During the first half of 1987 
Saudi Arabia's operated under a quota of 4.1m b/d, which was increased to 4.3m 
b/d for the second half. Official OPEC prices were re-established on the basis 
of a market price of $18/b which represented the average of seven crudes, rather 
than the price of Saudi Arabia's own Arabian Light crude only, as in the past. 
During 1988 Saudi Arabia again abandoned fixed pricing in its determination to 
sell its full quota of oil. In 1989 strong global demand for oil enabled OPEC to 
increase its quotas on two occasions, with Saudi Arabia's individual quota rising 
back above 5m b/d for the last quarter. 
Until1981 Aramco's crude petroleum was disposed of in five main ways: 
(i) by direct export as crude from terminals at Ras Tanura and Juayma, (ii) as 
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Table 4.7: Annual Production of Crude (m. barrels) 
Aramco Getty Arabian Total % Average 
Oil Oil change production 
1980 2525.3 28.5 70.0 3623.8 4.2 9.9 
1982 2310.0 23.6 33.4 2367.0 -34.0 6.5 
1984 1435.5 57.5 - 1493.0 -9.9 4.1 
1986 1711.8 34.4 - 1746.2 50.7 4.8 
1988 1803.7 35.2 24.9 1863.8 24.0 5.1 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Aramco. 
throughput in Ras Tanura refinery, {iii) by twin submarine pipelines for processing 
in the Bahrain refinery, (iv) by pumping as crude in the 1,600 km Tapline link 
with the Mediterranean seaboard at Sidon and Tripoli in Lebanon, ( v) by tanker 
or pipeline transfer to meet local requirements. The disposal pattern for Saudi 
crude changed dramatically in 1981 with the completion of Petroline, the 1,200km. 
crude pipeline from Abqaig across the peninsula to Yanbu on the Red Sea, and 
with the cessation of all supplies to Lebanon via Tapline in 1982. Petroline had an 
initial capacity of 1.8m. bld, but this was doubled by 1986, and further expansion 
plans have been announced in 1989. Much of the crude oil is exported direct, 
from Yanbu, but some is transpiped to Sidi Kreir on Egypt's Mediterranean coast 
using the Sumed pipeline. From 1985 until 1989 Iraqi crude was also exported 
from Yanbu after linking up via a pipeline spur with Petroline in the Eastern 
Province, but in 1989 an independent trans-peninsula pipeline was completed for 
Iraqi crude, terminating at al-Muajjiz just south of Yanbu. 
In 1988 Saudi Arabia entered an agreement with one of its former Aramco 
partners, Texaco, to become a partner in Texaco's US East Coast refinery and mar-
keting network, thus securing a permanent lifting commitment for up to 600,000 
b/d of its crude. Saudi Arabia continues to honour long term and large contracts 
99 
with its former US partners- Texaco, Mobil, Exxon and Chevron. Crude oil lifted 
by Getty Oil is delivered to Mina Sauel for export or for refining in the company's 
refinery. The Arabian Oil Company has an export refinery at AI-Khafji, and the 
company's crude production is either refined there for export or delivered straight 
to tankers at the same location. 
4.6.3 Natural Gas Industry 
In 1988 Saudi Arabia was estimated to have proved gas reserves of 77,294bn 
cubic ft, the fifth largest in the world after the USSR, Iran, Qatar and the USA. 
ARAMCO started commercial production of gas in Saudi Arabia in 1962 when it 
began extracting NGLs from oilfield gas and processing them at an NGL plant at 
the Ras Tamura refinery and export terminal. In 1977 ARAMCO installed gas 
separation and gathering scheme on the Berni field which was designed to process 
6.2m. cubic metres of associated gas a year, and simultaneously worked as agent 
for Petromin on building the government's own Master Gas System (MGS). The 
scheme, completed in 1981, provides for the gathering of 3bn cubic ft/d of associ-
ated gas and the processing of this gas to extract ethane, methane, sulphur, LPG 
and natural gasoline - the ethane (375m. cubic ft/d) being made available as a 
feedstock for the Kindom's ethylene crackers, the methane (2bn cubic ft/d) being 
used for fertilisers and methanol production and to provide fuel for desalination 
plants, power stations and other industrial projects, and the NGLs (300,000 b/d) 
being largely exported. The Shedgum gas separation plant was completed in 1980, 
the 300,000 b/d of ethane and NGL separated from the methane being piped to a 
secondary fractionation plant at Juayma for separation into 160,000 b/d of LPG 
and natural gasoline for export, and 160m. cubic ft/d of ethane which is piped to 
Jubail as feedstock for the petrochemical plants there. A twin plant on the huge 
Gihawar field was finished at Uthmanuja in 1981, and it is from this plant that 
the ethane/NGL stream is piped across the peninsula to Yanbu, using approxi-
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mately 30,000 b/d of fuel in the pumping process. The two plants at Uthmaniya 
and Shedgum also produce about 2,500 tons of sulphur a day. The gas gathering 
system will be further enhanced by current work on harnessing gas output from 
the northern offshore fields of Zuluf and Marjan. During 1985 Saudi Arabia im-
plemented schemes to harness just under 1bn cubic ft/d of non-associated gas, 
so ensuring the supply of fuel gas for Eastern Province industry by freeing the 
Kingdom from gas associated with fluctuating crude oil production. 
4.6.4 Petroleum Refining 
Domestic crude refining plants are situated at Ras Tanura, Jeddah, Riyadh 
and Yanbu. The Ras Tanura refinery has a capacity of 450,000 b/d, is owned by 
Saudi Aramco, and sells both to the local market and abroad. The Jeddah re-
finery is owned 75 percent by state interests (now Samarc) and 25 percent by 
the private sector, it has a capacity of 90,000 b/d. In addition, Samarc has ac-
quired ownership of two refineries, previously 100 percent owned by Petromin: the 
Riyadh refinery which opened in 1974 with a 15,000 b/d capacity, now boosted 
to 120,000 b/d, and the Yanbu domestic refinery, opened in 1984 with 170,000 
b/d of its eventual 420,000 b/d planned capacity installed. Samarc has also been 
given the task of rationalising three other Petromin projects: the Petromin Mar-
keting Company (Dhahran), the North Jeddah Station (Petroject) and Petromin 
Services (Petroserve). Samarc is also in the process of acquiring Petromin's share 
in two operational export refineries and the Kingdom's only lube oil refinery, al-
though these projects are to continue to operate under existing arrangements. The 
two refineries are joint ventures with Shell in Jubail and Mobil in Yanbu, both 
with export capacities of 250,000 b/d. A third export refinery at Rabigh (capacity 
325,000 b/d) has been developed as a joint venture between Petromin and Petrola 
and was transferred to Samarc when it became operational, after long delays, in 
1990. Mobil has a 30 percent stake in the 1.6m h/y lubrication oil refinery at 
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Jeddah. 
4.6.5 Petrochemicals 
Saudi Arabia has three major ethylene crackers, with a total capacity 
of 1.6 million tons a year, all of which entered the commissioning phase in late 
1984, six months ahead of schedule. These companies are Arabian Petrochemical 
Co. (Petrochemya) at Yanpet, which is fully owned by Sabic, since Dow Chemical 
pulled out of the project in 1981; Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical Co. (Sadaf) is a 
joint venture with Mobil and Saudi Petrochemical company (Sadaf), which is a 
joint venture with Shell and Petrochemya located at Jubail. 
The Yanpet cracker, which supplies feedstock to downstream units pro-
ducing 290,000 tons of a linear low density polyethylene or high density polythy-
lene, started up in February 1985. The ethyelene glycol unit (220,000 tons) came 
on stream a month later. In the initial stages marketing of most of the product 
from the Yanpet plants has been handled by Mobil. 
The Petrokemya plant supplies ethyelene to the Al-Jubail Petrochemical 
(Kemya) joint venture between Sabic and Exxon. This project has the capacity to 
produce 260,000 tons of linear low density polyethylene. The Petrokemya cracker 
also supplies ethylene to the Eastern Petrochemical Company (Sharq), a joint 
venture between Sabic and a Japanese consortium led by Mitsubishi. This complex 
moved into production ahead of schedule in the first quarter of 1985. Sharq has 
a capacity to produce 130,000 tons of LDPE and 300,000 tons of glycol. Some 
ethylene from Petrokemya is also to be supplied to the Sabic/Lucky Goldstar 
VCM/PVC plant was opened in 1986. This will produce 300,000 tons VCM and 
200,000 tons PVC. 
It is likely that the next round of chemical investment in the Kingdom 
will be dominated by the private sector. Sabic proposes to sell 75 percent of its 
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shares to private citizens, with the first 20 percent having been offered in 1984. 
The National Industrialization Company (NIC) which was successfully floated in 
November 1984, has proposals for several joint investments. Its major project 
concerns a $300 million synthetic rubber plant to be built at Yanbu under a 
joint venture with France's Michelin. NIC also has plans for a polyester fibre 
plant based on ethyelene glycol feedstock from the Sharq project at Jubail. Other 
private-sector ventures includes proposed pharmaceuticals production, involving 
Saudi Pharmaceuticals (SPC) in which NIC has a share. Hoechst has been linked 
with a drugs investment in Saudi Arabia. 
An interesting private sector proposal revealed in 1985, was that by the 
Saudi firm, IDI Ltd, to construct a 50,000 ton titanioum dioxide pigment plant at 
Jubail. This unit, which would use chloride route technology was built by Lurgi 
of West Germany and would supply local and exports markets. 
4.6.6 Cement Industry 
The construction boom in the Kingdom led to unparalleled demand for 
cement, as most of the new structures erected were concrete and cement based. 
Output from three cement plants located in Riyadh, Jeddah and Dhahran kept 
local supply and demand reasonably matched until 1973, with imported cement 
accounting for only 20 percent of total supply. By 1977 imports met 80 percent of 
total demand. Since 1977 several new cement plants have come on stream in Saudi 
Arabia and, by the time cement consumption peaked at 23.8m tons in 1983, the 
self-sufficiency ratio had improved to 35 percent. There are eight cement plants 
currently in full operation in Saudi Arabia, including the Saudi-Kuwait Cement 
Company, the latest to come on stream. All are owned on a joint stock basis, with 
sizeable loan contributions from the Saudi Industrial Fund. 
4.6. 7 Iron and Steel Industry 
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Table 4.8: Industrial Production of Sabic Companies. (000 tons) 
Products 1984 1985 1986 1987a 
Caustic Soda - 120 b 450 
Ethanol - 200 b 300 
Ethyelene - 928 b 1970 
Ethyelene Dichloride - 190 b 560 
Ethyelene Glycol - 310 b 580 
Hdpe - 190 b 
Ldpe - 379 b 870 
Melamine - 14 - 20 
Methanol 827 1287 b 1410 
Nitrogen - 82 - 146 
Oxygen - 55 - 438 
Steel rod and bars 972 1017 1368 1519 
Styrene - 125 b 360 
Sulphuric acid 73 84 972 100 
Urea 862 865 - 930 
Ammonia - - - 500 
(a) Upgraded capacities except for actual production for steel rod and bars. Total 
petrochemical production in 1988 was 7,815,000 tons, and total fertilizer 
production 1,960,000 tons. 
(b) Total petrochemical production in 1986 was 6,654,000 tons. 
Source: Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (Annual Report 1988). 
The Saudi Arabian Petroleum Mineral Organization introduced the first 
generation of steel plants in the Gulf by establishing a steel rolling plant in Jeddah 
in 1966 with an annual capacity of 45,000 tons. The plant's capacity was increased 
to 140,000 tons in 1981. Another SABIC owned iron and steel plant, Hadeed in 
Jubail, has a production capacity of 850,000 tons annually. 
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4.6.8 Other Industries 
In Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Industrial Development Fund had, up un-
til 1985, provided finance for more than 1000 projects at a total cost of over 
$10 billion. In 1984 and 1985 the Kingdom approved more than 300 industrial 
projects covering a whole range of industries- engineering, chemicals, food indus-
tries, building materials, pharmaceuticals, oil field equipment, among others. The 
number of factories that were in production in the Kingdom in 1985 was around 
2, 700 and covered 15 percent of local demand. By 1990 Saudi Arabia is aiming at 
producing 30 percent of its industrial needs locally. 
The Saudi Government had identified some 25 secondary industries and 
around 80 light industries opened for investments utilizing the Kingdom's hydro-
carbon and mineral resources. Businessmen who invest in these industries are 
granted attractive investment facilities by the various financial institutions in the 
Kingdom, including a 10-year tax holiday, low and favourable utility rates and ex-
emptions from customs and import duties of raw materials. In addition to these 
incentives, the investors would also be given government priority in the provi-
sion of feedstocks and priority to sell their products to the government or to the 
domestic market. 
4.7 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
4. 7.1 Introduction 
The general economy of the U AE is based directly on oil and gas, largely 
from the major producer, Abu Dhabi, but still with some contribution from Dubai 
and, recently, from Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah as well. The reliance on hydrocar-
bons and re-exports from Dubai, coupled with the headlong dash for development 
that followed the 1973-74 oil boom, has made for violent fluctuations in economic 
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growth over the past ten years. In the period between 1975 and mid-1977 the 
economy was marked by an usualy high rate of growth. Gross domestic product, 
measured in 1980 prices, increased from Dh 17.1 bn in 1972 to Dh 71.2 bn in 
1977. From 1977 to 1978 there was a period of sharp economic contraction, which 
showed itself most in the private sector economic of Sharjah and Ras al-Kaimah 
and, to a lesser extent, in Dubai. Economic activity started to pick up again 
in 1979-80. Political events in the Gulf, notably the revolution in Iran and the 
Iraq-Iran war, caused UAE oil revenues to rise suddenly from $12.9 bn in 1979 to 
$19.6 bn in 1980. 1982 saw a dramatic reversal in the oil exporters' fortunes, with 
UAE output dropping by over 18 percent from one year to the next and GDP (at 
1980 prices) falling from Dh 109.8 bn in 1980 to Dh 98.4 bn in 1983. On Dp at 
current prices fell from Dh 117.5 bn in 1981 to Dh 85 bn in 1987. 
The UAE government has attached prime importance to the development 
of suitable industries as a means of diversifying the country's economie base and 
reducing dependence on the export of oil, so both Abu Dhabi and Dubai embarked 
on major industrial projects during the 1970s. 
4.7.2 Oil Industry 
Oil is the mainstay of the UAE economy. It was discovered in Abu Dhabi 
first, at the offshore field of Umm Shaif in 1958 and at the Bah field onshore in 
1960. The fields were developed quickly and Abu Dhabi soon became a major oil 
exporter in world terms. Oil was discovered in Dubai in 1966 at the offshore Fateh 
field, with production and exports starting in September 1969. The onshore oil 
and condensate Marghan field came on stream in 1983. Sharjah had a share in 
the small Mubarak field, off Abu Musa island, from the time this came on stream 
in 1974. At the end of 1980 Amoco made an oil and gas find at Sharjah's Sajaa 
field. Ras al-Khaimah was the fourth emirate to find and exploit oil. Its off shore 
Saleh field was found by Gulf Oil's local subsidiary in February 1983. The three 
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remaining emirates are still looking for oil. 
Since quotas were first imposed on Opec members in 1983, the UAE has 
protested that its allotment took insufficient account of the size of reserves and 
production capacity, as well as the fact that there is more than one producing 
emirate, with the federal oil ministry in no position to exercise authority over 
the country as a whole. The UAE's output quota was put at 988,000 b/d in the 
first half of 1989, rising to 1,041,000 b/d in the third quarter and 1,095,000 b/d 
in the fourth quarter. The country has consistently exceeded this and average 
production in the first three quarter of 1989 was 1.8mb/d. 
Table 4.9: Oil Production of the UAE's 
Sources 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Crude oil production(OOO b) 
Total UAE* 1149 1069 1203 1370 1502 1433t 
Abu Dhabi 788 701 788 955 1059 1013 
Dubai 331 319 351 350 378 355 
Sharjah 38 51 64 65 65 65 
U AE oil exports( 000 b) 1077 1037 978 1132 1250 1345 
(*)Totals may not add exactly due to rounding. (t) Opec quotes 1,418 for 
1987 and 1,510 for 1988. 
Source- Petroleum Economist, Oil and Gas Journal, OPEC, Annual Sta-
tistical Bulletin. 
Despite recent finds in the smaller emirates, Abu Dhabi will continue to 
dominate the scene in terms of production and reserves. It averaged production 
of 1,013,000 b/d in 1988, compared with about 355,000 b/d for Dubai and 65,000 
b/d for Sharjah. In 1989 Abu Dhabi's production averaged 1,925,000 b/d and 
that of Dubai 425,000 b/d. Reserves at the end of 1988 were 98.1 bn barrels, of 
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which Dubai was estimated to account for 4 bn and Abu Dhabi for the remainder. 
Abu Dhabi is also, however, continually making new finds, especially offshore, or 
finding new structures in existing fields, even though exploration has been severly 
curtailed. 
4. 7.3 Oil in Abu-Dhabi 
Of the companies involved in exploiting hydrocarbons in the emirate, 
three dominate the scene. These are the Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil 
Operations (Adco), the Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Operating Company (Adma-
Opco) and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc). Until Adnoc's Upper 
Zakum field came on stream in 1983, over 90 percent of Abu Dhabi's oil production 
came from fields exploited by the first two companies, in each of which a 60 percent 
share is held by the state. 
Adco, founded in September 1978, took over the operations of ADPC, 
which under its original title of Petroleum Development Trucial Coast (PDTC) 
won its 75 year concession from the ruler of Abu Dhabi in 1939. It was 23.75 per-
cent owned by BP Exploration Company (Middle East), 23.75 percent by Shell, 
23.75 percent by Compagnie Fransaise des Petroles (CFP), 23.75 percent by the 
Near East Development Corporation, and 5 percent owned by Partex, represent-
ing Gulbenkian interests. ADPC's first discovery was at its fourth well, at Bah, 
in December 1960, and its second was at Bu Hasa in 1962. Other commercial dis-
coveries followed at Asab in 1965, Sahil in 1972 and Farm Yafur in 1973. In the 
meantime , however, ADPC had gradually been relinquishing parts of its original 
concession, retaining less than 40 percent by 1971. The Abu Dhabi government 
acquired its initial stake in ADPC in 1972 (at a time when participation agree-
ments were reached between most Gulf countries and their concessionaries) and 
subsequently increased this from 25 percent to 60 percent in 1974. The present 
composition of ADCO is BP 24 percent, Shell 9.5 percent, Mobil and Exxon 4.75 
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percent each, Partex 2 percent and Adnoc 55 percent. 
The second major company, Adma-Opco, took over from its predecessor, 
Abu Dhabi Marine areas, in 1977. Adma (one third CFP and two thirds BP) 
took over in 1955 a concession which had been granted to D' Arcy Exploration 
Company in 1953 to search for oil in all offshore and submerged areas now coverd 
by the ADPC concession. Adma discovered oil at Umm Shaif in 1958, but the first 
shipment of U mm Shaif crude had to await the construction of an export terminal 
at Das Island, which was completed in 1962. A second Adma discovery at Zakum, 
in 1965, began production in 1967. Ownership of the company now stands as 
follows: Adnoc 60 percent, Japan Oil Development Company, 12 percent, BP 
14.67 percent and CFP 13.33 percent. Of Abu Dhabi's existing, established, oil 
producing areas, the onshore fields of Bah, Asab and Bu Hasa have already been 
mentioned. Some of the more important offshore operations can be summarised 
as follows: 
U mm Shaif and Zakum, are both operated by Adma-Opco and both export 
through Das Island. Crude output from these fields was 227,698 and 198,316 
b/d respectivity in 1981, falling to 134,000 and 72,000 b/d respectivily in 1983. 
Subsequently production figures were not published but, after being cut in 1986 
to 170,000 b/d, the total allowable output from the two fields was raised in mid-
1987 to whatever they could dispose of. This was around 180,000 b/d in the first 
half of 1988 and around 300,000 b/d in the second half. 
Upper Zakum has production capacity of 500,000 bjd. The field is jointly 
owned by Adroc and Jodco but CFP was the contractor for the development. 
Output from Upper Zakum, a costly field to develop at a time when the oil price 
was already declining, began 1983 and by 1988 was around 300,000 b/d, although 
its production has always been particularly vulnerable to Abu Dhabi policy vis-
a-vis Opec, and it was reported to have been cut to 100,000 b/d in the summer 
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of 1989. 
Al-Bundug field, which came into production in December 1975, exports 
through a pipeline to Das. Production was erratic, with stoppages occuring in 
1978 and 1979 due to the rise in the gas/oil ratio. Qatar and Abu Dhabi, which 
take an equal share in revenues from this field because of its location, pressurised 
Udeco (a group of Japanese Companies which owns one third of the Bundug Oil 
Company, with BP and CFP owning another third each) to carry out a water 
injection programme. This programme, which began in 1981 at a cost of $300 m, 
allowed output from the field to reach 12,000- 13,000 b/d in 1988. 
Abul-Bukhoush field, which has been developed by a company of that 
name, is jointly owned by CFP (51 percent), Nepco Exploration (24.5 percent) 
and Kerr McGee and Amerada Hess (12.5 percent each). This field came into pro-
duction in 1974. Allowable production was 60,000 b/d in 1986, but in November 
of that year production facilities were damaged in an air raid resulting from the 
Iraq-Iran war. It is now back on stream, producing around 40,000 b/d at the end 
of 1988. 
The Umm al-Dalkh field, which is also limited to the Zirku terminal, was 
developed by the Jodco organisation. It came on stream in 1985 and at the end 
of 1988 was producing a steady 10,000 bjd. Udeco was set up in 1980 for the 
exploration and development of the U mm al-Dalkh, Sateh, Dalma and J amain 
fields. 
The Sateh field, also developed by the Japanese, came on stream in 1987; 
production at the end of 1988 was estimated at 15,000 b/d. 
The Mubarraz field, discovered by the Abu Dhabi Oil Company (Adoco, 
comprising Munuzen Oil, Daikyo Oil and Nippon Mining and the Japan National 
Oil Company), came on stream in 1973 and is currently producing around 9,000 
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- 10,000 bfd. A company named after the oil field, set up in 1979 to explore a 
new 1,582 Km2 area awarded to Adoc, is now producing 8,000 b/d from West 
M u barraz field. 
The Arzanah field was discovered by a group of US independents led by 
Amerada Hess ( 41.5 percent), Pan Ocean {315 percent), Bow Valley Industries 
{10 percent), Wington Enterprises {12 percent) and Houston Oils {5 percent), in 
an area relinquished by Adma. During 1988, the field was producing only 10,000 
b/d, compared with its initial yield of 22,000 b/d registered when it came on 
stream in 1979. 
4. 7.4 Oil in Dubai 
Oil was first discovered in Dubai in 1966 in an offshore concession by 
the Dubai Petroleum Company {DPC). This company was founded in 1963 by 
Continental Oil Company of the USA and Dubai Marine Areas {Duma) which, at 
that time, was two thirds owned by BP and one third by CFP. The Fateh field 
was found in June 1966, with production and exports starting in September 1969. 
In November 1970, a second field, Southwest Fateh, was found in 1973 and named 
Rashid after the ruler of Dubai. This come on stream in March 1979, producing 
oil and gas from six wells. A fourth field, Falah, started production in June 1978 
and a fifth, the Margham onshore field, was discovered by Arco Dubai in 1982. Of 
these fields, Fateh has been most productive, with output averaging over 200,000 
b/d, followed by Southwest Fateh with some 184,000 bfd. Falah and Rashid are 
both much smaller, yielding 10,000 b/d each. 
4.7.5 Oil in Sharjah 
Production of petroleum began in Sharjah in 1974, with the Mubarak 
field producing at the rate of 60,000 b/d. The field lies in a protocal area which 
is occupied by Iran, and in the north it lies in Iranian territorial concessions for 
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hydrocarbons exploration. Shajah has production and drilling rights, but shares 
production and revenue with Iran. Of the remaining revenue, 20 percent is shared 
with Umm al-Qawian and 10 percent with Ajman. The field has brought Sharjah 
revenues of around Dh 20m per year since then, apart from in 1975 and 1976, 
when the value of export was about Dh 30 m each year. During early 1986 a 
new $100m investment programme for the Muborak field was announced. This 
should expand Sharjah's output considerably over the next decade. Four consortia 
were responsible for exploration of production in the 1970's- Crescent Petroleum 
Company, Foreman Exploration, Reserve Oil and Gas and Amoco, which took over 
its concession in 1976. At the end of 1980, however, Amoco announced a major 
new onshore discovery of petroluem and natural gas. Experts of crude petroleum 
from this Sajoa field started in mid- 1982 at a rate of 25,000 b/d. 
4.7.6 Oil in Ras al-Khaimah 
Gulf Oil, which had been exploring for oil in a 2,000 Km2 offshore con-
cession was finally able to announce a significant oil find in 1983 : this marked a 
long awaited and fervently hoped for breakthrough for Ras al-Khaimah. Gulf Oil 
was awarded an option to carry out geodetic work in onshore areas in 1978 and 
was later granted coastal shelf areas as well. At the end of 1981, a 2,000 Km2 
offshore exploration concession was confirmed as having been awarded to a group 
led by Gulf Oil (37.5 percent), International Petroleum of Canada {22.5 percent), 
Windsor Resources of Canada (17.5 percent), Opic of Tawian (17.5 percent) and 
Petrokal (5 percent). Windsor Resources withdraw almost immediately, however, 
and the remaining partners increased their stakes. 
Gulf Oil was taken over by Chevron in 1985, which in 1987 sold its share 
in the concession to the following partners: International Petroleum has 42.01 
percent, OPEC 31.31 and Wintershall 26.68 percent. International Petroleum 
(IP), which is also involved in oil exploration of Oman's Musardam peninsula, 
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in 1987 signed a 2,000 Km2 onshore concession agreement with Ras al-Khaimah 
and has since drilled several development wells. IP was joined in the middle of 
1988 by the US Phillips Petroleum International Corporation Mid East with a 50 
percent interest, and Swedish Petroleum Exploration Consortium with 7 percent, 
thus leaving IP with 43 percent. IP remains the operator. 
4.7.7 Natural Gas Industry: An Overview 
During the early 1970's much of gas produced in association with petroleum 
was flared off, but in 1977 an LNG plant in Das Island started recovering offshore 
associated gas, and soon afterwards plans were set in motion for a scheme to 
collect onshore gas. This scheme known as GASCO, began production in 1981, 
and by 1985 was producing 24,000 b/d of propane and 28,000 b/d of butane. In 
1981 a new gasfield was found underlying the offshore Zakum oil field, and in 1984 
exploration began in Abu Dhabi's share of the Khuff formation, though to be one 
of the largest offshore gasfields in the world. Abu Dhabi is also dominant in terms 
of gas, though not to quite the same extent as in oil. Its reserves were estimated 
at 5,197 bn m3 as of January 1988, compared with 311 bn m3 for Sharjah, 142 bn 
m3 for Dubai and 34 bn m3 for Ras al-Khaimah. By the end of 1988 the emirate's 
total gas reserves had fallen to 5,664 bn m3. Exploitation of non-associated gas 
has assumed some urgency in Abu Dhabi, however, because of the effect on gas 
projects of the decline in output of crude oil. The UAE's marketed production 
of natural gas stood at 18.58 bn m3 in 1988, remaining at around the same level 
that was reached in 1987. 
4.7.8 Natural Gas in Abu-Dhabi 
The state oil company Adnoc, set up in November 1971, has branched 
out in a wide range of upstream activities, including gas gathering and liquefac-
tion, refining expansion and the acquisition of a sizeable tanker fleet. Besides its 
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shareholdings in Adco and Adma-Opco, Adnoc has a 51 percent stake in the Abu 
Dhabi Gas Liquifaction Company (Adgas), which it owns with BP (16.33 percent), 
CFP (8.17 percent), Mitsui (22.05 percent) and Bridgestone (2.45 percent). This 
company has built a $550 mn plant on Das Island to produce 2.2 - 2. 7 mn tons 
of LNG and 1 mn tons of LPG annually, as well as natural gasoline and sulphur, 
from offshore gas. Shipments from this plant began in 1977 with most of the LNG 
and LPG going to Japan, but since 1982 the plant has operated for much of the 
time at less than capacity because of the drop in Abu Dhabi's output of crude oil 
during the 1982-85 period. This in turn has prompted Adgas to seek to exploit 
non-associated gas, such as that obtainable from the Khuff formation offshore. 
Adnoc has also holds a 68 percent stake in Abu Dhabi Gas Industries (Gasca), 
along with Shell (15 percent), CFP (15 percent) and Partex (2 percent). Gasca 
runs a $1.8 bn project at Ruwais to extract propane, butane and condensate from 
associated gas produced by the onshore Bu Hasa, Bob and Asab oilfields. The 
plant has the capacity of produce 4.75 mn tjy of LNG (1.22 mn tjy of propane, 
1.4 mn tjy of butane and 2.12 mn tjy of natural gasoline), most of which is des-
tined for Japan, but it too was adversely affected by persistetly low oil production 
during 1982-85 and the Bah plant, as well as the field, was closed early in 1986. 
Plans to de-mothball Bah were announced in 1989. 
There also appear to be major non-associated gas reserves underlying 
the offshore Zakum oil field, where a discovery well tested at over 75 mn ft3 a 
day. This is in addition to an earlier discovery, in 1979, of large reserves of non-
associated gas in the Khuff formation underlying the U mm Shaif offshore field, 
where a discovery well tested at over 80 mn ft3 a day. The latter reserves are 
estimated at 100 trillion ft3, while those of the Thamama C and F formations 
of the onshore Bah field are put a round 90 trillion ft3• Thamama C gas came 
on stream in the third quarter of 1984 from a gas treatment plant at Bah with 
a capacity to produce 390 mn ft3 s/d of sweet gas, 960,000 tjy of condesate and 
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45,000 tjy of NGL. The gas is used for power generation by Abu Dhabi Water 
and Electricity Department. 
4.7.9 Gas in Dubai 
Dubai's associated gas was flared during the first few years of oil pro-
duction but in 1975, after the 1973-74 oil price rises had made gas seem more 
attractive, the Dubai government set up its own body, the Dubai Natural Gas 
Company (Dugas), which is owned 80 percent by the Dubai government and 20 
percent by Scimitar Oils, to exploit gas produced at the emirate's offshore fields, 
as well as gas from Sharjah. Technology for this purpose is provided by Scimitar, 
a subsidiary of Sunningdale Oils of Canada. Three of the wells at Rashid oil fields 
were on Dugas's behalf. Dugas facilities have been expanded to gather 150 mn 
ft3 /d of gas from Fateh, Southwest Fateh and Rashid and a second compressor 
platform was installed in 1986. A processing plant at Jebel Ali, which receives 
the gas, has the capacity to produce 700 t/d of butane, 9,000 b/d of condesate, 
1,000 t/d of propane and 130 mn ft3 /d of dry gas. A special gas terminal has 
been built at Jebel Ali port which can handle gas tankers of up to 48,000 tons. 
The plant was formally inaugurated in 1980 and began exporting the following 
year. Just over half its capacity, however, is geared to processing residual gas to 
supply the needs of Dugas's own generators, followed by those of Dubai itself and 
of the Dubai aluminuim plant. A small proportion of the propane, butane and 
condensate produced is also consumed locally by the Dubai Gas Bottling Com-
pany, which supplies the local market. Dugas exports the remainder of its output 
to Japan. In 1989 Dugas signed an agreement with Arco to take some 460 mn ft3 
2f Mangham gas. 
4.7.10 Gas in Sharjah 
At the end of 1980 Amoco of the USA helped redeem the situation of 
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Sharjah with its discovery of the gas/condensate onshore field at Sajoa. By 1985 
Amoco was producing some 60,000 b/d of low sulphur condensate and some 500-
600 mn ft3 of gas. Sharjah took a long time to decide what to do with the 
gas, all of which now goes to the LPG plant, owned 60 percent by the Sharjah 
government, 25 percent by Amoco and 7.5 percent each by two Japanese concerns, 
JBC Corporation and Tokyo Bocki, which have responsibility for marketing. The 
plant produces 230,000 tfy of propane, 170,000 tfy of butane and 230,000 tfy of 
condensates. Of the dry gas, some 54 percent or 209 mn ft3 / d, goes to Dubai 
Electricity's Jebel Ali power station and the rest to Emirates General Petroleum 
Corporation (EGPC). EGPC has built a pipeline network to take the gas to power 
stations in the other northern emirates. 
4.7.11 Gas in Ras al-Khaimah 
Cost over-runs on drilling were partly justified when the Saleh field was 
found offshore. The gasfcondersate field field came on stream in 1985 at a rate 
of 5,000 b/d and production briefly rose to 10,000 b/d before pressure problems 
asserted themselves. By 1989 production had fallen to negligible quantities. 
4. 7.12 Petroleum Refining 
The government of Abu Dhabi has continually planned to develop its 
"downstream" production, and its first refinery, at Umm al-Nar, came on stream 
in 1976 with a capacity of 15,000 b/d. A second refinery, at Ruwais, went into 
operation in June 1987. The Ruwais refinery, which after expansion was originally 
planned to achieve an output of 300,000 b/d, was forced to produce temporarily 
at a capacity of only 75,000 b/d, after reduced demand had led to cutbacks in 
the scale of expansion. There are also plans for the refinery to be linked to a 
27,000 b/d hydrocracker unit which was then under construction. In 1982 work 
began on a 60,000 b/d extension of the Umm al-Nar refinery and was completed 
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in 1984. In 1985 Abu Dhabi had a total refinery capacity of 240,000 bjd. Plans 
were announced in mid - 1989 to increase output at Umm al-Nar to 85,000 b/d 
and to upgrate Ruwais products with sweetening and de-bottlenecking projects. 
4.7.13 Petrochemicals 
During the 1970's there were several plans for the development of petro-
chemical industries in the UAE, but the only one to come to fruition has been the 
fertilizer complex at Ruwais, Ruwais Fertiliser Industries, of which two-thirds is 
owned by ADNOC and one-third by total- CFP. The $350 million plant is geared 
to produce an eventual 1,000 tons per day of ammonia and 1,500 tons per day of 
urea. There is also an Organic Fertilizer Plant in AI-Ain and there are plans for 
boosting its daily capacity from 45 to 160 tons to meet local demand for organic 
fertilizers. There are also plans for setting up of a laboratory for carrying out 
tests on soil quality and fertilizer effectiveness. 
4.7.14 Aluminium Smelting 
Dubai Aluminium (Dubal), the largest non-oil industry in Dubai, com-
menced operations at the end of 1979. It was built at a cost of $800m., and has an 
installed capacity of 135,000 metric tons of aluminium ingots per year. In 1987 it 
produced 106,000 tons, of which 77,347 tons went to Japan. Production amounted 
to 163,445 tons in 1988 and Dubal plans to increase production to 230,000 t/y 
with an additional pot line. 
4.7.15 Cement Industry 
The U AE has nine cement factories, three in Ras al-Khaimah (one pro-
ducing white cement) and one in each of the other emirates, with a total capacity 
of around 8.5mu tjy.Local demand for cement was estimated at less than 2m tons 
in 1986, but discussion between the emirates on how to rationalize production 
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made little progress. So the cement surplus of the U AE reached 4 million tons 
by 1988. The new plant is owned by Ajman Cement Company which was set up 
with a paid up a capital of DH 225 million. 
4.8 Industrial Cooperation amongst The GCC Countries:-
The blueprint for GCC industrial cooperation is contained in Article 
12 of the Economic Agreement (EA), which calls on the states "to coordinate 
industrial activities, formulate policies and mechanisms aiming at the industrial 
development and the diversification of their productive bases on an integrated 
basis", "standardise their industrial legislation and regulations", and, "allocate 
industries between member states according to relative advantage and economic 
feasibility". Similarly, Article 13 highlights the need for the member states to 
"pay special attention" to the establishment of joint ventures in industry. Many 
of the specifics of these more general objectives were articulated in the more 
recent industrial development strategy, the GCC Unified Industrial Development 
Strategy, adopted by the member states in 1985 (See Appendix c). 
The importance of harmonizing and codifying regulations relating to in-
dustry was echoed by the GCC ministers of industry during their first meeting in 
Riyadh in October, 1980. In order to establish a common base for such a codifica-
tion process, however, action to standardize the various measures and procedures 
in the GCC industries was necessary. For this reason, at their second meeting in 
Taif in October 1981 the ministers proposed the creation of the Gulf Standards 
and Measures Organization (GSMO), as well as the establishment of an industrial 
data centre to be developed together with GOIC. The GSMO was formally es-
tablished by the Supreme Council during its meeting at Doha in November 1982, 
though since its inception it has been little more than an extension of SASO. By 
February 1987, 53 common standards had been reached through GSMO. 
118 
It is not surprising that the GCC ministers of industry also embraced the 
principle of encouraging and protecting infant industries from the outset of the 
GCC. They agreed in October 1981 to assist local industries by using only national 
products in public projects. Measures to protect local industries, most especially 
cement, aluminium, steel, copper, and asbestos, have also been examined during 
the regular meetings of the industrial cooperation committee, leading to a call to 
the Supreme Council on 12-13 April1985 to impose a 30 percent duty on cement, 
iron pellets, and aluminium imports. To date, no trade restrictions have been 
imposed on a concerted or GCC - wide basis. 
The industrial cooperation committee has also sought to reduce intra 
- GCC competition through central planning. In particular, the committee has 
agreed not to establish any new cement enterprises or tyre manufacturing plants, 
as there were already sufficient numbers of such endeavors to meet regional de-
mand. On the other hand, during its meeting in December 1983, the committee 
considered measures to encourage development in other industries, such as fibre-
glass and local processing, by requesting sector studies from the GOIC. Studies on 
the promotion of joint ventures in the areas of medicines, chemicals, and building 
materials have also been requested by the committee. 
The long-term objective for industrial cooperation between the GCC 
states was elaborated in the March 1985 statement on Objectives and Policies 
of Development Plans in the GCC states. The statement called on the member 
states to "diversify sources of income by a gradual reduction of dependence on 
oil whereby its share in the gross domestic product and in financing current de-
velopment expenditures is reduced, and increase the share of non-oil sectors (i.e. 
industrial) in the gross domestic product, general budget revenues, and export 
revenues in a way that compensates for reduced dependence on oil". Specifi-
cally, vertical and horizontal expansion of the petrochemical, gas derivatives, and 
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petroleum sectors and the expansion of the refining capacity for petroleum prod-
ucts were highlighted in the statement. 
The ongoing efforts to codify priorities in the area of industrial cooper-
ation resulted in the formulation of the Unified Industrial Development Strategy 
in November 1985. The strategy provides for industrial development among the 
member states, "suited to the potential and conditions of each state", aimed at 
narrowing the gap between them. This is yet another example of the compen-
satory nature of the GCC economic programme. Moreover, the strategy allows 
for integration between the industrial sectors of the GCC states, optimization 
of collective resources, and the development or research and applied science and 
technology capabilities such that "the contribution of conversion industries sector 
to the GNP" will be increased "to the highest level possible". Together, these are 
the areas toward which the GCC industrial programme will be directed. 
4.9 Summary 
Industrialization in the Gulf region has been progressing at a very rapid 
pace with governments spearheading the process through building a strong in-
dustrial base and related infrastructure that are conductive to the establishment 
. of future industrial projects by the private sectors. The advancement of self-
perpetuating industrial sectors is now widely perceived as being the most promis-
ing option to lead Gulf econmic growth in the 1990s. The region has undoubtedly 
learned from the mistakes of the past and is taking measures to eliminate dupli-
cation and over-capacity problems that face certain existing industrial projects. 
Many investment decisions taking during the boom years, especially in the private 
sector, were often based on over-optimistic economic conditions and assumptions 
of long-term government protection and subsidies. Insufficient care was paid to 
the need for through feasibility studies. 
120 
Deficiencies of the sector may also be traced back to the lack of an overall 
industrialization strategy, bureaucratic obstruction , the nature of the industrial 
labour force ( almost exclusively expatriate ), unbalanced consumer consciousness, 
and the inadequacy of incentives at both production and export levels. 
It has become evident that for industrial strategy to succeed, it should 
also take into consideration the need to develop manpower, services, financial and 
capital markets, engineering, maintenance, consultancy and research and devel-
opment facilities. Only those projects that do not require long-term subsidies and 
protection to become commercially viable should be considered. A comprehensive 
strategic outlook for industrial development at both the national and regional level 
needs to be drawn up and implemented, encompassing such fundemental decisions 
as the relative priorities given to import substitution or export oriented industries. 
Priority should be given to those new projects ensuring complementarity with the 
existing industries. A sliding scale protection- tariff formula directly proportional 
to the ratio of value added of an industry to total value needs to be implemented, 
with infant industries benefiting from higher tariff rates and for a specific period 
of time only. Industries applying for protection should adhere to certain levels of 
specifications and standards and be able to compete in price and quality in the 
local markets. High prices of industrial products could harm the consumers and 
dampen future export potentials. 
Furthermore, governments in the region could help promote private sector 
industries by having tenders drawn up in such a way as to favour locally processed 
products and part of Gulf governments' foreign aid might be provided in kind, 
which would then consist of domestic industrial products. Trading companies 
should be encouraged to take charge of part of the marketing responsibilities, so 
far assumed by the industrial units. 
GCC cooperation policy has focussed on standards and the creation of a 
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Unified Strategy but these have not yet become dominant over national industrial 
strategies. 
These are still the early days of Gulf industrialization. The GCC coun-
tries are trying to compress into a couple of decades what has taken industrial 
countries a century or more to achieve. The road ahead, therefore, remains long 
and challenging. This is not only because of the need to develop indigenous 
manpower and managerial skills that can handle ever-evolving technological ad-
vancement, but also to promote social values and attitudes that are not alien to 
industrial development. During the boom years of the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
sudden easy access to wealth created a consumer oriented society in which the 
relationship between productivity and reward was largely diluted. Self-fulfilment 
was, to a large extent, realised through purchasing power not through creative or 
productive ability. 
Like other developing countries, an indigenous tradition of research and 
development in the region is still lacking. Research is considered to be more of 
an academic exercise than a vital ancillary to industry and transfer of technol-
ogy. Without fostering an indigenous tradition for research and bringing forth 
a change in the general attitude towards employment in the productive sectors 
of the economy, manufacturing may become an "enclave" economic sector which 
provides income to the rest of economy but little productive development. It will 
be most unfortune if current efforts to reduce the region's over-dependence on the 
export of a single commodity, namely crude oil, succeed at the expense of creating 
a perpetual dependence on foreign labour and technical expertise. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Services Development in the GCC Countries 
5.1 Introduction 
The economic history of the Arabian Gulf states has passed through two 
periods: the first period is called the pre-oil period, which covered the time span 
before the possibilities of the existence of oil resources became known, and the 
second period called the oil period, which covers the period from when the first 
commercial oil exports began to the outside world. 
Life was very simple before the discovery of oil in the Arabian Gulf region. 
At that time, the main resource for the Gulf region was the sea. The bare nature 
of the land and the lack of rain in the Gulf region meant that Gulf people had a 
hard struggle against nature. In Saudi Arabia they used to depend mainly on the 
revenue from customs, taxes and fees on pilgrims who converged annually from all 
over the world to visit the holy places, while the other Gulf states used to depend 
on pearl-diving, fishing, building boats and trading activities. 
During this period, trade between the Gulf area and India, Iran, Africa 
and Iraq played a significant role in their economies in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centures, and its main centres were Kuwait and Bahrain. 
The oil revenue of countries of the Gulf Cooperation is mainly channeled 
into educational, health and social services made available to the region's people. 
After decades of struggling to secure food and housing requirements, the discovery 
of oil gave the governments of the region the opportunity to begin planning for 
the provision of suitable housing, health and social care. 
Modern transportation, improved communications and other amenities 
were also made available by the Gulf's developing welfare states. With increas-
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ing wealth accruing from oil proceeds and the subsequent population boom, the 
G.C.C. member states realized the necessity of establishing adequate facilities to 
provide drinking water and electricity. In a desire to improve the living standards 
of the region, these states also began to build roads, construct houses and schools 
in addition to providing gardens, playgrounds, and improved postal services. 
Prior to any organized cooperative planning (i.e. the GCC), certain Gulf 
states, due to the lack of adequate financial surpluses were unable to implement 
these development projects, therefore, a number of Gulf countries, such as Kuwait, 
extended educational and health services to needy sister states. This type of 
cooperation was formalised with the setting up of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
With the GCC's formation, leaders and officials of the six states expressed deep 
concern with boosting cooperation in the fields of education, information, health, 
housing, transport and electricity and water supplies, in addition to developing 
joint interest in such fields as youth and sports. The GCC leaders wanted to 
coordinate all these activities. Despite achievements in all these areas, the region 
continues to face the challenge of building up a Gulf spirit, with which Gulf 
citizens would realise their roles as both providers and beneficiaries of services 
and as owners of the means of production. This aspiration, however, can only be 
achieved through improved education systems in which local cadres could qualify 
in the necessary fields, so that their talents and capabilities would be developed. 
This is the only way to compensate for existing shortages of national expertise 
and improve performance in this sector. 
5.2 QATAR 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Before the discovery of oil, Qatar's pearling industry was the mainstay of 
the economy. During the 1930s Japan began producing and marketing cultured 
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pearls, an action which had disastrous effects on Qatar's earning potential. Thus, 
Qatar has already experienced the difficulties which can result from overdepen-
dency upon a single resource. The discovery of oil was welcome, indeed, for it 
came immediately after the slump in the pearl market. 
5.2.2 Education Services:-
Education in Qatar is free but not compulsory. The first primary school 
was established in 1952. At that time there were 250 male pupils, taught by 6 
teachers at one school in the capital, Doha. By 1971, state schools were providing 
for 17,500 primary and 5,000 secondary pupils. By 1986 the school population 
had risen above 50,000, about 60 percent of whom were studying at primary level. 
There were 165 schools in 1985 and another 37 were planned, although only ten 
of these looked likely to be built in the immediate term. Qatar University was 
established in 1977. The first students graduated in 1981 and by 1986 the number 
of students studying at Qatar University and overseas was put at 5,000. A new 
campus is being built, the first phase of which was completed in mid-1985, with 
a view to accommodating 3,000 students. However,a women's science faculty was 
among components of the university project postponed in 1986. 
There is an important regional vocational training centre which offers 
courses in industrial skills up to City and Guilds standard in addition to a College 
of Trade and Industry. Some 500 students a year enter industrial training and 
professional institutions. The Ministry of education has also given more attention 
to adult literacy education programme. The number of persons attending evening 
schools and anti-illiteracy centres was about 5942 in 1986/87 which is 9.9 percent 
of the total enrolled in the pre-university levels. 
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5.2.3 Health and Housing Services:-
Health services have been planned in Qatar in the form of providing fa-
cilites for curative and preventive medicine. Health services in Qatar are provided 
to all residents in the country free of charge. This includes medical, dental and 
surgical services. 
There are now over 1,000 hospital beds, including 464 in the main hospital 
at Doha and 600 in the Hamad General Hospital which opened in 1979. A new 
women's hospital with 310 beds was completed by the end of 1987. Further 
specialist hospitals and health centres are planned. An incipient drug problem has 
recently been recognised among the young and this has encouraged the government 
to increase spending on leisure and extra-curricular educational facilities. 
Housing Services:-
Qatar has one of the most advanced and extensive welfare systems in 
the Gulf and is committed to ensuring that oil wealth benefits all Qatari citizens, 
although, when oil revenue began to plunge in 1986, various plans for additional 
schools and hospitals were shelved. The government invested heavily in the 1970s 
and by the early 1980s nearly all the major infrastructure was in place. The 
capital, Doha, houses 80 percent of the population and the industrial centre of 
Umm Said, 40 Km south of Doha, is being extensively developed. A new town 
is planned for Ras Laffan in the north east, near the site of a huge offshore gas 
development, although initial plans have been scaled down considerably. 
5.2.4 Information and Tourism:-
The mass media, which consists of the press, Qatar News Agency, radio 
and television, provide information regarding international and local issues to the 
people of Qatar. There are several Arabic and foreign language daily newspapers 
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and other periodicals. Two television channels provide a variety of programmes 
in Arabic and other languages, while AM and FM radio broadcasts are made in 
Arabic and English. 
The Ministry of Information, which was established in April 1972, con-
trols the media and lays down broad guidelines which they should follow in their 
productions. The Ministry of Information also publishes its own periodicals which 
provide information relating to social and cultural activities in Qatar and the 
Arabian Gulf region. The formation and implementation of government policy is 
communicated to the general public through the media. 
Cultural facilities such as museums, theatres and amusements parks, also 
make a contribution to the forces of cohesion in any nation. The past achievemnts 
of the country in these fields are preserved so that they may stimulate future 
generations. 
5.2.5 Transport and Communications:-
5.2.5.1 Roads: 
A network of some 900 km of good roads, some dual carriageway, provides 
a ring road system and links Doha with Ruwais in the north, Dukhan, Umm 
Said and the frontier at Salwah. There is now a continuous land connection with 
Europe, so that it is possible to drive on a surfaced road from the English Channel 
to Ras al-Khaimah or Muscat via Qatar, the average journey taking about twelve 
days. 
5.2.5.2 Ports:-
Doha's deep water port, completed in 1970, was extended in 1977 but 
Umm Said port handles the bulk of industrial goods and oil. Umm Said has nine 
berths, as does Doha, comprising five deep water and four shallow water facilities. 
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In some ways Qatar's ports have been overshadowed by other Gulf ports which 
can offer deeper draught and better container handling facilities. By the end of 
1985, however, the decline in new construction projects adversely affected imports 
and port traffic. This trend continued in 1986 when a 12 percent drop in unloaded 
cargo was reported during the first half of the year, and during the same period 
in 1987 an even more dramatic fall, of 38 percent was reported. A new ship repair 
yard owned by the Qatar National Navigation and Transport Company opened in 
Umm Said in 1982. Its facilities include a floating dry dock capable of handling 
vessels up to 8,400 tons. 
5.2.5.3 Airports:-
There is an international airport at Doha. Some 17 airlines serve the 
airport, which provides regular air links from Doha to destinations in Europe and 
Asia as well as other parts of the Middle East. Plans for a new international 
airport west of Doha, with a runway of nearly 15,000 ft., were postponed in 1980. 
5.2.5.4 Telecommunications:-
The internal telephone service 99 percent state owned has been extended 
in stages from 18,000 lines in 1975 to 120,000 in 1989. Direct dialling is available 
to 170 countries, including the USA and Western Europe, as well as to other 
parts of the Gulf. An earth satellite station has been built and a second satellite 
link-up, to provide access to North America and Europe, opened in February 
1985. A third link up to Arabsat, the Pan-Arab satellite system, was due to open 
in 1985, but was delayed. A maritime communication station was completed in 
early 1985. A microwave repeater tower on the border of Saudi Arbia was opened 
in 1983 providing 920 telephone circuits, one television and one radio channel 
between the two countries. Plans to extend the connections to Kuwait, Iraq and 
Jordan have been shelved. A submarine cable link to Bahrain and the UAE was 
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completed by the end of 1984. 
5.2.6 Insurance and Banking:-
The existence of a sound and organized banking system will discourage 
people from hoarding cash balances. It is natural that individual savers would be 
willing to increase the return on their savings by depositing them in banks, and 
earning interest. 
Qatar has not so far attempted to become a financial centre like Bahrain 
but it does have 14 banks. Four of these are entirely locally owned: the Qatar 
National Bank, the Doha Bank, the privately owned Commercial Bank of Qatar, 
and the Qatar Islamic Bank. The great majority of Qatari banks' activities centre 
on issuing letters of credit and providing loans to the private sector undertaking 
government projects. The National Bank holds nearly 50 percent of deposits and 
handles most of the government's business. It also has some of the functions of a 
central bank, although it shares these with the Qatar Monetary Agency, which sets 
interest rates. In 1980, as a result of the flow of capital out of Qatar, interest rates 
were revised upwards to a maximum of 9.5 percent on loans and 7.7 percent on 
deposits. However, these were revised downward by 1 percent in 1986. The rates 
have remained below world levels and capital continues to flow out. The Islamic 
Bank was in part designed to help attract local money into the local banking 
system. Since over 90 percent of revenues in Qatar stem from the government, the 
banking community is heavily dependent on government spending. In 1983 when 
the government stopped, or delayed, payments on several large contracts, Qatari 
banks suffered from an acute liquidity crisis. This was alleviated in 1984 when 
government revenues increased. The Qatar National Bank provided support to the 
smaller local banks during the 1983liquidity crisis. There have been mixed results 
on banking profits in the period since then. The Qatar Islamic Bank posted a four-
fold rise in net income in early year 1987/88. The government's failure to produce 
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a current budget for 1986 added to managers' concerns, but results were mixed, as 
they were in 1987. However, results have subsequently improved and apart from 
a slight drop at the Commercial Bank of Qatar attributable to an exceptional 
item, the locally owned banks reported improved profits in 1988. Problems with 
bad debts and strict control of government spending have constrained new lending, 
while Qatari banks are attempting to expand into the retail market. The National 
Bank is now also going into international syndications, acting as an agent for the 
government's $200 mn syndicated loan. 
Growth in money supply has been erratic since 1980 and money supply 
M1, comprising currency in circulation and demand deposits, contracted by 31 
percent in the year to the end of September 1988 as a result of a fall both in 
demand deposits and in currency in circulation. 
Table 5.1 : Monetary Indicators (QRmn, end period) 
Sources 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988@ 
Currency outside banks 1,068.4 1,186.4 1,120.0 1,287.8 1,248.7 1,163.4 
Demand deposits 2,556.1 2,948.1 2,896.7 3,199.4 3,529.7 2,132.5 
M1 3,624.5 4,134.5 4,016.7 4,487.2 4,778.4 3,295.9 
Time and savings 
deposits 4,863.2 6,219.5 7,288.7 8,081.7 8,871.5 9,163.9 
M2 8,487.7 10,354.0 11,305.4 12,568.9 13,649.9 12,459.8 
@ - End September 1988 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Insurance:-
In 1980 Qatar, together with Libya, Kuwait and U.A.E. took part in a 
new international insurance company, the Arab Insurance Group (Arig), based in 
Bahrain and capitalised at $3 bn. The participation of the government reflected 
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concern about the war risk premiums issued by Lloyds of London and U.S. insurers 
on business in the Gulf. The Qatar Insurance Company is locally owned and 
includes a 20 percent state holding. 
5.2. 7 Electricity and Water:-
Water supply in Qatar depends on the desalination of sea water, since 
sufficient sweet water is not available. The production of water and its distribution 
is entrusted to the Water Department of the Ministry of Electricity and Water. 
Qatar's power needs are supplied by two major power stations. One at Ras Abu 
Aboud has a capacity of 210 mw and 11.5 mn g/d of distilled water. Another, 
at Ras Abu Fontas, came into full operation in 1983 with a total generating 
capacity of 1,150 mw and desalination capacity of 48 mn g/d. Another power 
and desalination plant is to be built at Wusail. When completed, it could provide 
1,500 mw of power and 10 mw g/d of water but work on the plant has been delayed 
by budget constraints, though bids were sought in mid 1989 for the construction 
of an additional 250 mw of generating capacity and 10 mn g/ d of desalination 
capacity, for completion in 1991 and 1992. Local power demand, however, was 
expected to have risen to 1,350 mw by 1988, compared with 730 mw in 1983. 
Desalinated water provides the vast majority of Qatar's drinking water and water 
consumption is estimated at around 50 mn g/ d. Pending completion of the Wusail 
complex or some alternative, such levels will stretch local desalination capacity to 
its limits. 
5.3 KUWAIT 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Before the discovery and export of oil, the Kuwaiti economy depended 
on fishing, pearl-diving, seafaring, boat-building, herding and trade. These were 
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the pillars of the Kuwaiti economy, from its establishment in the 1670s until the 
outbreak of the Second World War. 
5.3.2 Education Services:-
The youth of the Kuwaiti population imposes special demands upon pub-
lic services. The state's commitment to a comprehensive education system repre-
sents one of the most important responses to this challenge. Kuwait's first school 
was established in 1912, and education has been treated as a priority for most of 
the modern era. Kuwait is a nation heavily involved in learning and acquiring the 
skills needed for the next century. Children entering schools can look forward to 
a process that leads a growing proportion to recognised academic and technical 
qualifications. For many, higher and advanced education is a practical reality. 
Education is compulsory and free from the ages of six to fourteen, and 
there is an active literacy campaign which by 1985 had reduced the illiteracy rate 
to 9.9 percent among Kuwaiti men and 24.1 percent among Kuwaiti women. 
Higher education has a two-decade history. Kuwait University was opened 
in 1966 with a single faculty. Today, there are now 17,047 students, and the uni-
versity provides education in a wide range of disciplines to a high level. A large 
number of Kuwaitis continue to leave the state to pursue higher education, but 
the long-term objective is to provide most of the training needed in the country. 
Vocational training has been emphasised in the past decade as the gov-
ernment recognised the need for technically qualified, as well as academically 
qualified staff. A series of vocational institutes have been established. In 1982, 
the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training was established. 
The Public Authority is responsible for drafting plans and training schemes 
for the whole economy. Specific training centres include the Telecommunications 
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Training Institute, the Aviation Institute and the Fire-fighting Training School. 
In the 1986/87 academic year, more than 10,000 trainees were enrolled in pro-
grammes at these centres. 
5.3.3 Health and Housing Services:-
Health care is free for all residents, and life expectancy in 1987 was 71 
years for men and 75 years for women, among the highest in the Arab world. 
Kuwait, which adopted the health registration system, constructed a clinic in each 
area so that the citizens enjoy easy access to medical services, with those clinics 
preserving medical files for each family to facilitate monitoring of the patients 
health and any possible hereditary diseases. 
The Ministry of Public Health was established in 1962 to meet the in-
creasing and divergent medical needs. It comprised a considerable number of 
well-qualified medical cadres and sought the assistance of consultants in the vari-
ous medical spheres upon the establishment of the state's health service facilities. 
The Ministry efforts in developing health services were manifested in the number 
of hospitals which had increased from 8 in 1961 to 17 in 1989 as well as the prolif-
eration in the country's poly-clinics which went up from 32 to 45 during the same 
period. In 1988, a total of 8,446,989 people received treatment in Kuwait by 362 
medical doctors at 56 different centres, with 900 work hours per day. Child care 
centres offered, during the same year, services to approximately 2.5 million peo-
ple, while mother care centres served more or less 300,000 pregnant women and 
extended 192,000 consultations in cases of gynaecology. The number of physicians 
working in the country's public health institutions was at 2,842 in 1988, averaging 
one doctor for each 200 people in comparison with 1961 statistics, which showed 
that there had been a single physician for about each 1,000 people. Beds also 
increased from 2,158 in 1961 to 8,000 in 1988. 
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Kuwait's Medicine Plant, which was established in 1966. 
The plant currently covers all the country's needs of the kinds of medications 
produced by the factory and 13 percent of the Ministry's requirements of medicine 
in general. 
Housing Services:-
Housing is one of the major issues faced by Kuwaiti society due to the fact 
that it directly touches upon the lives of broad sectors of citizens, especially the 
young generation and the newly-formed families. The government, in fact, vowed 
to handle the housing problem some years before the independence, commenced 
to scrutinise providing citizens with housing facilities. 
In the light of studies and researches conducted by Social Affairs and 
Work Ministry, government houses were distrubuted among three groups of citi-
zens, those nominated by the committee members from the limited-income people, 
provided that the nomination be approved by the rest of members, people who 
are temporarily granted houses until construction of their land plots or purchase 
of substitute houses instead of demolished ones, and citizens who cede their right 
to obtain land plots. 
The Credits and Saving Bank was brought into being to grant housing 
loans for citizens who would rather purchase constructed houses, and for those 
who have state-allocated or privately-owned land plots and for people intending 
to expand or rehabilitate their houses. The Bank extends loans to limited-income 
people who intend to construct additional storeys or annexes to their houses. 
The Housing Public Authority gave priority to planning and zoning to 
guarantee proper landscaping, on the one hand, and to make sure that citizens 
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are equally accomodated on the other. A total of KD 706 million were allocated 
for the Authority in the first Five-Year housing plan, which enabled the Authority 
to implement a number of housing units, including 9,696 Arab-style houses. The 
Authority started its second housing plan (1981-85) with an ambitious step that 
aimed at establishing 36,000 residential units, and vowed that it would spare no ef-
fort to quicken the pace of accomplishment and development in the accompanying 
services and utilities. 
5.3.4 Information and Tourism:-
Radio and television are state controlled and, until1986, there was a rel-
atively free, privately owned national press. After the parliamentary dissolution, 
however, a strict press censorship law was introduced, and the press has been ef-
fectively turned into another state controlled medium with censors working inside 
the newspaper offices. A number of newspapers run supplements or sister papers 
in foreign languages to serve the large expatriate community. One of the most re-
spected dailies, Al-Qabas, started an international edition in 1985, with facsimile 
and printing facilities in London. There were seven daily newspapers in 1987. In 
1984 their combined circulation was 283,000, equivalent to 208 copies per 1,000 
of the population. In 1984 there were also 710,000 radios and 575,000 televisions. 
The advent of video recorders has inflicted heavy damage on the cinema sector, 
where the number of visits dropped from 6.3 mn in 1978 to only 0.9 mn in 1987. 
Tourism:-
The question of leisure facilities posted a challenge, but Kuwait overcame 
this by recognising that leisure pursuits are essential to give the population a com-
plete change from the mundane, work-a-day existence. The problem of providing 
facilities for the young has been taken very seriously and recreational activities 
have been on the increase. 
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In former times Kuwaitis had their own popular pastimes such as falconry 
and hunting in the desert for the hubara bird, and the diwaniyah, the meeting 
place for men (which still remains in spite of all the other social changes ). The 
rapid growth of Kuwait's population, coupled with its long summers, has made 
leisure activities and tourist services an essential aspect of city life. Recreational 
programmes in the summer were initiated by the late Saleh Shehab, a pioneer of 
the recreational movement. 
Today Kuwait has a wealth of recreational facilities - gardens, beaches 
and even appearances by international artists organised by both the government 
and by private enterprise. The people in Kuwait today have access to several 
modern leisure areas. 
The Touristic Enterprises Company, which is 92 percent government 
owned and 8 percent owned by investment companies, manages several tourist 
enterprises, such as the famous Kuwait Towers, the Ice-Skating Rink, the Five 
Sea-clubs, and the new tourist complex in Failaka established on an area of 5 mil-
lion square metres. The company also administers Entertainment City at Doha 
and the two rest-houses at Salmi and Nuwaiseeb, and supervises a modern fleet of 
ferries that carry passengers from Ras Al-Ardh harbour to Failaka Island. It is also 
responsible for Kuwait's three public beaches and their amenities, and for Shaab 
garden, with playground facilities for children, in addition to the Musical Foun-
tains. Finally, mention must be made of the two zoological gardens, the sporting 
facilities of Kuwait's hotels, the public cafes as well as other recreational projects, 
all of which provide the population with many opportunities for enjoyment and 
relaxation. 
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5.3.5 Transport and Communications:-
5.3.5.1 Ports:-
The two commercial ports of Shuwaikh and Shuaiba (Doha) have been 
expanded, but further expansion of Shuwaikh, originally planned to cope with the 
large re-export trade, was shelved for the duration of the Iran-Iraq war. Traffic 
through the ports fell from the peak levels of the early 1980s, with total ship 
departures dropping from 3,094 in 1984 to 2,295 in 1987. But the following year 
saw a good recovery. Shuwaikh, which handles half the country's shipping move-
ments, recorded an increase in tonnage to 3.2 mn tons, compared with 3 mn tons 
total tonnage recorded by Shuwaikh and Shuaiba in 1986. Total tonnage handled 
by the two ports in 1988 increased by 20 percent to 7.3 mn tons. Re-exports 
accounted for about one quarter of the tonnage of total sea imports in 1981 and 
1982, but by 1987 this had fallen to 1 percent. 
5.3.5.2 Airports:-
Kuwait's international airport was completed in 1979, and a second run-
way was subsequently built. There are preliminary plans for a second airport to 
be built in the 1990s, although a stopgap expansion was completed during 1986 
with the refurbishing of the old terminal building to serve as a second terminal 
for flights to Arab and Asian destinations. Although passenger traffic declined 
from a peak of nearly 4 mn in 1978 to 2.9 mn in 1985-87, freight traffic increased 
steadily and stood at 86 mn Kg in 1987, the main growth coming from outgoing 
freight. The state owned Kuwait Airways Corporation (KAC) was one of the first 
purchasers of the Airbus, of which it has five, in addition to 13 Boeings. After 
preliminary talks on a possible merger between KAC, Saudia and Gulf Air were 
aborted in 1986, KAC went ahead with plans to expand its fleet. At the end of 
1989 it was considering the purchase of four aircraft. 
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5.3.5.3 Roads:-
Roads in Kuwait City and to other main towns are good, and were im-
proved in a major 330 Km scheme completed in 1988. Traffic congestion in the 
city is severe, despite the existence of many fiyovers, There were 564,410 vehicles 
in use at the end of 1987, of which 424,554 were private cars. 
5.3.5.4 Telecommunications:-
The telephone system is good, with 254,826 telephone subscribers in 1987, 
equivalent to 136 per thousand of the population, and work is in hand to increase 
this to more than half a million. A computer linked directory enquiry service came 
on line in 1982 and the mobile telephone system was privatized and enlarged from 
4,000 lines to 25,000 lines in 1987. Another new development is fibre optics: a 
pilot scheme with 1,920 channels has linked the city to Mishref since 1983. A pilot 
video-text scheme with 1,000 business lines and 300 residential lines was started 
in 1984 using French technology. In 1985 Kuwait agreed with its G.C.C. partners 
to standardise all telecommunication charges. 
5.3.6 Insurance and Banking:-
Besides the Central Bank, the financial sector in Kuwait comprises seven 
commercial banks, namely: National Bank of Kuwait, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, 
Gulf bank, Al-Ahli Bank, Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East, Burgan Bank, 
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait (Branch), as well as three specialised banks, namely, 
Credit and Saving Bank, Kuwait Real Estate Bank, and the Industrial Bank of 
Kuwait. There is also the Kuwait Finance House which is run in accordance with 
Islamic law, and while technically not a bank (i.e. under Central Bank super-
vision) it performs a number of banking functions. Apart from the local banks, 
there are 28 investment companies operating in Kuwait and subject to Central 
Bank supervision and 79 exchange companies, of which 18 are under Central Bank 
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control. In addition a number of insurance companies and agencies are operating 
in the financial market, five of which are Kuwaiti, while others are owned by Arab 
and foreign companies. 
Table 5.2 : Monetary Survey (KD mn). 
Sources 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Net foreign assets 1,966 2,134 2,235 2,341 1,980 1,604 
Claims on private sector 4,753 5,045 5,068 5,156 5,473 5,659 
Claims on government - - - - 537 1,202 
Governments deposits 791 992 996 566 509 610 
Other (net) 1,546 1,691 1,859 2,369 2,707 2,758 
Source: Central Bank of Kuwait, Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, 1989. 
Since the end of 1984 the Central Bank has audited the loan portfolios of the 
commercial banks and, based upon its analysis of the volume of non-performing 
loans, has determined the level of loan loss provisions, declared profits and divi-
dends. After a long delay, the Central Bank in 1986 implemented a scheme to help 
banks reschedule bad debts by guaranteeing promissory notes issued by delinquent 
debtors, and taking a very active role in the auditing process of each bank. The 
result has been that the commercial banks are effectively government controlled 
with respect to their domestic lending activities. 
Another aspect of the Central Bank's increasing monetary control was its 
introduction in April1984 of a two tier exchange rate. This was imposed after an 
abnormal surge in demand for dollars at the end of March, which was far in excess 
of commercial demand. After the new rate, which was set by supply and demand, 
was in place, the Central Bank withdrew its standard currency swap arrangements 
139 
for all but commercial deals, and effectively closed down the free foreign exchange 
market in June. By August the excess demand for dollars had subsided as local 
banks offered better rates on KD deposits, and the two rates have not diverged 
since that time. However, the dual system still exists, and different rates will be 
applied again in case of unusual capital outflow. Since 1984 the central Bank has 
used its facility for offering currency swaps as an informal control mechanism. 
A third area in which the Central Bank has flexed its muscles has been the 
informal financial sector. Regulations preventing money changers from accepting 
deposits and making loans have been in place since March 1984, although one of 
the largest money-changers, Jawad and Haider Abulhassan, chose to ignore the 
new rules and had to be rescued by the Central Bank early in 1985. The activities 
of this long-established firm were subsequently wound down but only after a bitter 
court battle with foreign creditors. 
There have been other casualties: the three big investment companies -
Kuwait Investment Company (KIC), Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and 
Investment Company (KFTCIC) - suffered a veritable haemorrhage of losses after 
the stock market collapse of 1982. The two state-controlled companies recorded 
huge losses. KFTCIC lost a total of$580 mn in 1984-87, while KIC lost$190 mn 
in 1938-85. By 1988 there were indications of a shaky recovery at KFTCIC which 
has been recapitalised and restructured, although KIC and KIIC lost money again 
after modest recoveries in 1987. 
The Stock Market:-
The financial sector lost its glamour after the events of 1982, when a 
classic speculative bubble burst on the thriving unofficial stock market, the Suq 
al-Manakh. This market had developed after 1977 as Kuwaiti investors looked 
for new Gulf investment opportunities as restrictions on new company formation 
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in Kuwait developed. Its collapse left a trial of entangled debt totalling KD 27 
bn created from 29,000 post-dated cheques, which took two and a half years and 
the creation of two specialized government institutions to work out. It involved 
the expenditure of KD 756 mn of the General Reserves on a futile attempt to 
maintain high share prices on the official stock exchange between August 1982 
and April 1984, as well as a further KD 500 mn to reimburse "small" investors 
who had had their fingers burnt. In the end, only 88 debtors were officially 
declared bankrupt. A further rescue was mounted in 1986 when the government 
bought up 33 "closed" companies in the manufacturing sector. This resulted in a 
modest revival of prices on the stock market, which has been adequately equipped 
with regulations to prevent any further speculative outbursts. In the first half of 
1989 a series of reforms was introduced further to stimulate the market. Floor 
and ceiling rules were abolished, transactions were allowed off the stock exchange 
floor, unit trusts were legalised and a parallel listing reopened. 
5.3. 7 Electricity and Water:-
The discovery of oil in Kuwait, still the key source of national wealth, 
ushered in an era of cultural awakening and revival that involved different walks 
of life: social, educational and economic. Power utility played a vital role in 
laying down the foundations for this awakening and in satisfying the needs and 
requirements of such a cultural march. Relevant figures show the extent this 
utility had developed over the past few years. A big expansion programme is 
under way in electricity supply and it accounts for some of the largest items of 
capital expenditure in the state budget. Two current projects are for a thermal 
station at Al-Zour {South) and a 2,400 mw station at Subuja, with a third station 
planned for Al-Zour (North). Electricity production in 1988 was 19,598 mw Kwh, 
having grown by an annual average of 9.4 percent over the five previous years. 
Of this 85.4 percent was consumed by households and industry, with the balance 
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consumed by power stations. 
For certaines, Kuwait was dependent in meeting her fresh water needs 
on a scant number of wells, in addition to water quantities transported by dhows 
from Shatt al-Arab in Iraq. The first distillation plant in Shuwaikh was contracted 
for in 1953, thus it was the outset of distillation plant era. Limited quantities of 
underground water, however, were discovered in both Al-Rawdatin and U m-Al-
Aish fields and the first pumping operation started in 1962. The natural reserves 
of both fields are estimated at around 40 thousand million gallons. The Ministry 
has drawn up a Five-Year Plan (1985-90) to promote and develop water facilities 
with a view to step up production capacity compatible with future needs. 
5.4 BAHRAIN 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, the people of Bahrain have earned their livelihood from 
three main sources - pearl fishing, agriculture and trade. The first two industries 
provided not only a source of income to the majority of the people, but also a way 
of life which, due to its system of working, held them in virtual bondage. Trade, 
whilst it did not employ a great number of people in Bahrain, was nevertheless 
important as it provided the major source of revenue for the state prior to the 
discovery of oil. 
5.4.2 Educational Services:-
Regular education in Bahrain started in 1919 when the first boy's school 
was opened in Muharraq town. Nearly ten years later in 1928, the first girl's 
school was opened. 
Education in Bahrain is in three stages: Primary stage (6 years), In-
termediate stage (3 years), and Secondary stage (3 years). Higher education is 
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available for secondary graduates. 
Bahrainis are comparatively well educated, with 20 percent having com-
pleted secondary or higher level education. In 1986 there were 139 state schools. 
Educational facilities include the University of Bahrain, which opened in 1978, 
and the Gulf Technical College, which was set up in 1968 and now has 2,500 
students. In May 1986 it was announced that the two institutions would merge 
to form a new university which would offer a full degree programme, as well as 
postgraduate courses. The Arab Gulf University at Sakhir, funded by the GCC 
states and haq, opened in April1987. Today it has an intake of 300 students and 
a teaching staff of 120. In 1986 there were 1,670 students studying at universities 
abroad, 36 percent fewer than in 1984. 
In addition, many of the large companies in Bahrain such as the Arab 
Shipbuilding and Repair Yard and Gulf Air are beginning to provide technical 
training, while the Bahrain Bankers Training Centre, established in 1981 to train 
and develop local banking skills, is financed by a levy on all licensed banks. The 
government also encourages private companies to train local workers. 
5.4.3 Health and Housing Services:-
The government is offering a free health service for all the population 
through a number of hospitals and health centres. The government is trying to 
reach the aim of the World Health Organization "Health for everybody in the year 
2000". Four decades of oil production have enabled Bahrain to establish a highly 
developed system of social services. By the end of 1986 the state's free health 
services had 8 hospitals and 41 health centres with a total of 1,360 beds and 4,920 
staff. Increasing attention is being given to preventive medicine, occupational 
health and to the treatment of drug abuse. 
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Table 5.3 :-Government Hospitals and Health Centres (1983-86) 
Indicator 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Hospital 3 3 3 3 
Maternity Hospitals 5 5 5 5 
Health Centres 17 17 18 18 
Environmental Health Centres 7 7 7 7 
Child Welfare Centres 16 16 16 16 
Total 48 48 49 49 
Source: Annual Statistical Abstract 1987. 
Housing Services:-
The state also provides extensive low cost housing for its citizens, espe-
cially in lsa Town, which by the end of 1984 had a population of 35,000. A major 
three year programme, costing $195 mn, for low and middle income housing is 
under way with Saudi aid. The first residents of Hamad Town, which is being 
built as part of this plan, moved into their homes in 1984. Hamad Town now has 
some 12,000 residential units, as well as about 30 new schools, shopping, leisure 
and health facilities. Another new town will eventually be built on reclaimed land 
and this could have a population of 60,000- 70,000. For the time being, however, 
housing is scarce and there is a five year waiting list for new homes. 
5.4.4 Transport and Communications:-
5.4.4.1 The Causeway:-
Agreement on the construction of a $600 mn causeway to link Bahrain 
and Saudi Arabia was reached in principle in November 1976, with Saudi Arabia 
agreeing to bear the total cost. The causeway, which is 25 km long and includes 
four major high span bridges, was due to opened officially in November 1986. 
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Since its opening local Bahraini merchants have suffered as Saudi consumer goods 
are priced about 20 to 30 percent less than similar items in Bahrain, but the island 
has also benefited from an influx of Saudi visitors, as well as Western expatriates 
working in the Kingdom. Tourism in Bahrain benefited greatly in 1987: hotels 
reported a 40 percent increase in occupancy during the summer. Some 1.4 visitors 
arrived at the island in the first half of 1987, compared with 260,000 in the whole 
of 1986. Around 250,000 people currently cross the causeway each way every 
month. 
5.4.4.2 Ports:-
The deep water harbour at Mina Sulman has 14 berths and two container 
terminals, as well as a roll-on/roll-off berth. A major extension programme was 
begun in 1983 to increase the number of berths, cranes and storage areas. There 
has been a considerable increase in the number of containers which use the port 
and, in 1985, they accounted for 65 percent of total cargo amounting to 2 mn 
tons. The short and long term future of the port depends heavily on customs 
duties charged for goods conveyed via the causeway. Unless the causeway can be 
used for trans-shipment, traffic handled at the port will almost inevitably decrease. 
By mid-1989 plans had been submitted for the building of a new port, industrial 
area and free zone to be located either at Hidd or Sitra. The need for a new 
port has arisen because the inner channel of Mina Sulman cannot be dredged 
deeper to accommodate the new generation of container vessels and because of 
the deteriorating state of the port's finger pier. 
5.4.4.3 Airports:-
An expansion programme is under way at Bahrain International Airport 
on Muharraq island to build a new passenger terminal, extend the air cargo facili-
ties and add two more aprons. In 1988 the number of passengers using the airport 
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increased by 4.9 percent, to 3.88 mn from 3. 70 mn passengers in 1987. Revenues 
rose by 13 percent to BD 11.6 mn. The local airline, Gulf Air, is jointly owned by 
Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the U.A.E. and operates regular services throughout 
the Gulf and internationally. It announced profits for 1989 of $73 mn, a tenfold 
increase on 1988, brought about by higher volumes of business and the successful 
completion of rationalisation programme. In a programme expected to cost 1 bn, 
the airline plans to double the size of its fleet and to replace all ageing aircraft by 
1992. It aims to buy six Boeing 767-300s and twelve Airbus A320s. 
5.4.4.4 Telecommunications:-
Bahrain is an important telecommunications centre. In 1981 the govern-
ment acquired a 60 percent stake in the telecommunications system run by Cable 
and Wireless and this now operates as Batelco. Bahrain's television service, the 
first colour station in the Gulf, came into operation in 1973. The opening of the 
Middle East's first satellite earth station in 1969 underlined a determination to 
invest heavily to make Bahrain the communications centre of the Middle East. 
There are now three earth stations located at Ras Abu Jarjur on Bahrain's 
south east coast. Two of them link up with Intersat satellites over the Indian 
Ocean and the Atlantic. In 1985 a third link was established with the Arab 
Satellite ( Arabsat) system initiated by the Arab Satellite Communications Or-
ganization. Telecommunication links with the region are maintained through a 
1,200 channel submarine cable connecting Bahrain to the UAE and Qatar. There 
are plans to extend this link to India and Pakistan. The microwave system, is 
due to be replaced by a fibre optic link under construction along the King Fahd 
causeway. 
At the end of 1987, the Bahrain national telephone network comprised 
26 telephone exchanges, 65 percent of which were digital with a total capacity of 
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97,000 lines and 76,792 connections used at present. The growth of new services 
especially for the business and banking community has been spectacular. These 
include 463 leased circuits for database access, facsimile, teleprinter traffic and 
voice communications by the end of 1987. 
5.4.5 Banking and Insurance Services:-
Bahrain has used its geographical position and its communications sys-
tem to become a financial centre for the Gulf. The banking sector comprises 
onshore and offshore activity. The Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) decided in 
October 1975 to permit the establishment of Offshore Banking Units (OBUS) and 
to establish Bahrain as an alternative financial centre to troubled Beirut. The oil 
boom in the 1970s was the major fillip for Bahrain's aspirations as the major 
banking centre in the region, but during the recession of the mid-1980s a number 
of Western OBUs started to close their operations because of sluggish business. In 
1988 there were 19 domestic commercial banks, 62 OBUs, 19 investment banks, 
six money brokers, 18 money changers, one specialist bank for housing and the 
Bahrain Islamic Bank, 19 insurance companies, and 54 representative offices. The 
domestic banking sector is dominated by five banks which share 80 percent of 
local assets. The operations of the domestic sector are controlled by the BMA, 
which sets minimum reserve requirements, liquidity ratios and limits on loans to 
directors. 
The performance of the commercial banks showed some improvement in 
recent years. Provisioning against the bad debts of earlier years remained a prob-
lem but some progress was achieved and aggregate losses were cut to BD 600,000 
1988. The National Bank of Bahrain, for example, reported a 58 percent increase 
in net profits to BD 6.8 mn. Offshore Banking Units operate with minimum re-
strictions imposed by the BMA. They are, however, unable to compete for local 
business and must pay a registration fee. In 1977 this was fixed at BD 10,250 but 
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in 1984 was raised four to tenfold, according to each bank's assets and profits. 
After nearly ten years of expansion, total assets stopped rising in 1984. How-
ever, since mid-1987 assets have increased with the steady economic recovery in 
the Gulf, the arrival of the Japanese financial institutions, and at that time the 
prospects of a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war. By March 1989 OBU assets totalled 
$65.3 bn, compared with $62.7 bn at end of March 1988. They are now performing 
more efficiently and looking for business outside Bahrain, although problems with 
bad loans and the shrinking market have hit the OBUs hard. To offset this trend, 
they have rationalised their operations and diversified their activities, particularly 
branching out into investment banking. By mid-1988 around ten OBUs had left 
Bahrain and many of those remaining ran only representative offices. However, in 
1988 the Japanese made their presence felt in the Bahraini banking sector, with 
nine Japanese securities houses operating in Manama, out of some 24 Japanese 
financial institutions, mainly representative offices, incorporated in Bahrain. In 
1988 also, the BMA extended its weekly offering of the government treasury bills 
to OBUs and investment banks for the first time. The aim is to develop Bahrain's 
capital market. 
The BMA in 1988 further increased pressure on all Bahraini incorporated 
banks (local and offshore) to increase their bad debt provisions. But the brunt of 
the provisioning was taken in 1987. In 1988 the OBUs showed a market recovery, 
with only two of the locally incorporated OBUs (Arlabank and Al-Bahrain Arab 
African Bank} failing to report post-provisioning profits. The largest OBU, Arab 
Banking Corporation, for instance, reported pre-tax net profits of $142 mn in 
1988 - after having allocated all profits to loan loss provisions in 1987. Gulf 
International Bank,the second largest OBU, announced net profits of $46 mn for 
1988 compared with losses of $179 mn in 1987. The optimism caused by the Iran-
Iraq war cease-fire had not translated into significantly higher business for the 
OBUs by mid-1989 and the major banks have started diversifying their sources of 
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income, targeting Europe, the USA and the Far East. 
One group of banks which has been making good progress, especially in 
competitive short term trade finance, is Bahrain's Islamic banks including Bahrain 
Islamic Bank, Faisal Islamic Bank of Bahrain (FIBB), and Al-Baraka Islamic In-
vestment Bank of Bahrain. FIBB has been setting the pace in Morabaha (pur-
chase and sale) syndications, which not only attracted regional Islamic banks but 
also the Islamic banking of conventional Arab banks and Western banks, such 
as Grindlays International Bank of Bahrain and Manufacturers Hanover Trust. 
FIBB has arranged four successive syndications for Pakistani state corporations 
since November 1987. 
Trading commenced on the Bahrain stock exchange in June 1989. 29 
Bahraini public companies are listed on the exchange- nine banks, five insurance 
and 15 general companies- with nominal capital of $1.6 bn. Plans exist to open 
the exchange to other Gulf and Arab companies. 
1981 
50,734 
Table 5.4 : Offshore Banking Units, Assets 
and Liabilities ( $ mn, end period). 
1983 1985 1987 
62,741 56,805 63,482 
Source: Bahrain Monetary Agency. 
Insurance:-
1988 
68,124 
History shows that whenever an enterprising people face a problem they 
rise to the occasion and find a solution. The formation of the Cooperative Com-
pensation Soceity in 1954 and the establishment of the Arab Insurance Group 
in 1980 are two such instances. The Arab Insurance Group (ARIG) came into 
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operation to meet the demand for large-scale reinsurance business and to sup-
plement the insurance infrastructure in the region. The rising rates of insurance 
premiums for cargo and hull which caused import bills to rise steeply acceler-
ated the demand for insurance services. Jointly financed by Kuwait, Libya and 
the UAE, the authorised capital of ARIG is $ 3,000 million of which 5 percent 
has been paid. The principal activities of ARIG are to undertake insurance and 
reinsurance operations throughout the world in all classes of business. It offers 
a substantial capacity both for treaty and for facultative business. As banking 
and insurance go hand in hand, the factors which favoured the development of 
the banking community were equally relevant for ARIG to choose Bahrain as its 
headquarters. 
Further large business opportunities in the reinsurance field prompted 
the local Gulf companies, including the three Bahraini companies in Bahrain In-
surance Company, Al-Ahlia Insurance Company, and Bahrain-Kuwait Insurance 
Company to form the Arab War Risks Syndicate. The step was calculated to 
enable the syndicate to make its own estimates of risks and was to apply suit-
able rates commensurate with the degree of hazards involved. Besides the Vehicle 
Insurance Fund and ARIG, the insurance sector in Bahrain covers three broad 
categories. The first category consists of the three Bahraini companies, in addi-
tion to the National Insurance Company which was registered in 1982 and the 
United Insurance Company owned jointly by the other local insurance companies 
and formed in 1986 to provide international insurance for vehicles using the cause-
way. The second category comprises 13 foreign insurance companies which have 
been allowed to establish branches in Bahrain. Finally, there are also 27 exempt 
companies permitted to conduct insurance business offshore. 
Of the five locally established insurance companies in Bahrain, the first 
to be formed was the Bahrain Insurance Company which was registered in 1969, 
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Bahraini nationals being the majority shareholders. The company has a paid-
up capital of BD 600,000 and undertakes marine, fire, motor general and aviation 
business. In 1984 the company employed 57 people of whom 32 or 56 percent were 
Bahraini. In 1976 Al-Ahlia Insurance Company and Bahrain-Kuwait Insurance 
Company were formed, followed by the National Insurance Company in 1982. 
5.4.6 Electricity and Water Services:-
Demand for power is rising by about 4 percent per year and a new power 
station was completed at Rifaa in 1985. This is capable of generating up to 950 
mw, which was equal to the entire output of the four main stations already in 
existence. Two others at Rifaa have a joint capacity of 650 mw, while the plants 
at Manama and Sitra have 120 mw capacity each. There are also two small plants, 
one of 23 mw located at Sitra and another of 40 mw at Muharraq. In 1989 pea.k 
demand was around 704 mw. In mid-1989 the Power and Water Affairs Directorate 
asked for an additional160 mw of capacity to be built to see the country through 
the 1990s. 
A major programme to build desalination plants was completed in 1985. 
Whereas in 1984 the desalination plant at Sitra produced an average of 5 mn 
gallons a day and was thus able to meet less than 10 percent of demand, by 
the summer of 1985 desalinated water supplies provided 35.6 mn g/d towards 
peak water demand of 55 mn g/d. By the end of 1986 total capacity rose to 45 
mn g/ d thanks to the completion of another desalination plant, this time at Al-
Dour. However, the possible shelving of some water and electricity expansion was 
announced by the government in June 1986 in response to the projected downturn 
in revenues over the 1986-87 two year budget period. 
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5.5 Oman 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Perhaps in the rediscovery of the historical richness of Oman's overseas 
relationships, a pardonable but mistaken over-emphasis has been given to ships, 
sailors and sea-faring pure and simple. What lay behind the scores of ships and 
hundreds of seamen which voyaged between the seaports of Oman and the shores 
of the Indian Ocean and far beyond, were the less superficially romantic mercantile 
and financial skills. It was these that made it worthwhile importing timber for 
ship-building, frequently the ships themselves, and ultimately the cargoes of goods 
for re-export. This last was, and perhaps remains, the key to Oman's trade 
prosperity, not so much the export of domestic products but - export service. 
5.5.2 Education Services:-
The development of formal education in Oman began only in 1979 when 
His Majesty Qaboos became Sultan. From 1970 to 1975, the priority was for rapid 
expansion so as to correct the neglect of past years when Oman had only three 
schools with 909 boys. 
The education system is largely run by the state. Following rapid devel-
opment in the last few years there were 721 schools by 1988/89, with over 298,000 
pupils and over 13,000 teachers, of whom over half were Egyptian. The number 
of Omani teachers is rising, but in 1988/89 still represented only 19 percent of 
the total. Female education has risen considerably and there are now 264 schools 
for girls, compared with only 47 in 1974/75, as well as 172 mixed schools. In 
1988/89 girls accounted for over 45 percent of the total number of pupils studying 
at the primary and secondary level. Sultan Qaboos University opened in Septem-
ber 1986 with 520 students entering its one and a half year foundation course. 
Faculties comprise education, medicine, science, engineering, agriculture and arts. 
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In addition to these figures on state education, there were 49 private schools in 
1988/89, with some 6,800 students, mainly in Muscat. Officials have been calling 
for the establishment of more private schools. 
Training and specialist institutes have been built and there are now over 
22,000 adults enrolled in government literacy and adult education centres, and 
over 1,500 students in vocational training institutes. 
5.5.3 Health and Housing Services:-
Oman will continue to improve and expand its health service during the 
current five-year plan (1985-90). As part of this policy, the Health Ministry is 
to provide more specialised hospital treatment and in January 1987 opened the 
560-bed Royal Hospital at Al-Ghubrah. The hospital will have facilities for open-
heart and orthopaedic surgery and treatment of kidney diseases. In addition 
to general medical wards, the Royal Hospital will have special maternity and 
childrens' wards. The hospital will also assist in the training of medical students 
from the Sultan Qaboos University. At present, some of the specialized medical 
and surgical services provided at hospitals include those of a 128-bed orthopaedic 
wing and a plastics surgery and burns unit at Khoula Hospital and a cardiology 
unit at N ahda Hospital, in the capital area. 
Substantial progress was made during the 1981-85 period under the sec-
ond five-year plan. Now, more health centres will be opened in remote areas, pri-
mary health services and facilities at existing district hospitals will be improved, 
and diagnostic and supporting services at secondary and tertiary levels will be 
upgraded. 
By the end of 1988 there were 4 7 hospitals, 86 health centres and 3 
maternity centres. The number of civil government hospital beds rose from just 
twelve in 1969 to more than 1, 784 in 1980 and over 3,450 in 1988. A teaching 
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hospital is under construction for Sultan Qaboos University, to add to the military 
hospital and the Royal Hospital, which was opened in 1987. 
Housing Services:-
Town planning is a critical factor in a rapidly developing country like 
Oman. From the outset, great care has therefore been taken to ensure the main-
tenance of a correct balance between demand, resources and overall national re-
quirements. Oman's carefully formulated town planning and housing policies have 
resulted in significant comprehensive improvements in living conditions, not only 
in the capital area but also in regional towns and villages. In addition to being 
responsible for town planning and housing, the Ministry of Housing looks after 
land allocation and community development, the latter ensuring that there is an 
appropriate proportion of residential, commercial and government plots of land 
to support a balanced community life. 
During the second five-year development plan (1981-85) the Ministry's 
major activities included the planning of the Ruwi business district in the capital 
area, the siting of Oman's road network within the capital area and outside, 
finding suitable locations for health and educational facilities such as the Royal 
Hospital at Al-Khod, and allocating plots for private housing and commercial and 
industrial properties at Khuwa.ir town, Wadi Kabir, Al-Khod, Al-Jadeed, Maabila 
South and Atkia/Hajir. The Ministry also launched a programme for developing 
six new townships in the capital area. These are at Qurum Beach, Khuwa.ir South, 
Ghubra South, Azaiba, Airport Heights and Madinat Al-Nahda. The first three 
are in the process of being implemented. In all, the Ministry Town Planning 
Department was instrumental in preparing some 28,600 new plots for building 
purposes in the capital area during the 1981-85 period. 
In the all provinces, including Nizwa, Sohar and Sur, the Ministry launched 
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a "quick plan" programme m 1981 to meet demands for land for various uses. 
Within three years, it provided 34,000 plots. The Ministry is also involved in re-
developing old sites in both the capital and rural areas. The aim being to improve 
buildings without destroying their character. 
5.5.4 Transport and Communications:-
5.5.4.1 Roads:-
Since Sultan Qaboos's accession, a major development effort has been 
concentrated on much needed roads. Only 10 km of roads had been paved by 
1970. The 230 km asphalt road built along the Batinah coast from Muscat to 
Sohar, and thence to the UAE frontier (whence it connects with the excellent 
Fujairah-Khor Fokkan-Dibba coastal road and with the transpeninsular Fujairah-
Sharjah road to the west coast), was turned into a dual carriageway in 1984. An 
offshoot linking Liwa (just north of Sohar) with Al-Ain/Buraimi, financed by Abu 
Dhabi, is complete, as is the road between Buraimi, lbri and Nizwa. Asphalted 
roads have also been built between Muscat and Matrah, between the capital area 
and Nizwa and in the south between Salalah and Raysut, Taqa and Thamarit. A 
788 km road connecting north and south Oman was completed in 1982, and a road 
maintenance and repair programme was implemented. By the end of 1988 Oman 
had 4,247 km of asphalted and 18,144 km of graded roads. During the 1981-85 
plan about OR 218 mn was spent on road construction - 162 percent more than 
planned. In a country where the population is so widespread and naturally barren 
and mountainous, with intermittent inhabited/fertile areas, land transport is vital 
to development. Vehicle registrations have risen dramatically, and vehicles on the 
road increased from about 14,500 in 1974 to 267,500 in 1986. 
5.5.4.2 Ports:-
The country's main port is the deepwater port at Muttrah (Mina Qa-
155 
boos), capable of handling 1. 5 mn dead weight tons of cargo annually at ten berths. 
Together with the new port at Raysut, near Salalah, Oman's modern ports un-
loaded 1.4 mn tons in 1988. Mina Qaboos's berths 1 and 2 were being converted 
for container handling in 1989, while a new port is planned for an as yet undecided 
site. 
5.5.4.3 Airport:-
A small airport in the capital area was replaced by the Seeb International 
Airport in 1972, a major expansion programme was completed in 1985. In 1988 it 
handled some 1.3 mn passenger arrivals and departures (741,000 in 1983). Nearly 
22,000 tons of air freight passed through Seeb in 1986 (17,000 tons in 1983). The 
Salalah airport, which opened in 1977, handled some 73,000 passengers in 1986. 
Several new airstrips, primarily for military purposes, have been built, and the air 
facilities at Masirah Island have been modernised and expanded. Gulf Air (one 
quarter owned by Oman) is expanding and has plans for partial privatisation. 
Oman's internal airline, Oman Aviation Services reported profits of OR 2.1 mn 
in 1986. 
5.5.4.4 Telecommunications:-
Telecommunications have been much developed. There is now a radio 
network, colour TV stations have been opened at Muscat and Solalah, and the 
internal telephone system, run by the General Telecommunications Organisation, 
has been developed rapidly. A major telecommunications expansion programme, 
begun in 1983, now provides digital switching systems in the central area capable 
of handling 44,000 new lines. By the end of 1988 over 83,000 telephone lines had 
been installed. A new microwave link has been installed near Nizwa to link it with 
Salalah and Ibri and the capital. Direct dialling to Salalah began in 1982. A drive 
is now on to expand and update rural telephone networks. Work has begun on 
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supplying telephones to the Sharqiyah and upgrading the network on the Batirah. 
An earth satellite has been built, and Muscat can be dialled from London. More 
earth satellite stations are planned. 
5.5.5 Banking and Insurance:-
Banking in Oman has developed in response to the economy's growing 
needs, watching the rate of expansion in a restrained and sensible manner. Apart 
from the Central Bank which replaced the former Currency Board in April1975 in 
line with a banking law of 1974, there were 25 banks licensed to operate in Oman 
at the end of 1987. Of these, 22 are commercial banks, nine of which are of Omani 
origin. The largest (also overall) is the National Bank of Oman ( 45 percent Omani 
owned), followed by the Oman International Bank (OIB - the only 100 percent 
Omani owned bank), the Oman Arab Bank, the Bank of Oman, Bahrain and 
Kuwait, and, in order of importance, the Commercial Bank of Oman, Al-Bank 
Al-Ahli Al-Omani, the Bank of Muscat, the Union Bank of Oman, and the Bank 
of Oman and the Gulf. At the end of 1988 there were 13 foreign banks licensed 
to operate in Oman. The largest of these (third in overall ranking) is the British 
Bank of the Middle East (BBME) - the first to establish itself in Oman, in 1984. 
The next biggest foreign bank in asset terms, the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), ranked fifth overall. Other foreign banks include Grindlays, 
Standard Chartered, Banque Paribas, Habib Bank, AG Zurich, Bank Melli Iran, 
Bank of Baroda and Citibank. The banking sector is under great pressure to 
increase its proportion of Omani staff, from about 50 percent today to 90 percent 
by 1990. Because of the proliferation of branches (194 in 1985) concentrated in 
the coastal areas, commercial banks now have to open two branches in the interior 
for every one opened along the coast. 
There are three development banks. The Oman Development Bank was 
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established by decree in 1976 with OR 10 mn capital, subscribed by the gov-
ernment (53 percent), a number of regional and international institutions ( 40 
percent), and private Omani investors ( 7 percent). The Oman Development Bank 
began operations in March 1979. The bank aims to grant medium and long term 
loans to finance industrial, agricultural, mining and oil projects and will also act 
to raise loans from the government and from international agencies to finance de-
velopment, it can borrow up to four times its paid up capital plus reserves. By the 
end of 1988 it had lent OR 48.7 mn to a total of 253 projects, including construc-
tion and chemical industries, local processing, beverages and storage facilities. 
It has a small scale industries scheme, a vocational entrepreneurs scheme and 
an Omani craftsmen scheme. An institution called the Oman National Housing 
Development Association was established in 1974 with the state and the BBME 
as shareholders, but was replaced by the Oman Housing Bank (OHB-10 percent 
BBME, 51 percent state, 39 percent Kuwaiti). Omanis aged 21-60 are entitled to 
buy subsidised homes if they earn less than OR 150 a month. The OHB lends 
up to 90 percent of the building cost, repayable in 20 years at 3 percent interest; 
most loans have been granted for projects in and near the capital area. The OHB 
now has five branches. The Oman Bank of Agriculture and Fisheries was set up 
in May 1981 to provide loans to small farms and fishing companies. 
There are about 20 insurance companies, including three locally owned. 
Foreign insurance companies since 1987 have to cede 30 percent of the market 
to these local companies. Money changers have been brought more closely under 
Central Bank control. 
Stock Exchange:-
An Omani stock market was officially established in June 1988, but trad-
ing started only in May 1989. The exchange's management is controlled by a 
board headed by the minister of commerce and industry. As of July 1989, there 
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Table 5.5 :-Money Supply (OR mn, end period}. 
Sources 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Currency outside banks 140.4 150.0 178.5 168.8 180.3 176.3 
Demand deposits 128.4 141.4 148.7 141.5 154.1 135.8 
M1 268.8 291.4 327.2 310.3 334.4 312.1 
Quasi-monetary deposits 406.5 517.8 597.6 555.5 578.3 655.3 
M2 675.3 809.2 924.8 865.8 912.7 967.4 
Source: Central Bank of Oman. 
were 48 listed companies, in addition to over the counter trading of 23 companies 
not listed on the exchange. All banks and licensed brokerage firms must be mem-
bers, and for the time being only Omani companies are accepted. Since a June 
1989 decision, GCC nationals may trade in shares of Omani joint stock companies 
that are already owned by persons from more than one GCC country. There are 
reported to be some 18,000 shareholders in the Sultanate. 
5.5.6 Electricity and Water:D 
The growth of electricity production has been rapid over the last decade. 
In 1970, 8 m KWh were produced, while by 1987 output had reached 1,913 m 
KWh. By 1990, consumption is expected to reach 1,000 MW and plans have 
already been drawn up for more power station to cope with rising demand. 
Rural areas have seen the Sultanate's biggest load-growth over the past 
five years, with demand sometimes increasing by as much as 70 percent. To or-
ganize efficient load-shedding, the Ministry of Electricity and Water is reinforcing 
the generation system in remote areas by relocating existing diesel generating sets 
to where demand is greatest. Existing high-voltage networks in the north, at Wadi 
Jizzi, and the capital area are to be extended to surrounding townships to release 
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small diesel generating sets for supplying power to the remote regions. 
By 1985, a total of 33.9 MW of new generating capacity was installed 
in the Interior and on the coast. Oman's main sources of power at present are a 
294 MW gas-fired complex at Ghubrah, a 250 MW gas turbine station at Rusail, 
a 26.5 MW plant at Wadi Jizzi near Sohar, and a 41.9 MW plant at Raysut, 
near Salalah, in the south. The plant at Rusail will shortly be extended by the 
installation of three generators, which will double its present capacity to 500 MW. 
MEW also has plans to build two large power plants at Barkah, on the Batinah 
coast, and Manah, near Nizwa. Barkah is to have a three-phased development, 
ultimately bringing its total installed capacity to over 600 MW with an associated 
desalination capacity of 36 million gallons of water per day. 
MEW is now reviewing detailed design bids for the first phase of the 
gas-fired Barkah station. Initially the station will have an installed capacity of 
160 MW with an associated 12 million gallons per day desalination plant. De-
tailed designs for the 100 MW gas-fired station at Manah began in 1987. Manah 
will serve as the central power station for the interior. Power generation for the 
Southern Region also comes under MEW. The biggest power station in the south 
is Raysut. There are served other smaller plants which together with the Raysut 
station, have a generating capacity of under 100 MW. MEW is looking into the 
possibility of bringing a gas pipeline extension to Salalah, from Petroleum Devel-
opment Oman's gas fields in the south, within the next five years. If this goes 
ahead, there will be a potential of up to 150 MW of power generating capacity to 
be centralised of Salalah. 
Since the early 1970s Oman has been attempting to estimate its water 
reserves and its hydrologic cycle. Since 1979 this work was coordinated under 
the Public Authority for Water Resources (PAWR), which monitored aflaj and 
wells, as well as drilling in order to improve its knowledge of hydrology and of 
160 
groundwater reserves. PDO, within its concession area, also has a good picture 
of groundwater reserves, quality and flow. 
The capital was originally supplied from local wells and by pipeline from 
pumping stations in the Seeb fan. This was supplemented from the thermal power 
desalination plant opened at Ghubrah, a unit which now produces 12 mn g. Two 
units which came on stream in 1986 doubled water output. Wadi Adai now also 
provides about 2 mn g/ d to the capital, and plans to build a large dam at Wadi 
Dayqah are still being considered. Total water production in 1988 had risen to 
10,530 mn gallons- a slower rise then in previous years. Most of this was produced 
by desalination. 
Many aflaj, the traditional source of water for the interior of northern 
Oman, are under repair. An increasing awareness of the need to conserve water led 
in 1986 to a rationalisation of responsibilities, with the Minister of the Environ-
ment and Water Resources becoming deputy chairman (under the Sultan) of the 
new Council of the Environment and Water Resources (CEWR). In March 1989 a 
reconstituted PAWR, autonomous and only responsible to the Council of Minis-
ters, took over the responsibilities of the Directorate-General of Water Resources 
and the Council for the Conservation of the Environment and Water Resources. 
The latter was renamed the Council for the Conservation of the Environment and 
Prevention of Pollution, while the Ministry of EWR has become the Ministry of 
the Environment. However, consumption of water is still rising at a dangerous 
rate, reaching 7,866.8 mn gallons in 1988, although demand in 1987 and 1988 
grew less fast than in previous years. Fortunately, the Wadi al-Khoudh retention 
dam proved a success during the rainstorms of 1987. The dam should now make 
it possible to retain an annual average of 5.5 mn m3 of water long enough for it to 
seep into the underground water system. Part of the 1986-90 development plan 
was the construction of OR 20.3 mn worth of recharge dams, irrigation repairs 
worth OR 5 mn, small flood control dams costing OR 7 mn, and new drilling. 
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5.6 SAUDI ARABIA 
5.6.1 Introduction 
The Saudi economy was originally based on subsistence agriculture, the 
livestock of the nomadic tribes and funds brought in by the annual pilgrimage to 
Makkah and Madinah. The discovery of oil irrevocably changed this situation, as 
oil revenue became the chief source of government finance and foreign exchange, 
and oil production the dominant component of GDP. 
5.6.2 Education Services:-
The education sector has made substantial progress due to the high pri-
ority accorded to it by the government. The Kingdom has spent massively on 
education since the early 1970s. At the end of 1987 there were 6, 790 boys schools 
of all grades in the government sector, comprising 4,668 primary, 1,548 interme-
diate and 574 secondary. There were also 84 male teacher training institutions 
and 443 adult education schools. The state institutions housed a total 1,171,671 
students and 75,066 teachers. In 1987 there were 933,230 girl students in the 
4, 7 44 schools under the General Presidency of Girls Education. There were an 
estimated 78 institutions of higher education in Saudi Arabia at the end of 1987, 
with a total of 114,516 students. 
5.6.3 Health and Housing Services :-
In keeping with its policy of providing medical services to all citizens, 
the government has been constantly undertaking projects for the expansion and 
development of medical and health facilities. The Minsitry of Health is estimated 
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to be responsible for about 60 percent of all health care facilities, and by the end 
of 1987 operated 157 hospitals and 1,438 health care centres, employing a medical 
staff of 50,105. In all, the kingdom has more than 210 hospitals with about 35,000 
beds. 
Table 5.6 : Health Facilities and Medical Staff in the Kingdom. 
Facilities 1985 1986 1987 
Hospitals 105 141 157 
Beds 20796 23862 25902 
Primary Health Care Centres 1306 1431 1438 
Medical Staff 40050 46400 50105 
Physicians 9257 10359 11326 
Nursing Staff 20707 24528 25986 
Pharmacists and Technicians 10086 11513 12793 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency - 1988 
Housing Services:-
The housing and urban development sector witnessed considerable ex-
pansion over the preceding years due to the active role played by the Real Estate 
Development Fund {REDF), the Ministry of Public Works and Housing and the 
Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, to develop this sector. REDF has been 
granting long and medium terms loans, to citizens to construct owner-occupied 
houses and investment-oriented housing projects. The Ministry of Public Works 
and Housing implemented a number of housing projects in various parts of the 
Kingdom. The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs carried out a number 
of public utility projects. Subsequently, adequate housing units have been made 
available and house rents have declined to normal levels. This was coupled with 
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a great progress in urban development involving proper services in public utilities 
such as water, electricity, sewage and drainage systems, networks of high quality 
asphalted roads, flyovers and underpasses to facilitate traffic movement, parks, 
efficient sanitation services and street lighting. 
Madinah general housing project, involving construction of 2,084 villas 
at a total cost of RIS 1,526 million, is nearing completion. About 97 percent of 
the work on the project was completed by the end of 1988. Work is also underway 
on al-Ahsa general housing project, of which 91 percent has been completed. The 
project comprises 400 villas with a total cost of RIS 285 million. Makkah general 
housing project, comprising 2,592 villas at a cost totalling RIS 1,842 million, is still 
in progress. About 66 percent of the work on this project has been completed. 
In the meantime, 4 7 percent of the work on al-Qatif general housing project, 
involving construction of 600 villas has been completed. The cost of the project 
is expected to amount to RIS 425 million. 
In 1987/88, REDF extended loans to the tune of RIS 3,972 million, to 
finance construction of 14,268 housing units, of which RIS 3, 797 million {95.6 
percent) were long term loans for the construction of 13,978 owner-occupied houses 
(98 percent), and RIS 175 million (4.4 percent) were medium term loans to finance 
construction of 290 investment-oriented housing units (2 percent). 
The Ministry of Public Works and Housing completed 64.4 percent of the 
first stage of the housing survey conducted in the major cities of the Kingdom, 
namely, Riyadh, Jiddah, Makkah, Madinah, Abha, Damman, Dhahran and al-
Khubar. On completion of this stage, the Ministry would proceed with the second 
stage to cover all populated areas of the Kingdom uncovered under the first stage. 
The information to be compiled and classified from the survey would be of a great 
help in analysing the housing situation in the Kingdom and in formulating policies 
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for future housing programmes. 
5.6.4 Transport and Communications:-
5.6.4.1 Roads:-
The road building programme has been given priority in development 
planning. At the end of the second five year plan ( 1980-1985 ) the road system 
consisted of 11,394 Km of main roads, 10,053 km of secondary roads, and 23,180 
km of rural roads. By the end of 1987 these figures had risen to 33,576 km for 
main and secondary roads and 59,226 Km for rural roads. Major arteries include 
the transpeninsula highway connecting Jeddah, Makkah and Madinah in the west 
with Riyadh and the Gulf oil fields in the Eastern Province, and the tapline road 
from Dammam to the Jordanian border. The Red Sea road is being extended 
south to the Yemen border, via Taif, Abha and Jizan, and expressways are being 
built between all major urban centres. During the fourth plan it is intended to 
build 277 Km of new main roads, 2,4 70 Km of secondary roads and 32,800 Km of 
agricultural roads. A causeway between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain was completed 
in 1985 and opened to regular traffic in November 1986. 
5.6.4.2 Railway:-
The Kingdom's railway network was built in 1977 to serve the people 
, consists of a 262 km single track line between Dammam and Riyadh, and its 
branches. The system is owned and operated by the Saudi Government Railroad 
Organization, and is undergoing extensive modernisation. 
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5.6.4.3 Ports:-
Saudi Arabia port network has expanded substantially over the last few 
years. The Kingdom now has five major ports- Yanbu, Jeddah, Dammam, Jubail 
and Jizan - two industrial ports, at Jubail and Yanbu, and 14 minor ports. In 
1976 the Saudi Ports Authority (SPA) was established to operate the main ports 
and to ease the congestion that was then plaguing them. In 1980 the five main 
ports and two newly expanded ones, Qadima and Ras al-Ghair, possessed between 
them a total of 130 berths with a total annual capacity of 14.2 mn dwt. During 
the third plan ( 1985-1990 ), Qadima and Ra.s al-Ghair were transferred to the 
authority of SPA, which aims to provide a 25 percent reserve capacity in the Saudi 
ports system to minimise the risk of renewed congestion. In 1987/88 the seven 
major Saudi ports handled 21.5 mn tons of imports and 46.7 mn tons of exports 
other than oil. There is a Saudi National Shipping Company, and in 1987 there 
were 203 commercial vessels flying the Saudi flag. 
5.6.4.4 Airports:-
The three international airports are Jeddah, Dhahran and Riyadh. The 
main domestic airports are at these locations and at Medinah, Abha, Jizan, Taif, 
Tabuk and Qasim, and there are an additional eleven minor airports, giving a total 
of 23 airports. In 1981 the new Jeddah international airport was opened, and in 
1983 there followed the new airport at Riyadh. The national carrier, Saudia, was 
one of the most rapidly expanding airlines in the world between 1975 and 1980, 
when the volume of passengers carried increased by 46 percent annually to reach 
8 mn passengers. Saudia carried 10.3 mn passengers in 1987, down from 10.8 mn 
and 11.4 mn in 1985 and 1984 respectively. Over two thirds of passengers are 
carried on domestic flights. 
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5.6.4.5 Communications 
The telephone and telegraphic network is being expanded rapidly. By the 
end of the second five year plan the number of telephones has risen to 452,000. 
Two earth stations, at Taif and Riyadh, are used for international communications, 
and a further eleven mobile earth stations throughout the Kingdom provide long 
distance service within Saudi Arabia pending completion of the microwave system. 
The total number of operating telecommunication lines at the end of 1988 was 
1,099,154 including 12,871 mobile telephones, and 13,767 telex lines. 
5.6.5 Banking and Insurance:-
The riyal was linked to the SDR on March 15, 1975. The riyal is freely 
convertible and there are no restrictions on the operation of bank accounts by 
residents or non-residents in any currency of on any remittances of currency or 
bullion into or out of the Kingdom. There has been a sharp increase in money 
supply since 1971 reflecting government policy to try to translate higher oil rev-
enues into economic development. Money supply exploded from SR 7,020 mn at 
the end of 1973 to almost SR 103 bn by the end of 1981 and by the end of 1988 
had risen to SR 190.13 bn. 
There were twelve commercial banks in Saudi Arabia, with a total of 
929 permanent branches, at the end of 1988. Two are wholly domestic banks, the 
National Commercial Bank and the Rujad Bank, which between them account for 
two thirds to three quarters of the balance sheet total. The others in recent years 
have conformed to decrees requiring majority Saudi participation and are rapidly 
extending their nationwide operations. Greater limitation is being imposed on the 
involvement of money changing establishments with banking services, and one of 
the kingdom's largest financial establishments, Al-Rajhi Company for Currency 
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Exchange and Commerce, was in 1988 restructured as an approved banking in-
stitution along Islamic lines. The banking sector's previous high profitability has 
been hit since 1984 by the need to make substantial provisions against problem 
loans in the public contracting sector, but there were signs of improved earnings 
again in 1988. 
Table 5. 7 : Consolidated Commercial Bank Portfolios 
(mid-year). (SR mn) 
Sources 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Cash in hand and 
deposits with Sarna 9,465 11,834 11,755 13,918 
Foreign assets 68,158 72,093 75,680 86,672 
Private sector 
Loans and investment 58,691 59,439 58,781 59,264 
Total deposits 109,796 113,628 112,834 121,927 
1988@ 
10,689 
114,741 
70,523 
142,473 
@. End year, and including balance sheet of Al-Rajhi Banking Investment Cor-
poration. 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. 
Subsidised long term credit to approved sectoral activities is also pro-
vided through five large specialized credit institutions which are capitalized from 
government revenue. The Saudi Agricultural Bank and the Saudi Industrial De-
velopment Fund have become major tools in influencing private sector investment 
response to match national development policies in their respective fields. The 
Public Investment Fund provides loan finance for major industrial projects in the 
public sector, while the Real Estate Fund guides concessionary loans to approved 
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private housing construction. The Saudi Credit Bank is accessible to low income 
Saudi nationals for cheap general loan finance. There is also a Credit Fund for 
national contractors. At the end of 1988 assets of the specialised credit institu-
tions on a consolidated basis totalled SR 157.1 bn, of which loans constituted SR 
127.0 bn. The Real Estate Development Bank accounted for 54.5 percent of these 
loans outstanding, the Public Investment Fund for 32.8 percent and the Saudi 
Agricultural Bank for 9.0 percent. 
Insurance Services:-
The Government aims at providing adequate conditions for the labour 
force through the social insurance system. The number of public corporations 
covered by the social insurance system (pension branch) stood at 1,348 at the end 
of 1988, while the number of private firms totalled 11,808 during the same pe-
riod. The number of workers benefiting from the social insurance system (pension 
branch) reached 3,943,234 at the end of 1988, of which 384,247 workers were in 
public employment and 3,558,987 workers were in the private sector. 
The total number of workers subscribing to occupational risk insurance 
stood at the end of 1988 at 3,149,572. Compensations paid by GOSI to benefi-
ciaries, Saudis and non-Saudis, of both pension and occupational risk branches 
during 1987/88 stood at RIS 453.4 million 
5.6.6 Electricity and Water:-
All electricity produced in Saudi Arabia is thermal. Installed capacity 
was 15,200 mw in mid-1988. In the past electricity was provided by small urban 
utility companies, as many as 100 of which operated small isolated grids of differing 
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frequencies and voltages. Over the three development plan periods, Saudi Arabia 
has succeeded in standardising frequency and service voltages, in consolidating 
the numerous small companies into regional groups, and in introducing electricity 
into rural areas in a significant way. A portion of the kingdom's electricity is now 
supplied by the 30 desalination plants operated by the Saline Water Conversion 
Corporation. There are now four Saudi Consolidated Electricity Companies, the 
Eastern, Central, Southern and Western, while the government owned General 
Electricity Corporation has responsibility for implementing the rural electrification 
programmes. In 1986/87 43,906 gwh of electricity was generated by the major 
companies of the kingdom, of which 24.6 percent was consumed by industry. 
5.7 U.A.E. 
5. '7.1 Introduction 
Prior to the late 1940s the vast majority of the population of the Tru-
cial States lived at a subsistence level, virtually indistinguishable from that which 
they had reached centuries before. During the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, pearling was vitally important to the economies of the Trucial States 
and before oil made the difference between a meagre subsistence level of living 
and a lifestyle with a few luxury items for some. Only the inhabitants of those 
states directly bordering the Gulf were allowed to indulge in pearling, with this 
stipulation enforced by the British maritime peace effort. Since the government 
began to subside in 1981 and 1982, there has been growing concern that on spend-
ing on health and education is pushed higher than necessary because it caters for 
dependents of expatriates. 
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5. 7.2 Education Services:-
The U .A. E. is engaged in expanding education, which is seen as a unify-
ing force for the future of the federation. The centrepiece of the UAE educational 
system is the Emirates University in Al-Ain, which graduated its first students at 
the start of the 1980s. It is due to be expanded on a 20 Km2 site to accommo-
date as many as 16,000 students by the year 2000. Initial construction work is 
expected to entail an outlay of Dh 3-5 bn. When the new university is built the 
existing campus will become a technical college. There are also plans to set up 
a military academy in Al-Ain. More tertiary education is now being provided by 
polytechnics, four of which, two for either sex, were set up in Abu Dhabi in 1988. 
There are some 760 schools in the emirates, both private and government, 
catering for some 320,000 pupils. In 1988 230,000 of these were in government 
schools. The government has been trying to discourage expatriates from entering 
state schools where classes are often too large. Most teachers are expatriate. 
5. 7.3 Health and Housing Services:-
In the U AE as a whole the ratio of hospital beds to population is coming 
close to the governments target of 1:200. By the end of 1986 there were over 40 
public hospitals, with a total of 3,9000 beds. The biggest are the Mafraq general 
hospital in Abu Dhabi, the Tawam, which normally admits only nationals, and 
the Al-Jimi in Al-Ain, as well as three large hospitals in Dubai- the New Dubai, 
the Zabeel East and the Rashid Centre Hospital. The Ministry of Health has built 
a general hospital in Sharjah, with construction completed in 1987, but payment 
disputes delayed its opening, until1990. Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah also have 
general hospitals. Ajman's plans for a hospital have been shelved for the time 
being. Abu Dhabi and Dubai are now turning their attention to primary health 
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care, with each due to open a series of ten health centres. Cuts in government 
finance for health have also led to a growing number of small private hospitals, 
the largest being the Al-Zahra in Sharjah, with a hundred beds. 
5. 7.4 Information and Tourism:-
The most outspoken publications in the UAE emanate from Sharjah. 
A journal called Al-Azmena at Arabia was closed down for its persistence in this 
respect but the Sharjah daily, al-Khalj, maintains the tradition to a certain degree. 
The two main English language newspapers produced in Dubai were started by 
brothers from the well known Galadari merchant family. Dubai's Arabic Language 
daily, Al-Bayan, started after its English Language counterpart in 1979. 
Television was inaugurated in Abu Dhabi in 1969 and in 1974 in Dubai 
and today there are some 200,000 television sets (mostly colour) in domestic use 
throughout the U .A.E. During 1985 Dubai became the first Middle East state to 
launch its own teletext service. 
Tourism:-
Tourism is a relatively new phenomenon for the UAE but one that is being 
taken seriously by the emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi as a means of putting 
to profitable use facilities that were built in the boom years of the 1970s but 
have since been underused. Nowadays there are attempts to attract Westerners 
(who might otherwise head for East Africa or the Caribbean) to sample the UAE 
as an offbeat resort for a winter holiday or as a stopover on a long haul flight 
to the Far East. Some 20,000 Western tourists were received in the UAE for the 
1989/90 winter season. A major new hotel is planned for Abu-Dhabi's is Corniche 
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and both Hilton and Meridien chains are considering new hotels in Dubai where 
existing luxury hotels are full during the winter. Hotel revenue in the UAE in 
1988 totalled Dh 903 mn, compared with Dh 809 mn in 1987. 
5.7.5 Transport and Communication Services:-
5. 7.5.1 Ports :-
Roads, ports, airports and aviation have been developed by individual 
emirates. Most emirates have established their own ports. The biggest is Port 
Rashid in Dubai. Opened in 1979, this is one of the largest artificial deep-water 
harbours in the Middle East. It handled nearly 4 mn tons in 1987, most of which 
was containerised. Dubai's gigantic dry dock did well out of the "tanker war" but 
claims to have lost more than it gained in the general discouragement of traffic 
by the Iran-Iraq war. Dubai's other main port is Jebel Ali, which concentrates on 
industrial and bulk cargoes for the Jebel Ali industrial zone. 
Port Zayid, in Abu Dhabi, opened in 1972, but was hampered during 
the 1970s by the absence of a container terminal, which encouraged consignees to 
ship through Dubai. In 1981, however, the terminal finally opened and the port 
handled more than 3.6 mn tons of cargo during the year. The port went into 
decline with the cuts in oilfield exploration, but a campaign for new business was 
launched in 1987, and the port has recently attracted Norasia shipping, a West 
German shipping line specializing in container traffic and forestry products. 
Sharjah, like Dubai, has two ports. Port Khalid, inside the Gulf, serves 
Sharjah city. It opened in 1976 but has suffered through the misfortunes of three 
of its major customers (Medtainer, Seatrain and Hellenic lines). Khor Fakkan, 
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on Sharjah's east coast, opened in 1978, permitting container traffic to reach 
destinations in the Gulf without passing through the Strait of Hormuz. This 
attraction failed to win many customers in the early years, although more interest 
was shown during the Iran-Iraq war, especially after the escalation of hostilities 
in the Gulf waterway in rrud-1984. Only 20 Km away from Khor Fakkan on the 
east coast is the larger port of Fujairah, opened in 1983. This serves Fujairah's 
own aggregate and cement industries, besides having the advantage of its location 
outside the Gulf. 
Table 5.8.: Tonnage Landed in Dubai (tons). 
Sources 1984 1986 1988 
Port Rahsid 2,706,365 2,886,127 3,909,379 
Jebel Ali 1,773,938 1,394,043 1,072,151 
Hamriya 227,486 387,720 428,151 
Creek 36,414 27,992 28,790 
Airport 68,070 70,156 86,805 
Total inc.oil terminals 7,037,898 7,286,448 7,459,493 
Source: Dubai External Trade Statistics. 
Fujairah it has specialised in handling the Australian live meat trade. 
Ras Al-Khaimah's Port Saqr mainly handles the emirates' exports of aggregate 
and cement. Umm al-Qaiwain's Shaikh Ahmed bin Rashid port acquired a free 
trade zone in 1987 which has since attracted several garment factories. 
5. 7.5.2 Airports:-
Five of the seven emirates have an international airport and a sixth is 
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under construction at Al-Ain in Abu Dhabi. The New Abu Dhabi International 
Airport (Nadia) was opened at the beginning of 1982, the old airport having 
reached the limits of expansion in the mid-1970s. Nadia had an initial annual 
capacity of 3 mn passengers, doubling to 6 mn by 1990, though only 2 mn used 
it in 1987. An aircraft maintenance centre opened there in 1987, 40 percent of 
which is owned by Gulf Air, the rest by the Abu Dhabi government. 
Many of Dubai's passengers were carried by Emirates Airline, which be-
gan :flying in 1986 and in 1987 opened a daily daytime service to London. In 1989 
it began :flying to Kuwait, Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and Iran (Bandar Abbas). The 
emirate has put considerable effort into developing its sea-air freight traffic and 
is planning a $70 mn sea-air cargo terminal to increase handling capacity from 
112,000 tjy to 250,000 tjy. Sharjah airport, only a short drive away from Dubai, 
has the capacity to handle 2 mn passengers a year. In the first half of 1988 some 
593,000 passengers used it, an 87 percent increase over the same period of 1987, 
many of them were Iranians on shopping trips to the U AE. Ras al-Khaimah air-
port is currently used on a regular basis by only four airlines, although it has 
capacity for 250,000 passengers a year. Fujairah airport opened in 1987, and 
Egyptian and Gulf Air now call on a regular basis. 
5. 7.5.3 Roads:-
Road development throughout the emirates has been extensive. Abu 
Dhabi City is linked to the mainland by two bridges, and a dual carriageway 
highway connects it with Al-Ain. A third important road runs west from Mafra.q 
to Tarif and Jebel Dhanna and from there to Qatar, providing a land route all 
the way from Europe to Ras al-Khaimah. 
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5. 7 .5.4 Telecommunications:-
Telecommunications are handled by Etisalat, formerly known as Emirates 
Telecommunications Corporation. This body was established in 1976 when it was 
part owned by Cable and Wireless and International Aeradio. By 1980 it was 
60 percent government owned, with the remaining 40 percent held by private 
interests in the U AE who have done extremely well out of their shareholding. 
By 1988 there were 86 exchanges with a capacity of 228,000 lines and more than 
188,000 subscribers. Two mobile telephone exchanges were functioning with more 
than 4,000 subscribers. Telex lines had increased to 7,000 and the number of 
telefax machines in the country had reached 205. GCC member states agreed to 
standardise telecommunications charges in 1985. Coaxial cables were inaugurated 
in 1987 between Fujairah and the Indian subcontinent. 
5. 7.6 Insurance and Banking Services:-
The oil boom in the UAE in the mid-1970s brought with it a proliferation 
of banking establishments. The emirates had 20 commercial banks in 1973, 46 
in 1975, 53 in 1976 and 55 by April 1977, making the country one of the most 
over-banked in the world. 
The Central Bank issued an annual report in which it listed operating 
banks in 1980. These numbered 49, with a total of 347 branches. Of these 28 
were fully licensed foreign banks (with two more approved but not operating) 
and the remaining 21 were locally incorporated. The foreign banks had by far 
the most branches, however, with 222 as compared with the locally incorporated 
banks' 125. There were also 17 local banks, whose main line of business is trade 
financing. A system of restricted license banks (RLBs) was instituted in March 
1976 in what some observers saw as a form of competition with offshore banking 
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units in Bahrain. Twelve RLBs had been licensed by the end of 1977 but the 
number was down to three by the end of 1986. 
In Abu Dhabi both local and foreign banks have been coming up against 
the Islamic prohibition of the payment of interest in their efforts to collect their 
debts; there is reckoned to be over Dh 8 bn owing to banks in the UAE. The 
mixture of foreign, albeit Muslim, judges in the country's legal system makes 
it difficult to establish a decision on this, despite the crisis of confidence which 
would grow among the foreign banks were the payment of interest, particularly 
compound interest, to be forbidden. There was still no real solution by 1988 
with the result that foreign banks are much more cautious about their loans. 
On the whole, 1988 was a good year for UAE banks with most of them showing 
a modest recovery in profitability. Total assets/liabilities grew by 10.4 percent 
between December 1987 and December 1988, most of the increase being due to 
expansion in foreign assets and liabilities. Operating costs were down and most 
banks were able to report reduced provision for bad debts which ate into their 
profits so drastically in the mid-1980s. 
In 1985 the Emirates Bankers' Association replaced the UAE Bankers' 
Association set up several years previously by foreign banks. Member banks of 
the new association must be at least 80 percent locally owned, but foreign banks 
may become associate members without voting powers. Only a U AE national 
may represent foreign banks at meetings of the association - not always an easy 
requirement to fulfil. In July 1988 the association protested successfully against 
Central Bank efforts to impose a license fee on foreign banks. The government 
is meanwhile considering ways of encouraging nationals to invest their money 
locally. The setting up of a stock exchange has been discussed regularly but 
awaits enforcement of the federal companies law promulgated in 1984. In the 
meantime, dirham certificates of deposit have begun attracting local investors. 
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Table 5.9: Money Supply, End Period (Db mn). 
Sources 1984 1986 1988 1989@ 
Currency outside banks 2,929 3,246 3,600 3,460 
Demand deposits 5,963 5,956 7,154 6,982 
Money {M1) 8,892 9,201 10,753 10,442 
(@) End July 1989 
Source: EIU, Country Profile 1989-1990 
5. 7. 7 Electricity and Water Services:-
The availability of gas in the U AE has become a major factor governing 
the conversion and expansion of power generating capacity. Installed capacity of 
the UAE's main power stations now totals about 3,850 mw. Most of this is in 
Abu Dhabi with nearly 1,650 mw, and the rest is in the domain of the federal 
Ministry of Power, which owns power stations in Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and 
Ras al-Khaimah. All power stations are gas fired. Peak demand in the UAE 
as a whole is expected to rise from 2,650 mw in 1986 to 6,900 mw by 2000, by 
which time installed generating capacity should total 8,040 mw. Dubai increased 
its installed capacity with the commissioning of the new 227 mw and 24 mn gld 
Jebel Ali Jet E power and destination plant {long delayed by problems with the 
South Korean contractors). In the meantime Dubai announced plans for its next 
power and desalination complex, to be built at al-Mamzar. This is designed to 
produce 400 mw of electricity and 56 mn g/d of water and should begin production 
in 1992. 
Electricity is heavily subsidised. The production cost in Abu Dhabi is 
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estimated at 28 fils per Kwh, of which the customer pays 7 fils. Water is virtually 
free in Abu Dhabi, Dubai's water consumers receive their water at a 37 percent 
discount. There have been discussions at GCC level to unify such subsidies, 
without much progress so far. 
5.8 Cooperation in Services Sector 
5.8.1 Finance 
At a 26 January 1987 meeting in Abu Dhabi, the governors of the GCC 
central banks agreed in principle to a common framework for their currencies. 
Though the specifics of the proposed unified currency structure have not yet been 
determined, a number of technical meetings were scheduled in the hope that a 
final proposal will be presented for consideration first to the Ministers of Finance 
and then to the Supreme Council. 
The proposed system will have to harmonize the GCC currencies, which 
at present are based on the U.S. dollar, on a basket of currencies in which the 
U.S. dollar is most prevalent, or on the International Monetary Fund's SDRs. 
Because the dollar has been particularly volatile in the 1980s and because four of 
the six GCC states have currencies tied to the SDR, it is possible that the final 
determination for the unified currency and exchange rate will be based on the 
SDR. But because of the currency structures of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which 
support the basket approach, the prospect of negotiating an international basket 
formula may also be necessary before a unified currency is adopted. 
The long-term effects of the decision on GCC financial integration are 
self-evident; in the short term, however, the unification will serve to reduce spec-
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ulation on GCC currencies and facilitate the ongoing promotion of trade and 
capital movement in the GCC arena. It is unreasonable, however, to expect the 
swift resolution of highly divergent views and systems in the GCC financial sys-
tems, particularly in an enviroment of general economic retraction. As with other 
areas of economic coopertaion, progress in linking currencies is likely to be very 
deliberate and develop under more stable economic circumstances. 
By the time of the eighth meeting of the Supreme Council in December 
1987, it was decided that conditions were not yet appropriate for the imposition of 
a unified currency system. In particular, the uncertainties created by the Iran-Iraq 
war and the acknowledgment that "there was little to gain politically from turning 
[the GCC's] back on the dollar" were the source of the decision. The importance 
of the efforts toward integration of the financial systems, however, were stressed 
by the GCC leaders in the economic declaration issued after the eighth Supreme 
Council meeting: "the Supreme Council blessed the efforts toward the adoption 
of a fixed common index of the GCC currencies as an important step within the 
framework of coordination of financial and monetary policies and the realization 
of a Gulf common market." 
5.8.2 Transportation 
In the areas of land, sea, and air transport, the GCC states have exam-
ined a number of ways to link their economic infrastructure more effectively. For 
obvious reasons, the importance of strengthened transportation ties between the 
GCC states cannot be overstated in the context of regional economic integration. 
Measures to promote transportation connections with other regions, such as the 
member states of the EEC, could also have a significant economic impact. The 
inclusion of sweeping provisions in the EA relating to transportation come as no 
surpnse. 
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By the virtue of their location on the Gulf and Arabian Sea and their 
long history of sea activity, the GCC states have understandably emphasized 
the standardization of port specifications and procedures. A second and more 
immediate reason for cooperation in this regard is the Iran-Iraq war, as unified 
port procedures would be strategically valuable to the GCC states in contingencies 
involving the interruption of the maritime trade of one or more GCC states. The 
member states are bound by the EA, in light of these and other factors, to: 
1. accord means for passenger and cargo transportation belonging to citizens of 
the other member states to receiver the same treatment they accord to their 
own citizens. 
2. cooperate in the fields of land and sea transportation [by coordinating and 
establishing) such infrastructure projects as seaports, airports [and) ... roads. 
3. coordinate aviation and air transport policies; and 
4. allow steamliners, ships and boats and their cargoes, belonging to any mem-
ber state, freely to use the various port facilities and grant them the same 
treatment and privileges granted to their own. 
The process of standardization and coordination of ports was launched by 
the first annual meeting of GCC port executives in October 1982 in Riyadh. This 
and subsequent meetings have been marked by consideration of a memorandum 
submitted by Oman with a proposal for the GCC to develop and expand Omani 
strategic port facilities, principally for reasons pertaining to contingencies arising 
from the Iran-Iraq war, leading to the adoption of a plan that was presented to 
the GCC foreign ministers on 17 March 1985. The port executives have also called 
for the adoption of common port standards based on the model of ports in Saudi 
Arabia. 
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In May 1983, the GCC ministers of transport and communication ap-
proved a proposal to establish an executive committee of civil aviation directors. 
The committee has since agreed to a new inter-Gulf flight schedule and the unifi-
cation of airline ticket structures. At its first meeting in July 1983, the executive 
committee advanced a set of proposals concerning inter-Gulf flights aimed at max-
imizing efficiency. The matter of common fares was discussed during its next two 
meetings, in February and September 1984, and on 30 September 1984 the com-
mittee formally recommended the unification of the rate structure along with a 40 
percent discount to youths between the ages of 12 and 26 years. Apart from these 
actions, the committee has also explored putative measures to protect GCC-state 
airlines from foreign competition. 
A plan to create a GCC air transport company was considered by a con-
ference held on 11 January 1982, which referred the matter to the Secretariat 
General for a detailed feasibility study. The ministers of transportation then ex-
amined the issue during their meetings of May 1982 and May 1983. By the 30 
September 1984 meeting of the comnmittee, the Secretariat General had com-
pleted its review and concluded that the proposed company was "non-viable." 
At a meeting in Muscat in June 1982, GCC ministers of transport and 
communication agreed to the preparation of a feasibilty study on a common rail-
way system. The proposal was based on the view that the GCC railway network 
could be linked eventually with lines to Europe and, therefore, could open vast 
new trade and other commercial potentials to the GCC states. Transport in-
frastructures in the GCC region proper have also been at the core of efforts to 
effect greater integration. Specifications for highways and connecting roads were 
approved by the ministers of transportation in March 1984. 
An achievement for the GCC with important implications for inter-GCC 
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trade and overall economic integration was the conclusion of the transit system 
agreement on 19-20 June 1982. The agreement, required by Article 5 and of 
the EA, contains six parts, which regulate composition and nature of shipping 
containers, wrapping requirements, customs seals, transit manifests, exceptional 
shipments, and the exchange of signatures between customs officials. 
Finally, the Secretariat General is currently engaged in the development 
of a policy paper with proposals for a GCC transportation policy. Such a docu-
ment would presumably serve as the centerpiece for evolving GCC cooperation in 
the transportation sphere. 
5.8.3 Electricity and Water 
The development of common electricity and water systems with stan-
dardized rates throughout the GCC has been the primary objective of the GCC 
cooperation committee on electricity and water. During their meeting of 30-31 
October 1984, the GCC ministers of electricity ordered a study to be completed 
in 1985 on the potential of a common electricity grid between the GCC states. 
The ministers announced in April 1985 that the initial feasibility study had been 
completed and next decided to request regional electricity demand projections 
over the next 20 years from the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research. A two-
phase plan to link the electricity systems of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi 
Arabia, after which Oman and the UAE would be connected, was approved in 
principle by the ministers of energy on 24 September 1986. By October, a pro-
posal detailing a reported $1.7 bn plan had been under serious consideration for 
final proposal to the Ministerial Council. A meeting in early 1987 to consider 
the proposal was postponed, but the process of integration of electricity grids has 
generated considerable support among the various relevant GCC committees. 
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A parallel effort has led to the standardization of electricity and water 
rates. At their meeting on 30-31 October 1984, the GCC ministers of electricity 
approved a plan to adopt a two-tier electricity rate system. The recommenda-
tions were adopted by the Ministerial Council on 22 April1985, and unified GCC 
electricity and water rates structures were implemented starting 1st October 1985. 
In addition, the committee has sought to identify areas of standardization 
through which electricity and energy resources can be conserved, such as common 
insulation requirements for buildings and coordination or purchases of electrical 
equipment. A common policy statement containing regulations governing the 
protection of water resources was adopted in June 1985. 
5.8.4 Communications 
Expanding communication links between the GCC member states and 
standardizing procedures and costs have been the focus of GCC activity in the 
realm of communications. Some two years before the establishment of the orga-
nization, a project to link Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE to a common marine 
cable system had been agreed upon. The GCC has sought to capitalize on the 
existing plans by determining the feasibility of a system including the other three 
member states. A study along these lines was initiated in October 1982. In the 
areas of telephone, telegraph, and post, efforts have concentrated on developing 
a common tariff system. Permanent commitees were established in each of these 
areas pursuant to a meeting of the GCC post and telegraph ministers on 30 May 
1983. A study on the introduction of standardized mailing codes throughout the 
GCC region was requested by the ministers at the same meeting. By 16 Septem-
ber 1984, the idea of unified tariffs had gained momentum in the GCC committee 
on unified tariffs as well. Representatives on that committee proposed the unifi-
cation of the telephone rate system based on a 30 percent reduction in intra-GCC 
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telephone charges in the evenings, Fridays, and public holidays. The plan was 
assessed by the telecommunication ministers at their meeting in Riyadh on 27 
October 1984. All GCC states have also become members of the Gulf Technical 
Bureau of Communication, which has been annexed to the Secretariat General. 
The organization serves to coordinate the distribution of airwaves as well as to 
unify other procedures relating to communications. 
5.8.5 Education 
Cooperation in education has been frequently cited as a major goal of the 
Council. However, it is interesting to note that the first meeting ever of the GCC 
ministers of education was not held until September 1985. One should hasten to 
add that educational cooperation has taken place under the auspices of the Arab 
Education Office of the Gulf states, which has been in existence for several years 
and which also includes Iraq. Indeed, in a recent interview, Bahrain education 
minister attributed the apparent slow pace of educational cooperation under the 
GCC to two factors: First, significant educational cooperation existed even before 
the creation of the GCC; second, GCC policy makers have directed their attention 
to more immediate issues such as economic and industrial planning and security. 
In fact, the eighth annual conference of the Gulf Arab states' education ministers 
(Qatar, March 1985) was concerned with matters relating to education, scientific, 
and cultural coordintion among the Arab states of the Gulf. 
In an interview, Bahrain's deputy minister of education, Hamad Al-
Sulayti, said that the thrust of educational cooperation is twofold: the Gulf Arab 
University (Bahrain) and curricular planning. Policy planners in this area are 
guided by two goals: to avoid duplication of efforts; and to define the common 
attitudes and culture that would enrich the school curriculum. He identified four 
immediate needs: studies; surveys; common syllabi; and coordination in the sci-
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entific and technical fields. He noted that in 1985 discussions were held on three 
topics : a master text book; common text books; and a plan for common texts in 
maths. The main problem facing educational cooperation, according to Al-Sulayti, 
is the "uneven" level of educational development in different GCC countries." He 
also stated 1hat agreement had been reached within the GCC on a statement 
defining the general educational goals for curricula in the Gulf Arab states. The 
1983 draft of the highly qualified should be employed in it.epared by the Arab 
Education Office of the Gulf states. It has become the basis for educational coor-
dination among GCC states. 
There is other cooperation in education as follows :-
1. The GCC have agreed to cooperate in curricular development, at least on 
the general foundations of curricula. Three foundations were delineated: 
psychlogical; social; and educational. 
2. Gulf cooperation in education is natural because of the common character-
istics among the GCC states: common geography, natural resources (oil), 
religion {Islam), language (Arabic) and culture. 
3. Social foundations for educational cooperation include the following: 
a. The Gulf states are basically Islamic societies which believe in Islam as a 
religion and a way of life. 
b. Gulf states are part of the Arab nation. 
c. Gulf societies are experiencing very rapid change and in spite of their fast 
development, they still suffer from aspects of undervelopment: high illiteracy 
and a shortage of technically trained manpower. 
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d. The Gulf is a very important region-economically and geographically. 
At the conclusion of their meeting (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, September 10-
11, 1985), the GCC ministers of education adopted the following general policies 
regarding education: 
1. Teaching is a specialised vocation, and only those who are highly qualified 
should be employed in it. 
2. illiteracy must be completely eradicated from the G.C.C. states. 
3. Higher education at the university level must be Arabised in all of its disci-
plines and branches. 
4. Citizenship, obedience, and the ability to defend one's homeland should also 
be nurtured through military education in schools. 
The ministers of education also adopted the following resolutions: 
1. A minimum level of basic education must be provided for all (elementary and 
middle education). 
2. Creativity, independent thinking, and analytical reasoning must be encour-
aged in schools. 
3. Educational curricula and textbooks must be unified throughout the GCC 
states. 
4. Special education must be encouraged. Educational opportunity must also 
made available to disabled. 
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5. Higher education must respond to society's needs and must train enough 
future leaders. 
6. Scientific research must be employed to solve the society's problems and its 
capabilities must be utilised without excessive reliance in imported technol-
ogy. 
5.8.6 Information 
Information is another area that has been the subject of cooperation 
arrangements among GCC states. Cooperation has involved news agencies, radio 
programmes, and even the creation of a regional GCC radio programme, called the 
"Voice of the Gulf Cooperation Council". This programme, initiated in July 1985, 
had broadcast from Abu Dhabi for three months and then would rotate among 
the GCC states at three-month intervals. The "Voice" had heard two hours daily. 
In the spring of 1984, the GCC called on member states to assist their na-
tional news agencies in obtaining current information. GCC officials stressed the 
need for objective political analysis of the news and recommended that ARAB-
SAT be used to serve Gulf news agencies. At their first meeting (October 1985), 
the GCC ministers of information discussed a draft agreement on further coop-
eration. The agreement, which consist of eleven articles, aims at strengthening 
the cooperation in the field of information, especially as it pertains to radio and 
television programs and news. The information ministers also discussed three 
working papers regarding the state of cooperation in information, the nature of 
joint information action, and the methods to be used to effect more and better 
cooperation in the field of information. 
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5.9 Summary 
The service sector in the six Gulf states accounts for a sizeable percent-
age of the region's GDP, averaging close to 46.8 percent in 1988. The largest 
contribution of service activities to gross domestic product is in Bahrain ( 62.4 
percent ) followed by Qatar ( 52.6 percent ) and Saudi Arabia ( 48.6 percent 
). The percentage contribution of these sectors to GDP in the other Gulf states 
ranges between 41 percent and 42 percent. Activities in this sector have been 
financed mostly by government expenditures from oil revenues ( e.g. health, ed-
ucation), with a sizeable portion of domestic requirements being provided for by 
imports. However, the trend in the coming decade is to encourage greater private 
sector participation, diversify the kind of service activities generated domestically 
and reduce the dependency on the outside world for the provision of the services. 
Promoting the services sector appears to offer a chance to diversify Gulf economic 
structure, given the difficulties encountered in establishing viable agricultural and 
industrial activities aside from these related to oil and petrochemical. 
The Gulf region is considered more important as a net importer of services 
than a net supplier. In 1989, a total deficit of$ 15.8 billion is estimated to have 
been recorded in the balance of services and transfers for the Gulf states. This 
deficit has been on a declining trend after reaching a peak of$ 44 billion in 1981. 
Exports of services, which include earnings from shipping, aviation, insurance, 
banking, tourism and other services recorded average rates of growth of 20 percent 
per annum during the boom period of 1976-1981. This gave way to annual rates of 
growth of 20 percent during 1982-1985 period, before declining in the subsequent 
three years. Payments to acquire services from abroad which rose at an annual 
rate of 35 percent between 1976 and 1981, increased by less than 1 percent during 
the period of 1982-1986 before declining thereafter. 
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As we have seen in this chapter, it may well be concluded that services in 
the G.C.C. countries have developed independently in each country as cooperation 
and integration amongst the G.C.C. countries in the sector is still limited. This 
can best be illustrated by a comparative summary of the evolution of financial 
services in recent years , as competition rather than cooperation has prevailed. 
The reduction in the pace of regional growth and development has led to an overall 
slackening of demand for finance. Guarantee business, contract financing and 
import financing, previously Gulf banks' core business, accounting for more than 
70 percent of their loan commitment, have fallen off sharply in 1987. The banking 
environment in the region has become more testing and competition among banks 
all chasing fewer first-tier clients is leading to tighter profit margins. 
Gulf bankers, preoccupied mainly by asset growth in the 1970s and early 
1980s, are now re-evaluating assets, insisting on quality, looking for opportunities 
abroad and specializing either in traditional trade financing, investment banking, 
financial services or in portfolio management. 
The economic slowdown in the region is bound to create cash flow prob-
lems, especially among inefficient companies that have been mismanaged for some-
time. Many Gulf companies expanded so rapidly in the boom period that they 
did not have time to build up an organizational structure to keep up with the 
volume of work at hand. 
While the underlying problems are the same, however, the symptoms 
have, under the influence of local conditions, taken different forms in the various 
countries of the region. In Saudi Arabia banks concerned with growth and market 
share competed with each other in boom years to attract more borrowers. Many 
of these clients are now facing difficulties in making repayments, and the banks 
have no guarantee that the courts would rule in their favour if borrowers fail to 
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repay their debt. In the absence of a modern banking law, courts resorting to 
Islamic Sharia will throw out cases where an element of interest is involved. 
In Bahrain the offshore banks have been greatly affected by the over-
all recession in the Gulf and the shift of the international market away from 
syndicated lending. Construction bonds and guarantees are drying up as infras-
tructural projects reach completion and new projects are either delayed, scaled 
down or shelved for lack of sufficient funds. Consumer demand decelerated as 
well, and business confidence was been adversely affected by the AL-Manakh cri-
sis in Kuwait and the Gulf war. The Iran-Iraq war has removed ample banking 
opportunities in both these two countries. At the same time official policy and the 
growing competence of the national banks have combined to exclude the OBU's 
from much of the available business. 
On the liability side, the dependence of the Gulf offshore banks on inter-
bank funding makes them vulnerable. International banks are wary of increasing 
their exposure to a region where the risk is received to be on the rise. The pri-
vately owned Arab OBU's have realised that without attaining a large scale of 
business it would not be possible for them to support too costly an organization 
out of Bahrain. 
The major problem of UAE and Qatar is that they are overbanked. there 
are 102 banks and 284 branches for 1.3 million people in the UAE. While in Qatar, 
ten foreign banks and five local banks are chasing a small amount of business. The 
downturn in the local and regional econmies has left its impact on banks operating 
in the two countries. Three banks in the UAE have run into difficulties in the last 
18 months ( 1987 ), and liquidity problems surfaced, as well in Qatar. 
The Gulf banks are making a big push towards internationalization in 
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competition with each other. The narrow economic base at home, the decline 
in domesting lending opportunities, the legal uncertainties and low margins as-
sociated with commercial banking are forcing these banks to seek more business 
opportunities abroad. 
The Gulf banks want to survive and develop more cooperation amongst 
the GCC countries. They should implement structural revisions, acquire recent 
development, computerize banking services and have a cadre of highly trained 
bankers capable of responding to the changing business environment. Whereas 
trade and contract financing require traditional banking expertise, the new areas 
of banking activities entail more specialised staff and new management structure 
that facilitate streamlineing in the decision- making process. In financial services, 
sophisticated management only well trained human resources are perhaps even 
more important than the capital of the bank. In times of feeble economic condi-
tions long-term strategic planning would be quite useful to help banks succeed in 
this highly competitive environment. It could help them carve their niche in the 
domestic, regional and international markets. 
It should be clear from the chapter and this illustration that the role of 
the GCC is very limited in the service sector, so without coordination , cooperation 
and avoiding the bureaucracy and the administrative problems there will be no 
integration amongst the GCC countries in the future. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
External Trade And Migration In The G.C.C. Countries 
6.1 Introduction 
Economic growth in developing countries averaged around 2.8 percent 
in 1987, noticeably better than in 1986. This modest performance was further 
accompanied by a marked strengthening of their external payment position. The 
aggregate current account of the developing countries turned almost into balance 
from a $39 billion deficit in 1986. Countries of West Asia which includes Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, North and South Yemen, as well as the GCC coun-
tries, saw the deficit in their current accounts shrinking from $13 billion in 1986 
to $2 billion in 1987. The corresponding drop in the current account deficit of 
the six GCC countries was equally significant, from $5.6 billion in 1986 to $1.1 
billion in 1987. The improvement in the region's external position was accounted 
for not only by the increase in the surplus of trade but also by the smaller deficit 
in the balance of invisibles. The positive adjustment in the Gulf countries terms 
of trade had more than offset the decline in the export volume of oil and boosted 
the purchasing power of their oil revenues by 7.3 percent, following declines of 
36.2 percent and 8.2 percent in 1986 and 1985 respectively. 
In 1987 overall improvement in the region's current account position was 
also due to the maintenance of adjustment efforts aimed at constraining imports. 
Import volume dropped on average by 7.6 percent in 1987, reflecting the comple-
tion of large infrastructural projects and continuing the trend of using resources 
more efficiently. On the other hand, OPEC's decision to lower its aggregate level 
of output has not affected all countries in the same way. Some countries increased 
their oil production in order to halt the downward trend in overall economic ac-
tivity. 
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In the services and transfer account, the debit items which largely rep-
resents payment to contractors, freight and insurance, remittances of expatriates 
working in the region and other expenditures on foreign personnel and services 
have been on the decline in various Gulf states. This is due to the completion 
of major contracts and a general drop in the demand for foreign workers. The 
decline in debit items was, however, offset to a large extent by the drop in the 
level of earnings from foreign investments, leaving the invisible balance for the six 
Gulf states firmly in deficit. 
The trend in the export/import ratios was on the decline over the past 
few years. The ratio relating current exports to current imports was nearly halved 
between 1981 and 1987, falling from 2.87 to 1.35 as the drop in export revenues far 
exceeded the decline in imports. Nevertheless, the ratio for the region as a whole 
remained above unity throughout this period, suggesting that the Gulf countries 
can meet their merchandise import requirements from their export proceeds. 
There has been a slight turnaround in economic activities in 1987 and 
1988 with positive growth being recorded in these two years. The compression 
of imports which went on for 4 years was reversed in 1987 with a larger increase 
recorded in 1988. While oil exports moved slightly higher in the last two years, 
non-oil exports posted a much larger increase, rising in the case of Saudi Arabia 
by 46 percent in 1988 and 10 percent in the case of Bahrain. Saudi Arabia is by far 
the largest market in the region, accounting for 53 percent of total GCC imports, 
followed by UAE ( 19 percent ) of which a good part is re-exported, Kuwait ( 13 
percent ), Bahrain ( 7 percent ), Oman ( 5 percent ) and Qatar ( 3 percent ). 
According to the latest IMF figures, the international reserves' position 
of the six Gulf states fell to $35 billion in 1987 compared with $92 billion in 1981. 
Nevertheless, the reserves/import ratio remained firmly adequate for all the Gulf 
states, ranging from 11.6 months of import coverage for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
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to 6 months of import cover for Qatar, U AE and Bahrain, and 5 months for Oman. 
6.2 QATAR 
6.2.1 Introduction 
The Qatar import market expanded consistently up to 1982 from QR 1.1 
bn in 1974 to QR 7.1 mn in 1982. However, since then the trend has been sharply 
downward, with imports falling to only QR4 bn in 1986 before a slight upturn in 
1987. This continued in 1988 with imports reaching nearly QR5 bn. Much of the 
earlier increase was due to the government's programme of development, notably 
in industry, and the associated oil and gas developments. Total exports started 
to fall in 1981, declining to a low of QR 6. 7 bn in 1986 before recovering to QR 
7.2 bn in 1987 and rising by 3 percent in 1988. 
6.2.2 Exports 
National exports witnessed some improvements during 1988 compared 
with 1987 which recorded a noticeable deceleration in exports following the sharp 
deterioration in oil prices. Despite the fall in quantity, oil exports rose in value 
by 7.6 percent in 1988. The value of non-oil exports, mainly petrochemicals and 
fertilizers, also grew by 6 percent against 1987. 
Table 6.1: Foreign Trade Summary (QR mn) 
Sources 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Exports fob 16,405 12,002 12,245 11,277 6,730 7,435 8,045 
Imports cif 7,088 5,299 4,230 4,147 4,000 4,128 4,613 
Source: Qatar Monetary Agency 
The rise in oil exports in 1988 was related to the stability in world oil mar-
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kets following the OPEC December 1986 agreement on fixed quotas and prices. 
According to this agreement, oil production of member countires was reduced and 
the spot prices of oil was fixed at $18 per barrel. 
Total export posted an increase of QR494.0 million or 7.3 percent to reach 
QR 8,045 million in 1988. However, if the continued depreciation of the dollar 
was taken into account, the real value of exports, nominated mainly in dollars, 
was less than their real level in 1987. 
6.2.3 Imports 
Figures pertaining to the first half of 1987 reveal some changes in the 
commodity structure of imports compared with the situation in 1986. The relative 
importance of machinery and transport equipment jumped to 44.3 percent of 
total imports during the first half of 1987 against 37.1 percent in the previous 
year. Manufactured goods came second in relative importance, absorbing 15.8 
percent of total imports compared with 18.9 and 19.3 percent in 1986 and 1985 
respectively. The group of foodstuffs and live animals came third, with a relative 
importance of 15 percent compared with 17.2 percent in 1986. This was followed 
by miscellaneous manufactured goods which accounted for 12.7 percent, against an 
average of 14 percent during the period 1983-86. Chemicals and related products 
rose in relative importance from 5. 7 percent in 1986 to 6 percent during the first 
half of 1987. As for the groups of beverage and tobacco, crude materials, inedible, 
mineral fuels and lubricants, the relative importance for each accounted for 1. 7 
percent, 3.1 percent, 0.7 percent respectively against 2.4 percent, 3.2 percent, and 
0.9 percent in 1986. The group of animal and vegetable oils maintained the same 
relative importance of 0.5 percent in the first half of 1987. 
Table 6.2 shows some changes in the geographical distribution of imports. 
As shown by Table 6.2 Japan still came first as a source of imports, accounting 
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Table 6.2: Qatar Imports by Origin (%of total imports by value). 
Sources 1984 1985 1986 1987 
U.A.E 2.8 2.6 3.1 3.0 
Bahrain 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Saudi Arabia 0.7 1.5 2.0 2.6 
Oman 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.08 
Kuwait 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Japan 20.0 18.2 17.0 16.3 
U.K 15.2 16.3 16.5 16.0 
W.Germany 7.5 8.7 9.6 7.2 
Italy 5.0 4.9 5.3 4.9 
France 5.5 7.6 5.1 4.3 
U.S.A 9.5 6.5 5.9 11.9 
Source: {1) EIU. Country Profile 1989-90; {2) The General Secretariat ofthe 
GCC countires - Economic Bulletin. 
for 16.3 percent of total imports against 17.0 percent in 1986. UK occupied the 
second position during the first half of 1987 with a relative importance of 16.0 
percent against 16.0 percent in 1986. The United States of America which came 
fourth in relative importance in 1986, advanced to occupy third position during the 
first half of 1987 with a relative importance of 11.9 percent against 5.9 percent in 
1986. The fall in the value of the dollar played a major role in stimulating further 
imports from the United States. 
Italy came fifth with a relative importance of 4.9 percent, while France came 
sixth with 4.3 percent, followed by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait which accounted for 3.0 percent, 2.6 percent, 0.4 percent each respectively 
The geographical distribution of Qatar's imports according to the groups 
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of countries show that European countries continued to take the lead among other 
groups, forming around 42 percent of total imports against 49 percent in 1986. 
Asian countries, except Arab countries in Asia, came second with a proportional 
importance of 27 percent compared with 28 percent in 1986. The two Americas 
maintained their third position, jumping in relative importance to 19 percent 
compared with 9 percent in 1986. Followed by imports from Arab countries which 
accounted for 8 percent during the first half of 1987 against 8 percent in preceding 
year. 
Imports from the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council accounted 
for the lion's share, of the latter figure constituting about 76.3 percent of imports 
from Arab countries (QR 167.2 millions during the first half of 1987). The United 
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia were particularly important among other Gulf 
countries as a source of goods imported by Qatar. 
6.3 KUWAIT 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The CBA estimates of the merchandise trade balance show that the bal-
ance of trade recorded a surplus of KD 532 million in 1988 (KD 988 million in the 
previous year), as the value of expoorts and re-exports totalled KD 1974 million, 
against KD 1442 million for the value of imports. This decline in the trade balance 
surplus in 1988 is attributed to the decrease in the value of Kuwait's oil exports, 
as we will explain later. 
Source: Central Bank of Kuwait, Economic Report 1988 
The geographical distribution of the trade balance surplus in 1988 mainly 
involved the following countries: Japan (KD 150.9 million), Tawain (KD 99.5 
million), Italy (KD 95.6 million) and Pakistan (KD 87.9 million). Among major 
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Table 6.3: Balance of Trade 
Sources 1986 1987{Estimated, MD) 1988{Estimated, MD) 
Balance of Tra.de(Merchandise) 567 988 532 
Exports and Re-exports( f.o. b) 2082 2306 1974 
Of which: Oil Exports 183C 2073 1732 
Imports( f.o. b) 1502 1314 1403 
Non-monetary Gold( Net) -13 -4 -39 
countries that Kuwait's balance of trade runs at a deficit with are the U.S.A. (KD 
120.4 million), U.K. (KD 116.1 million) and West Germany {KD 95.1 million). 
U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia rank fifth and seventh with a deficit of KD 62.7 million 
and KD 33.8 million respectively. 
6.3.2 Exports 
The world oil market was characterized by instability due to fluctuations 
in both the volume of production and the world demand for oil on the one hand, 
and the change in oil prices, on the other. 
The available data shows that the volume of OPEC countries production 
of oil at certain periods of 1988 exceeded 22 m b/d, compared with their fixed 
production ceiling of 15 m bid, excluding Iraq's quota. Furthermore, the official 
price of Arabian light oil dropped from U.S. $17.5 per barrel in 1987 to U.S. $13.7 
per barrel in 1988. No signs of improvement in oil market prices appeared before 
the agreement was signed on November 28, 1988 by OPEC's thirteen member 
states, determining a new ceiling for production quotas and a reference price for 
the first six months of 1988. This agreement provided for a production ceiling of 
18.5 million barrels a day and a reference price of U.S. $18 per barrel. 
Developments witnessed by world oil markets, coupled with the circum-
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stances faced by OPEC in 1988, were reflected in the value of Kuwait's oil exports, 
which decreased by KD 341 million (6.7 percent) below its level in 1987 to reach 
KD 1732 million in 1988. The lower value of oil exports is attributed to the marked 
decrease in the price average of these exports. However, despite the decline in the 
value of oil exports, this value still constitutes the major portion (87.3 percent) 
of the total value of Kuwaiti exports. 
The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) continued integrating its down-
stream operations at home with the marketing of oil abroad in the form of high-
quality refined products. To this end, KPC continued its programme to modernise 
the Kuwaiti refineries, the last of which was Mina Abdulla refinery. Thus, Kuwait 
was able to raise the operating capacity of its three refineries at Al-Ahmadi, 
Shuaibah and Mina Abdulla. The KPC policy, based on increasing the exports of 
refined products and creating outlets in the outside world, particularly in Western 
Europe, aims at maintaining the stability of the value of oil revenues by protecting 
it against price fluctuations that frequently predominate in crude oil markets. 
Furthermore, the loading capacity of KPC oil tankers increased by the 
entry into service, in 1988, of two new oil tankers with a capacity of 35,000 tons 
each, out of six oil tankers for which the KPC signed purchase contracts in 1987. 
The value of non-oil exports (excluding the value of exports of non-
monetary gold) recorded a slight increase (3.9 percent) in 1988 to reach KD 242 
million, against KD 233 million in 1987. This increase came mainly from a rise 
in the value of Kuwait's exports of chemical fertilizers (KD 7.3 million). On the 
other hand, the value of re-exports and exports of Kuwaiti origin accounted for 
60 percent and 40 percent respectively of the total value of non-oil exports. 
Despite the scant increase in the value of non-oil exports, it was the first 
increase after a series of declines between 1982 and 1987. The marked decline in 
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the value of non-oil exports during that period is attributed to several reasons, 
mainly the Iran-Iraq war and its continuation, the rise of national industries in 
neighbouring countries that are competitive to Kuwaiti industries, and the diver-
sion of part of the re-export and transit trade, which used to pass through Kuwaiti 
ports, to ports in other Gulf countries. 
The most important re-exported goods are transport equipment, ma-
chinery, electrical and non-electrical appliances and equipment and clothing and 
textiles. The most important goods included among exports of Kuwaiti origin are 
fertilizers and chemicals. 
The geographical distribution of the value of Kuwaiti exports is confined 
to a limited number of countries, five of which account for 48 percent of the 
total value of Kuwaiti exports. These countries are Japan {18 percent), Italy (9 
percent), Holland (8 percent), Tawain (7 percent) and Pakistan (5 percent). 
6.3.3 Imports 
In 1988 the value of Kuwaiti imports increased by KD 123 million (9.3 
percent) over the previous year. This increase in the value of exports can be 
explained by several local and international developments, the most important 
of which are a slight increase in local demand for imports, particularly consumer 
and intermediate goods, and a rise in commodity prices in the country of origin 
during 1988. 
It was noticable, however, that the pattern of economic classification of 
Kuwaiti imports in 1988 is not different from the prevailing pattern of the past few 
years, where consumer goods ranked first (39 percent) within the total value of 
imports, followed by intermediate and capital goods at rates of 37 percent and 23 
percent respectively. However, the ratio of Kuwait's imports from the countries of 
this group to total imports began declining in 1987 and 1988, reaching 69 percent 
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and 62 percent respectively, for several reasons, mainly the successive increase in 
the prices of goods of the industrial countries. Further, it can be noticed that five 
industrial countries account for 51 percent of the total value of imports. The ratio 
is distributed as follows: Japan (14 percent) the U.S.A. (14 percent), the U.K. 
(8 percent), West Germany {8 percent) and Italy (6 percent). Kuwait imports 
several products from industrial countries, mainly cars, automobile spare parts 
and accessories, oil drills, pipes, electrical applicances and cigarettes. 
Table 6.4: Imports from Ten Major Countries(Million Dinars). 
1987 1988 
Country Value Relative Weight% Country Value Relative Weight% 
Japan 271.3 18.4 Japan 215.1 14.4 
U.S.A 158.2 10.7 U.S.A 212.9 14.3 
W.Germany 127.9 8.7 U.K 133.5 8.9 
U.K 115.5 7.8 W.Germany 121.7 8.2 
Italy 94.6 6.4 Italy 95.6 6.4 
France 78.0 5.3 Turkey 89.7 6.0 
Turkey 77.6 5.3 U.A.E 79.6 5.1 
S.Korea 59.0 4.0 Saudi Arabia 76.4 5.1 
Saudi Arabia 53.0 3.6 S.Korea 67.2 4.5 
U.A.E 50.1 3.4 France 56.1 3.8 
Total 1086.1 73.6 Total 1147.8 76.9 
Source: Central Bank of Kuwait, the Economic Report 1988 
In terms of relative weight within the total value of Kuwaiti imports, after 
the group of industrial countries, come the Arab countries and the Asian non-
Arab countries, with an equal share of 14 percent each. The U .A.E. and Saudi 
Arabia ranked seventh and eighth among the ten major countries within the total 
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value of Kuwaiti imports at 5 percent and 5 percent respectively. Meanwhile, 
Thrkey and South Korea came at the top of non-Arab Asian countries exporting to 
Kuwait. This can be attributed to the relatively low prices of goods imported from 
these two countries, compared with prices of goods imported from the industrial 
countries. 
6.3.4 Kuwait's Trade with the G.C.C. Countries 
Kuwait's trade with the G.C.C. countries continued its growth, started 
in 1987, at accelerating rates to reach KD 285.3 million (an increase of 32 percent) 
in 1988. This value was close to the high level realized in 1982 (KD 284.1 million). 
The value of Kuwaits imports from the G.C.C. countries in 1988 totalled 
KD 189.1 million. The noticeable increase (55 percent) in this value compared 
with its level in 1987 shows the relative stability in the upward trend of these 
imports over the past few years. The value of Kuwaiti imports from these countries 
was divided into goods of national origin (71 percent) and goods of non-national 
origin (28 percent). Further, the increase in the value of imports was also divided 
into the value of imported goods of national origin (56 percent) and others of 
non-national origin (50 percent). 
The increased value of Kuwait's imports of goods of national origin from 
the G.C.C. countries may be attributed to the increased local demand resulting 
from the growing competiveness of these goods, which also justifies the expan-
sion and growth of both industrial and agricultural sectors in these countries. 
Moreover, the increased value of Kuwait's imports of goods of non-national origin 
from the G.C.C. countries reflects the developing and flourishing commercial role 
played by these countries in the region. 
Kuwait's exports to the G.C.C. countries in 1988 totalled KD 69.2 million 
(a decline of 5.3 percent below 1987), indicating an 8.3 percent increase in the 
203 
value of Kuwaiti exports of national origin over the the previous year, against a 
decrease of 22.6 percent in the value of Kuwait's exports of non-national origin. 
The distribution of trade by products between Kuwait and the G.C.C. 
countries can be divided into three main groups: animal and agricultural products, 
industrial products and natural products. Industrial products ranked first in the 
components of the balance of trade between Kuwait and the G.C.C. countries, as 
they accounted for 86 percent of the total value of Kuwait's imports from these 
countries in 1988. The most important components of industrial products that 
Kuwait imports from the G.C.C. countries were concentrated in chemicals, iron 
bars, plastic products and cement. Furthermore, both animal and agricultural 
products and natural products ranked second and third in the priority list of 
Kuwaiti imports from the G.C.C. countries. 
Table 6.5: Value of trade between Kuwait and G.C.C. Countries(Million 
Dinars) 
~987 1988 
Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Country Value % Value % Value % Value % 
Saudi Arabia 48.9 66.9 53.0 43.4 42.6 61.6 76.4 40.4 
U.A.E 15.9 21.7 50.1 41.1 16.9 24.5 79.6 42.1 
Bahrain 3.8 5.2 7.5 6.2 4.7 6.8 12.0 6.4 
Qatar 2.5 3.5 10.8 8.9 2.8 4.0 17.8 9.4 
Oman 2.0 2.7 0.6 0.4 2.2 3.1 3.2 1.7 
Source: Central Bank of Kuwait, The Economic Report, 1988. 
As for Kuwait's exports to the G.C.C. countries, industrial products, con-
centrated manufactured foods, constituted 97 percent of the total value of these 
204 
exports. Meanwhile, agricultural and animal products, mostly dairy products, 
accounted for the remainder. 
Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. captured the major portion of Kuwait's 
trade with the G.C.C. countries. The share of these two countries constitutes 82 
percent of the value of Kuwait's imports and 86 percent of the value of its exports. 
After Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. come Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. 
6.3.5 Government Procedures to Activate Foreign Trade 
During 1988 the concerned authorities continued their efforts to support 
and activate the momentum of Kuwait's foreign trade. They also adopted certain 
measures to secure more protection for domestic industries. Some agreements 
for economic and trade co-operation were concluded between Kuwait and other 
countries, one with Tunisia, another with Algeria and a third with Denmark. 
Furthermore, Kuwait participated in regional and international conferences on 
developing regulating trade among countries. 
Locally, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry took three decisions 
extending the period of customs protection for a number of domestic manufactured 
consumer goods. The Ministry also passed another decision regulating the re-
export of certain foodstuffs imported by the Kuwaiti Supply Company and another 
decision exempting from customs duties imports similar to domestic products of 
wood furniture imported for personal use. 
6.4 BAHRAIN 
6.4.1 Introduction 
Bahrain is traditionally an entrepot, re-exporting chiefly to Saudi Arabia, 
though this trade has been affected by the development of Saudi ports. Domestic 
exports (excluding re-exports) have risen mainly because of aluminium. Bahrain's 
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major import is crude oil, which is bought from Saudi Arabia for the Sitra refinery. 
6.4.2 Exports 
Total non-oil export trade increased from BD 142.6 million in 1984 to 
BD 218.5 million in 1988. The growth in exports was mainly due to the rise in 
exports of manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment and chemi-
cals. Exports from the bonded area increased to about BD 51.8 million in 1988, 
which compared to BD 31.0 million in 1988. Transit trade also increased to BD 
8.8 million which compared to BD 6.3 million in 1986. 
Total value of exports of crude oil and refined products declined, largely 
due to a fall in the crude oil and product prices. Total exports were valued at BD 
688.2 million in 1988 (as against BD 1062.1 million in 1984 and 959.6 million in 
1985). 
Table 6.6: Summary of Exports 
Exports 
Non-Oil 
End of Bahrain Re- Bonded Total Non- Oil Total Transit 
Period Expor1 Area Oil Exp. Exports Shipment 
1983 115.3 54.6 31.0 200.9 972.0 1172.9 29.9 
1984 91.5 13.1 38.0 142.6 1062.1 1204.7 16.6 
1985 61.9 13.5 54.2 129.6 959.6 1089.2 10.9 
1986 100.5 13.1 26.1 139.7 687.3 827.0 6.3 
1987 115.9 11.5 29.6 157.0 756.5 913.5 8.6 
1988 154.1 12.6 51.8 218.5 688.2 906.7 8.8 
Source: Bahrain Monetary Agency - Quarterly Statistical Bulletin - Sept. 
1989 
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6.4.3 Imports 
Non-oil imports decreased by 56.8 million from BD 632.8 million in 1985 
to BD 576.0 million in 1988. A considerable fall in non-oil imports was registered 
in imports into the bonded area during 1988-BD 87.0 million as against BD 145.3 
million in 1985. Imports into Bahrain declined by BD 163.4 million from BD 
590.0 million in 1984 to BD 426.6 million in 1987. The value of crude oil imports 
was lower, as in the case of oil exports, on account of depressed international oil 
prices. Oil imports contracted by BD 70.6 million or 15 percent from BD 469.7 
million in 1987 to BD 399.1 million in 1988. 
In addition to Saudi crude oil it also imports alumina from Australia and 
there is a sizeable trade in gold. Japan, the UK and USA are traditionally 
Bahrain's leading suppliers, with the UK and the USA vying for first place since 
1985. 
Bahrain's major exports are products from the Sitra refinery and Abu 
Saafa crude, which together accounted for 75 percent of total exports in 1988. 
Japan and the USA are major customers for Bahraini products, although Saudi 
Arabia has become the most important since 1987. 
Trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council States was lower in 1984, 
mainly due to a substantial fall in the exports to the states. Total exports in 
1986 to the GOO Countries amounted to BD 14,418 million as against 7,656 mil-
lion in 1985. Imports from these areas increased by BD 22,508 million in 1986. ( 
Statistical Abstract 1987). 
Bahraini exports to other GOO states comprising mainly aluminium, 
furniture, water pipes, medical syringes, fruit juice, leather goods and air condi-
tioners, in 1988 totalled BD 59 mn, 195 percent up on 1987 when they stood at 
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Table 6. 7: Total Non-Oil Imports (% ) Classified by Countries. 
Contry 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
GCC. Countries 3.5 4.5 4.2 5.1 7.4 11.5 
Kuwait 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.1 
Saudi Arabia 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.6 3.2 6.0 
U.A.E 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.7 3.2 4.0 
Qatar 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Oman 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Asian Countries 36.5 34.0 32.5 32.1 24.4 28.2 
Japan 27.5 24.9 23.5 21.0 12.9 14.4 
Thailand 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.5 1.6 2.0 
Taiwan 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.4 
China 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 
Singapore 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.7 
Pakistan 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 
India 1.7 2.4 2.7 3.4 3.2 3.8 
HongKong 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.1 
European Countries 36.7 32.5 33.4 33.7 35.2 38.5 
Belgium 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.2 
Denmark 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 
W.Germany 10.7 8.0 7.6 8.2 6.5 8.5 
France 5.3 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 4.4 
U.K 18.2 18.2 19.0 18.4 22.5 23.0 
American Countries 
U.S.A 15.2 18.7 21.8 20.7 23.6 13.2 
Canada 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.1 0.4 
Oceanic Countries 
Australia 6.9 8.4 6.7 6.4 6.8 6.7 
Total 100.( 100.(] 100.(] 100.0 100.(] 100.(] 
Source: Bahrain Monetary Agency. 
BD 20mn. Saudi Arabia was the main market, taking BD 42 mn worth of goods 
in 1988 compared with BD 19mn in 1987. 
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6.5 OMAN 
6.5.1 Introduction 
The Sultanate continues to maintain a liberal exchange system without 
any restrictions on external payments or transfers in regard to current or capital 
transactions. The Omani Rial remains pegged to the US Dollar at the rate fixed 
after the 10 percent devaluation effected in January 1986. 
There are virtually no trade restrictions except for the petroleum prod-
ucts used as fuel which the Oman Refinery Company produces on an adequate 
scale to meet domestic demands. Import duties levied are generally low, at 5 
percent, and only about one half of imports are dutiable. In a few select cases, 
however, higher custom duties are levied for the purpose of protecting domestic 
infant industries. 
The extent of the openness of the economy can be gauged by the ratio of 
its aggregate value of exports and imports to gross domestic product plus imports. 
The ratio stood at 59 percent in 1987. During 1988, oil prices in the world market 
weakened compared to the previous year. This had an unfavourable impact on the 
external balance of the country as oil accounts for major portion of the Sultanate's 
export receipts. 
6.5.2 Exports 
Omani exports can be categorised into three main groups: oil and re-
lated products, non-oil commodities of domestic origin and re-exports. Despite 
the substantial declines in oil exports receipts in 1986 and 1988, it continued to 
account for the major portion of export revenues. With the exception of these 
two years when it accounted for about 90 percent and 88 percent, respectively, it 
had otherwise accounted for more than 90 percent. 
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Since 1981 oil exports in quantity have been increasing steadily at an 
average annual rate of 9.6 percent, from an average export of 278.7 thousand 
barrels a day in 1980 to 580.5 thousand barrels in 1988. Oil prices on the other 
hand have been on a declining trend during this period, from an annual average 
high of US $36.9 per barrel in 1980 and 1981 to US $13.46 per barrel in 1986. In 
1987 it rose to US $17.30 per barrel but fell again to US $13.7 per barrel in 1988. 
Asian countries, mainly Japan, have been the main export markets, ac-
counting for over 90 percent of crude oil exports in 1988. Japan's share increased 
to 50 percent in 1988 compared to 41 percent during the previous year. TheRe-
public of Korea's share also increased from 16 percent in 1987 to 25 percent in 
1988, while that of Taiwan decreased from 10 percent to 6 percent. The Sultanate 
also continues to export to other regular customers such as Sinapore, Thailand 
and India, while also commencing exports to China. 
Re-exports after having declined in 1986 to RO 85.0 million from RO 97.1 
million in 1985 stayed the same in 1987 as in the previous year, while in 1988 
they rose by 8 percent to RO 92.0 million. Over 75 percent of re-exports are of 
machinery and transport equipment. In fact, road vehicles and other transport 
equipment accounts for over 57 percent of re-exports. About 55 percent of re-
export is to G.C.C. countries. The major part of all is to U.A.E. which alone 
accounts for almost 50 percent of total re-exports. 
During 1987 and 1988, a significant jump in the value of non-oil exports 
of domestic origin took place. In 1987 it rose by RO 12.3 million or by 46 percent 
from RO 26.6 million to RO 38.9 million. In 1988 it increased more substantially 
by RO 24.0 million or by 61 percent to RO 62.9 million. Copper exports jumped 
substantially by 81.4 percent in 1988 over 1987 from RO 9.6 million to 17.4 million. 
Quantumwise, the increase was 28.5 percent from 14,116 metric tons in 1987 to 
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Table 6.8: Direction of Oil Exports (in Million Barrels) 
Country of destinatioiJ 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Japan 83.2 109.~ 99.9 80.4 104.6 
Singapore 11.3 4.8 3.5 12.1 5.1 
France 0.3 1.9 6.0 - 2.7 
Netherland 2.5 
- -
3.6 0.8 
Italy 
- - -
7.6 -
China 
-
- - - 4.6 
U.K - - 0.6 0.6 -
Korea 22.2 23.2 31.6 31.0 52.1 
Brazil - - - 6.1 7.7 
Australia 0.3 0.3 0.9 - -
Belgium 
- -
0.9 
- -
U.S.A 3.9 - 4.1 13.3 2.4 
Phillipines 0.6 
- -
3.1 5.4 
Taiwan 1.6 4.4 12.1 20.0 13.6 
India 4.6 6.2 14.0 7.5 2.3 
Thailand 1.6 11.0 8.7 7.1 4.7 
Greece 
- - - -
2.6 
Srilanka 
- - - -
1.6 
Others 2.9 3.7 5.1 4.7 1.7 
Total 135.0 164.S 187.4 197.1 211.9 
Source: Central Bank of Oman - Annual Report 1988 
18.137 metric tons. Another major increase registered was in fish exports which 
rose by 60.2 percent in 1988 from RO 11.8 million in 1987 to RO 18.9 million. 
Quantity wise the rise was 71.2 percent, from 20,64 7 metric tons in 1987 to 35,350 
metric tons. Other exports also registered significant increases. 
6.5.3 Imports 
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Recorded imports reached RO 846.5 million during 1988. This, when 
compared to the previous year, represents an increase of RO 145.8 million or 20 
percent. One third of the recorded imports for the Sultanate were of machinery 
and transport equipment. They amounted to RO 284.0 million which was higher 
by RO 22.7 million or by 8 percent over the previous year. 
Manufactured goods, which accounted for more than one fifth of total 
recorded imports in 1988, registered the highest increase of RO 55.5 million or 43 
percent as it reached RO 182.8 million. Over one sixth of recorded imports were in 
food and live animals which recorded an increase of RO 125.0 million {11 percent) 
to reach RO 147.3 million. Miscellaneous manufactured articles and commodities 
and transactions not classified elsewhere also recorded big increases during the 
year to the tune of RO 22.1 million {31 percent) and RO 34 million {172 percent), 
respectively. With the exception of minerals, fuels, lubricants and related material 
which registered a significant decline of RO 9.1 million ( 41 percent); other imports 
showed considerable increases. As pointed out earlier, the increase in imports is 
due to the acceleration in economic activity during the year. 
As Table 6.9 shows, Japan was Oman's leading supplier between 1981 and 
1988, followed by the UK. Japan, UK and USA held respectively the first three 
positions for 1988 as the largest exporters to the Oman. Japan ranked first, 
accounting for 16.8 percent of total imports of Oman. UK was second, accounting 
for 13 percent, followed by USA in third position, accounting for 8 percent. Next 
in importance was West Germany accounting for 5 percent. 
Oman's trade with its neighbours is no exception and the creation of the 
GCC in 1980 coupled with the vast economic developments that have evolved in 
the region in the last two decades, has given momentum to the pace of trade. The 
U AE being the closest next door neighbour to Oman tops both lists of Omani 
non-petroleum exports and imports. 
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Table 6.9: Value of Imports by Regions and Countries of Exports 
(% of total imports by value) 
Country 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Japan 22.0 21.3 20.2 14.4 15.2 16.8 
U.K 18.6 16.6 16.4 17.9 14.7 13.3 
U.S.A 7.7 7.6 5.7 7.6 6.7 8.8 
W.Germany 7.3 9.5 7.8 9.0 8.8 5.2 
Italy - - - - - 4.1 
Netherlands 3.4 3.1 3.1 4.0 4.5 
-
India 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 3.7 -
France 2.1 2.9 3.8 3.6 3.6 -
Bahrain 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.7 -
Qatar 0.01 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.2 -
Kuwait 0.08 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 -
Saudi Arabia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.1 -
U.A.E 17.5 17.8 21.1 18.7 21.0 21.0 
Source: 
(1) The Economist Intelligence Unit- Country Profile 1989-90. 
(2) Sultanate of Oman- Foreign Trade Statisties- Dec 1987 
Table 6.9 shows very clearly that among the G.C.C. countries, UAE is by 
far the major exporter to Oman. It is to be noted, though, that most of the goods 
imported from the UAE are not of UAE origin, but are re-exported. The UAE 
market, especially that of Dubai, is basically re-export oriented and, as such, it 
is engaged in bulk import for their own and neighbouring markets. Bulk imports 
from the sources of origin reduces costs for various reasons. Unit price paid to the 
supplier becomes lower. Furthermore, there are gains associated with transport 
costs, as well as insurance. Besides, the number of their sea ports and adequacy 
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of warehousing facilities, is another advantage contributing to quick handling and 
the reduction of storing costs. 
6.6 SAUDI ARABIA 
6.6.1 Introduction 
The country depends on imports for a large proportion of its manufac-
turers and much of its foodstuffs. Capital goods make up the bulk of imports 
but consumer products are coming increasingly into the picture. The USA has 
traditionally been the leading supplier, but was displaced temporarily by Japan 
in 1984 and 1985 and again in 1987. The major clients for Saudi crude and refined 
oil are to be found in Asia and Western Europe, with the Far East becoming the 
most important market for the first time in 1982. In 1986 Saudi Arabia regained 
its position as leading oil exporter to the USA. Non-oil exports, including petro-
chemicals, light manufactures and wheat, have also begun to feature significantly. 
6.6.2 Exports 
The Kingdom's foreign trade and balance of payments position mani-
fested some positive developments during 1987/1988. For the first time in six 
years, oil exports recorded a remarkable increase of 32 percent reaching Rls 10.4 
billion. The surge in non-oil exports reflected the Kingdom's success in diversi-
fying its economic base, reducing dependence on oil as a major source of export 
earnings, and encouraging the private sector to play a more effective role in the 
economic field. There was an increase in imports but at a rate lower than that 
in exports. As a result, a rise was recorded in the trade surplus for the first time 
since 1981/1982. 
During 1987/1988, the Kingdom's oil exports rose to Rls 76.5 billion, 
increasing by Rls 9.6 billion, or 14 percent, over those of 1986/1987 (Table 6.10 ). 
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Table 6.10: Oil Exports (Million Riyals) 
Sources 1982/83 % 1984/85 % 1986/87 % 1987/88 % 
Crude 190,676 93 106,454 90 54,265 81 55,171 72 
Refined, of which 14,228 7 11,775 10 12,622 19 21,330 28 
Burker Fuef 975 - 384 - 222 - 230 -
Total 204,904 100 118,229 100 66,887 100 76,501 100 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency- annual report 1988. 
This was mainly due to improvement in oil prices during the period under review. 
A breakdown of oil exports by product indicates that crude oil exports of 
Rls 55.2 billion depicted an increase of 2 percent over the preceding year, while 
refined products recorded a notable rise of 69 percent, reaching Rls 21.3 billion. 
Consequently, the share of refined products in total oil exports went up from 
19 percent in 1986/87 to 28 percent in 1987/88, signifying the expansion and 
improvement of the refining sector in the Kingdom. 
6.6.3 Imports 
Imports (CIF) increased by 6 percent to Rls 75.3 billion during 1987/88 
as compared with Rls 70.8 billion in 1986/87 (Table 6.11) it registers an increase 
for the first time since 1982/83. 
The increase in imports during the year, appears to be attributable partly to 
the resumption of growth in economic activity following completion of the adjust-
ment process, and partly to the rise in cost of imports resulting from appreciation 
in the exchange rate of some major currencies and the impact of inflation in some 
other partner countries. 
The private sector imports financed through commercial banks increased 
by 12 percent, from Rls 43.5 billion in 1986/87 to Rls 48.7 billion in 1987/88. 
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Table 6.11: Imports(CIF) 
Year Total(Million RLS) %Growth 
1982/83 136,098 +12 
1984/85 106,968 -16 
1986/87 70,780 -10 
1987/88 75,313 +6 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency- annual report 1988 
The share of private sector imports financed through commercial banks in total 
imports rose from 61 percent in 1986/87 to 65 percent in 1987/88, reflecting the 
growing use of banking services for imports. 
The composition of imports financed through commercial banks during 
the year under review indicates that imports of foodstuffs (Rls 7.9 billion) main-
tained top position, in spite of a decline of 4 percent in their value and of 3 
percentage points in their relative share in total imports from (19 percent to 16 
percent ) . The decline is indicative of the success in the Kingdom's policy of 
achieving self-sufficiency in food. 
Motor vehicle imports (Rls 6. 7 billion) moved from the third to the second 
position due to a sharp increase of 38 percent in their imports for the first time 
since the decline which started in 1983/84. 
The rise in the value of motor vehicles imports was accounted for mainly 
by an increase in their number. This was due partly to entry of new types of cars 
and increased sales promotion by car dealers and easier payment facilities. As a 
result, their share in total imports rose from 11 percent in 1986/87 to the third. 
Although imports of textiles and clothing increased by 15 percent, their 
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Table 6.12: Pdvate Sector Imports Financed Through Commercial 
Banks (Amounts in million Rls) 
1984/85 1986/87 1987/88 
Sources Amount % Amount % Amount % 
Foodstuffs 9,717 17 8,209 19 7,854 16 
Textiles and Clothing 6,167 11 5,283 12 6,058 12 
Construction materials 6,173 11 4,314 10 3,872 8 
Motor vehicles 6,594 11 4,854 11 6,684 14 
Machinery 6,093 10 3,089 7 2,973 6 
Appliances 4,595 8 3,702 9 4,507 9 
Other goods 18,392 32 14,049 32 16,791 35 
Total 57,731 100 43,500 100 48,739 lOU 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
relative share in the total remained at 12 percent. Appliances (Rls 4.5 billion) 
recorded the second highest rise of 22 percent and, hence, moved up from fifth 
to fourth position, accounting for 9 percent of the total imports and maintaining 
the same share as in the 1986/87. The rise in appliance imports may have been 
due primarily to the higher landed cost resulting from the appreciation of some 
major foreign currencies. Construction materials (Rls 3.9 billion) continued their 
downtrend which began in 1983/84, recording a fall of 10 percent in their imports. 
Thus, they moved back to the fifth position, and their share dropped to 8 per-
cent compared with 10 percent in the 1986/87. The further drop in construction 
materials' imports is attributable to continued slowdown in the construction sec-
tor, following the completion of major infrastructure projects, as well as to the 
increase in domestic production of construction materials and surplus in supply of 
housing. Machinery imports fell by 4 percent, reducing their share from 7 percent 
in 1986/87 to 6 percent in 1987/88. Other imports (Rls 16.8 billion) increased by 
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20 percent. As a result, their share in total imports rose from 32 percent to 35 
percent. 
Import data by origin (Table 6.13) indicate that the Kingdom's total 
imports from Japan (Rls 13.0 billion), which increased in 1987/88 by 17 percent, 
registered the highest growth rate among the major industrial countries group. 
This increase followed a four year period of continuous decline. Imports from UK 
(Rls 5.8 billion) witnessed a rise for the second consecutive year, increasing by 
14 percent. Imports from West Germany, which witnessed a downtrend starting 
in 1983/84, registered a rise of 1 percent to Rls 5.8 billion. Imports from the 
remaining industrial countries declined. Imports from USA showed a decline for 
the fifth consecutive year, falling by 7 percent to Rls 11.5 billion in 1987/88. 
Imports from Italy (Rls 5.1 billion) and France (Rls 4.0 billion) recorded a marginal 
fall of 1 percent each. On the whole, the Kingdom's imports from all the industrial 
countries mentioned above ( 45.3 ) billion) showed a rise of 4 percent, while its 
imports from the other 8 industrial countries (Rls 7.3 billion) and the rest of the 
world (Rls 22.8 billion) recorded increases of 9 percent and 11 percent respectively. 
In terms of percent share, Japan regained the first position as the leading 
exporter to the Kingdom, accounting for 17 percent of total imports. The USA 
dropped to the second position, accounting for 15 percent. The UK moved up 
to the third position (8 percent), and West Germany maintained the same share 
but dropped to the fourth position. Italy (7 percent) also moved down from the 
fourth to the fifth position. France maintained its sixth position, with a share 
of 5 percent. These countries together accounted for about 60 percent of the 
Kingdom's total imports in 1988 compared with 62 percent in the 1987. The 
remaining industrial countries contributed about 10 percent, while the rest of the 
world accounted for the balance of 30 percent. It is worth mentioning that the 
share of the rest of the world has tended to rise over the years, from 21 percent 
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Table 6.13: Saudi Imports by Origin (Million Rls) 
Country 1985 % 1986 % 1987 % 1988 % 
GCC 1670 1.8 1616 2.5 1417 3 1364 2 
U.A.E 614 0.6 536 0.8 491 1.0 445 0.7 
Bahrain 307 0.3 347 0.5 235 0.4 234 0.3 
Kuwait 486 0.5 472 0.7 407 0.8 422 0.6 
Qatar 239 0.2 232 0.3 251 0.5 216 0.3 
Oman 24 0.2 29 0.4 33 0.6 47 0.7 
Western Europe 44,728 48.2 28,480 44.3 21,871 46 28,055 45 
W.Germany 9,861 10.6 6,768 10.5 4,472 9.5 5,827 9.2 
Italy 8,595 9.2 5,783 9.0 4,242 9.0 5,145 8.1 
U.K 6,898 7.4 4,806 7.5 4,301 9.0 5,847 9.2 
France 9,252 9.9 3,963 6.0 3,324 7.0 3,966 6.2 
Other 8 Industrial Countries 10,122 10.9 7,160 11.0 5,532 11.5 7,270 11.5 
Asian(Non-Islamic 27,851 30 20,549 32 14,004 30 22,162 35 
and Non-Arab Countries) 
Japan 21,093 23 14,502 22.5 9,140 19.5 12,996 20.5 
India 945 1.0 857 1.5 636 1.5 861 1.5 
Thailand 738 0.7 620 0.9 547 1.0 966 1.5 
Singapore 1,213 1.3 848 1.5 622 1.5 754 1.0 
China 679 0.7 740 1.1 619 1.5 2,917 4.5 
S.Korea 3,183 3.5 2,982 4.5 2,440 5.0 3,668 6.0 
North America 
U.S.A 18,448 20 13,557 21.2 9,968 21 11,492 18 
Total 92,697 100 64,202 100 47,260 100 63,073 100 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
in 1982/83 to 30 percent in 1988. Mainland China moved from the sixth to the 
fourth position, while Thailand moved up from the tenth to the seventh position. 
India dropped to the eighth position. Singapore dropped from the eighth to the 
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Table 6.14: Saudi Non-Oil Trade with the G.C.C. Countries (Mil-
lion Riyals) 
1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 
GCC Imports Exports Difference Imports Exports Difference Imports Exports Difference 
U.A.E 536 329 -207 491 222 -269 445 368 -77 
Bahrain 347 134 -213 235 55 -180 234 128 -106 
Kuwait 472 302 -170 407 301 -106 422 608 +186 
Qatar 232 116 -116 251 89 -162 216 118 
Oman 29 42 +13 33 22 -11 47 45 
Total 1,616 923 -693 1,417 689 -728 1,364 1,267 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
tenth position. 
6.6.4 Non-Oil Trade with G.C.C. Countries 
The Kingdom's non-oil exports to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries 
went up during 1987/88 by 84 percent to Rls 1,267 million as compared with Rls 
689 million in 1986/87. The increase is attributed to the rise in Saudi exports 
of industrial products by 125 percent and agricultural and animal products by 
39 percent. This increase is a manifestation of the development of the Kingdom 
in industrial and agricultural sectors. The Kingdom's non-oil imports from GCC 
members, on the other hand, declined by 4 percent, from Rls 1,917 million in 
1986/87 to Rls 1,364 million in 1987/88 Table(6.14). 
As a result of the rise in the Kingdom's export to and fall in its imports from 
its GCC partners, the trade surplus in favour of GCC countries in their non-oil 
trade with the Kingdom declined from 728 million in 1986/87 to Rls 97 million in 
1987/88. Kuwait continued to maintain its position as the largest Gulf market for 
Saudi exports and accounted for 48 percent (Rls 608 million) of the Kingdom's 
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-98 
-2 
-97 
total non-oil exports to GCC countries, followed by the UAE with a share of 
29 percent (Rk 368 million). Bahrain and Qatar exchanged position, the former 
moving up to the third position, accounting for 10 percent (Rls 128 million) of the 
total, while the latter dropping to the fourth position, accounting for 9 percent 
(Rls 118 million). Oman continued to occupy the fifth position, accounting for 
about 4 percent (Rls 45 million) of total Saudi non-oil exports to GCC countries. 
The rate of growth of the Kingdom's non-oil exports to all GCC countries 
in 1987/88 varied considerably. The exports to Bahrain recorded the highest rate 
of increase (133 percent), which may partly be attributable to better movement 
between the two countries made possible by the King Fahad Causeway. The 
second highest increase in exports was accounted for by Oman (105 percent), 
followed by exports to Kuwait (102 percent). The Kingdom's exports to the UAE 
rose by 66 percent and to Qatar by 33 percent. With respect to the Kingdom's 
non-oil imports from GCC countries, the UAE's share was about one-third (Rls 
445 million), followed by Kuwait which accounted for about 31 percent (Rls 422 
million) Bahrain contributed 17 percent (Rls 234 million), Qatar 16 percent (Rls 
216 million) and Oman 3 percent (Rls 47 million). Four GCC countries achieved 
a trade surplus with the Kingdom during 1987/88, namely, Bahrain (Rls 106 
million), Qatar (Rls 98 million), and Oman (Rls 2 million). For the first time, a 
surplus was recorded by the Kingdom in its trade with Kuwait (Rls 186 million). 
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6.7 UAE 
6.7.1 Introduction 
The UAE traditionally enjoyed a substantial trade surplus. Imports 
peaked at Dh 36 bn in 1981, following the oil price rises of 1979-80, the much 
increased budget of 1980 and the fresh influx of immigrants that occured after the 
second oil boom. From 1982 onward imports declined, reaching a low of Dh 23.6 
bn in 1986. In the two following years they rose again, climbing to Dh 31.3 bn 
in 1988. The trade balance, meanwhile, reflected the sharply fluctuating export 
earnings during that period: the trade surplus peaked in 1986 at Dh 34.6 bn, 
falling to a low of Dh 20.3 bn in 1987. According to the IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics, the trade surplus narrowed further to Dh 15.2 bn in 1988. 
6. 7.2 Exports 
The value of non-oil exports was estimated to have reached about Dh 
5.4 billion in 1988, an increase by 2.0 percent compared to 1987. This estimated 
figure includes the values of exports of petroleum products from the emirate of Abu 
Dhabi, exports of goods from the emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Shajah, and 
estimates of the value of exports from the rest of the emirates, in addition to the 
emirate of Abu Dhabi's exports of fertilizers, oils, chlorine and other commodities. 
In view of the decline by about 20 percent in oil prices in 1988, com-
pared to 1987, a drop in prices, and consequently in the value of petroleum export 
products was quite inevitable, particularly with the fact that the volume of ex-
ports of these products in 1988 was almost equal to the volume exported in 1987. 
Accordingly, the value of petroleum exports from Abu Dhabi National Petroleum 
Company's (ADNOC) refineries (Ruwais and Umm Al-Nar) dropped by 12 per-
cent. The decline in exports of petroleum products in 1988 has led to a drop 
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in the relative significance of the group of mineral fuels and lubricants (group 3) 
which decreased to 61 percent compared to 70 percent in 1987. 
Table 6.15: Structure of Non-Oil Exports(l)(In Million of Dh) 
Groups 1986 1987 1988 
0. Food and Live Animals 91.05 86.68 70.12 
1. Beverages and Tobacco 35.79 27.52 50.31 
2. Crude Materials 82.70 101.07 139.67 
3. Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and related materials2 2,286.02 3,216.63 2,818.3 2 
4. Animal and Vegetable oils 0.14 1.62 2.60 
5. Chemicals 82.68 81.08 92.74 
6. Manufactured Goods classified by materials 800.66 978.61 1,251.00 
7. Machinery and Transports Equipments 152.76 27.55 57.34 
8. Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 33.47 68.00 121.05 
9. Other Commodities - - 0.04 
Total 3,565.27 4,588.76 4,603.19 
1. Include Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah Expxorts only. 
2. Data include values of petroleum products originating from Abu Dhabi re-
fineries. 
Source: Central Bank Bulletin, June 1989. 
Nevertheless, the total value of non-oil exports has not declined due to the 
increase in value of exports of all other goods groups , and the increase in value of 
exports of the group of manufactured goods classified by material (group 6) which 
resulted from the rise in international aluminium prices. Prices of aluminium rose 
by 25 percent in 1988, compared to 1987 and by 44 percent compared to 1986, 
while the volume of exports thereof in 1988 exceeded the volumes exported in 1987 
and 1986 by only 6 percent and 4 percent respectively. Accordingly, the relative 
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significance of group 6 grew from 21 percent in 1987 to 27 percent in 1988. Japan 
ranked first among importers of Dubai's aluminium, receiving about 65 percent 
of total exports, followed by the U.S.A. (12 percent). 
The value of exports of group 8 (miscellaneous manufactured articles) has 
also increased by 78 percent compared to 1987. Such an increase was mainly due 
to the substantial growth in exports of ready-made clothes from various factories 
in the country. These exports have rapidly shown increased competitiveness in 
terms of prices and quality, causing the initiation of a quota system in the U.S.A. 
for its imports of U.A.E. ready-made clothes {the U.S.A. receives the lion share 
of U.A.E. exports of ready-made clothes). 
Re-export activity is one of the prominent features of the U .A. E.'s for-
eign trade. Dubai emirate has emerged as the major trading centre for re-export 
activities in the Gulf. The integrated infrastructure schemes and trade promo-
tional facilities extended by Dubai, in particular, and the other emirates of Abu 
Dhabi and Sharjah have boosted the re-export of goods from the U .A. E. to the 
Gulf states, Iran and other countries in Asia, East Africa and Europe. The value 
of U .A. E.'s re-exports value have shown substantial increase during the period 
1981-87, increasing from Dh 3.8 billion to Dh 6.9 billion, registering an annual 
average increase of 11.6 percent. Developments in value of re-exports according 
to types of goods (Table 6.16) show that capital goods have recorded the largest 
increase in 1988, with the value thereof growing by 25 percent, consumer goods 
followed next with an increase by 29 percent, then intermediate goods by 6 per-
cent, and other goods by 17 percent. The reason behind these developments may 
be attributed to the changes in the destinations of re-exported goods. Re-exports 
to Iran, for example, have decreased and these were usually in the category of 
consumer goods. 
6. 7.3 Imports 
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Table 6.16: Structure of Recorded Re-Exports. (In mn. of Db) 
1987 1988 
Sources Amount % Amount % 
Consumer Goods of whicb 4,318.8 65.1 4,715.8 62.9 
(Foodstuff and Tobacco) {1,696.4) {25.6) (1,465. 7) {19.5) 
Intermediary Goods 396.3 6.0 419.1 5.6 
Capital Goods 1,616.5 24.4 2,023.8 27.0 
Others 306.5 4.6 339.7 4.5 
Total 6,638.1 100 7,498.4 100 
Source: Central Bank Bulletin, June 1989 
The geographical distribution of exports and re-exports in 1988 shows that 
Saudi Arabia has received 12.7 percent of total exports and re-exports, followed 
by Qatar which received 11.7 percent, then Japan and Iran which received similar 
shares of 8.6 percent. The most significant development is in the geographical 
distribution of exports and re-exports to Iran, whose share has declined from 
16.7 percent in 1987 to 8.6 percent in 1988, while the significance of exports and 
re-exports to G.C.C. states grew by 19 percent during 1987. 
The total value of U .A.E. imports has continued its ascending trend which 
started in 1987, reaching Dh. 31.3 billion in 1988, an increase by 18 percent 
compared to the year before, and approaching the levels recorded in the early 
eighties, which were followed by successive decreases over the period 1982-86. 
The increase has occured in imports to Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. 
The values of Abu Dhabi and Dubai imports have increased by 20 per-
cent, while Sharjah's imports increased, in value, by 4 percent, hence decreasing 
the share of the emirate of Sharjah in total U .A. E. imports. This general in-
crease in value of imports may be attributed to several reasons including, most 
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importantly, the recovery of activities in non-oil investment opportunities, sta-
bility in the region, improved economic performance and re-building of the stock 
which in general declined over the past few years, besides the increasing demand 
for imports for the purposes of the re-export trade which grew by nearly Dh 1.0 
billion in 1988, compared to 1987. The increase in value of imports may also 
be accounted for partly in terms of the slight depreciation of the U .A. E. dirham 
against currencies of major exporters to the U.A.E. ( particularly Japan which 
ranks first among these countries). 
Transit trade has also witnessed a remarkable recovery during 1988, in-
creasing, in value, by nearly 43 percent compared to levels recorded in 1987. The 
bulk of this increase has occured in the transit trade of the emirate of Abu Dhabi, 
whose value grew by 90 percent, while the value of transit trade through the emi-
rate of Sharjah increased by only 10 percent. As the rate of increase in transit 
trade has exceeded the rate of increase in imports, the share of transit trade in 
total imports grew to 11.4 percent in 1988, compared to 9.4 percent in 1987. 
The commodity classification of imports reflects a comprehensive increase 
in values of all commodity groups, except for the group of food and live animals 
whose value remained constant in 1988, and the groups of mineral fuels and lu-
bricants and oils and fats, whose values dropped by 15 percent and 5 percent 
respectively during the same period ( Table 6.15 ). The major increase in value 
of imports has occured in capital goods, whose value grew by nearly 25 percent 
in 1988. Consumer goods recorded the second largest increase, followed by inter-
mediate goods. 
As Table 6.17 shows, the leading industrial countries annual share in the 
value of the U .A. E.'s total imports fluctuated between 65 and 70 percent during 
the period 1984-87. Among the leading industrial countries, Japan topped the list 
of exporters to the U.A.E., followed by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic 
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of Germany, the U.S.A. and France in the fifth position. 
Table 6.17: Value of Imports by Regions and Countries 
of Exports (%). 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
Country Value % Value % Value % Value 
GCC 534.9 9.7 450.1 9.0 386.8 8.0 357 
Bahrain 384.1 7.1 237.9 4.7 130.0 2.6 249 
Saudi Arabia 62.1 1.1 128.5 2.5 187.7 3.8 44.0 
Oman 5.3 0.09 7.8 0.1 6.8 0.1 4.0 
Qatar 30.1 0.5 39.8 0.7 46.3 0.9 22 
Kuwait 53.2 0.9 36.1 0.7 16.0 0.3 38 
EEC 2757.7 51.0 2531.5 50.5 2620.5 54.5 3064 
U.S.A 849.3 16.0 713.5 14.2 626.5 13.0 681 
Japan 1258.5 23.2 1317.2 26.2 1184.0 24.5 1241 
Rest of the World 1.3 0.02 1.3 0.02 1.5 0.03 2160.0 
Grand Total 5401.7 100 5013.6 100 4819.3 100 7503 
% 
4.7 
3.3 
0.5 
0.05 
0.2 
0.5 
40.8 
9.0 
16.5 
28.7 
100 
Source: G.C.C General Secretariat· Economic Bulletin Volume IV 1989. 
6.7.4 U.A.E. Intra-Trade with G.C.C. Countries 
The growth in U.A.E. trade with G.C.C. countries was largely attributable 
to the staged implementation of the Unified Economic Agreement among G.C.C. 
states and was further boosted by the relative stability in the region following 
the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war. The general improvement of economic con-
ditions in the region besides the development and diversification of agricultural 
industries in G.C.C. countries may also be added as contributors to these recent 
developments. 
Exports and re-export trade with G.C.C. countries grew by 19 percent in 
1988, forming a sizeable portion of nearly 39 percent of the country's total exports 
and re-exports. This was attributable, on the one hand, to the improvement in 
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volume and quality of U .A.E. exports and to the substantial increase in U .A. E.'s 
re-export trade, on the other. It is noted here, that the U.A.E. has always been 
an active centre of re-export trade. This is mainly attributed to its strategic 
geographical location and the vast experience of local businessmen in the area of 
trade, besides accessible services, easy communications, smooth regulation and 
modern, well equipped ports. 
U.A.E. imports from G.C.C. countries grew by Dh.1454 million in 1988 
(Table 6.18 ), mainly due to developments in co-ordination and implementation 
of the Unified Economic Agreement between G.C.C. states, developments in the 
agricultural and industrial sectors in G.C.C. countries and the general state of 
stability in the region, following the cease-fire in the Iraq-Iran war in the second 
half of 1988. The increase has occurred in all groups with the exception of group-
3 (mineral fuels, lubricants). Major imports of this group included petroleum 
products and residual materials, besides lubricating oils and asphalt. Meanwhile, 
imports of group 6 (manufactured goods classified by materials) grew by Dh.177 
million. The most important imported items of this group included iron and 
steel bars, wire rods and sections, sanitary towels, insulation materials, canning 
containers, and building materials. Imports from the food and live animals group 
{0) have increased by Dh.101 million, most notably due to trade in cereals, fresh 
milk, dairy products, live animals and dates. 
The value of imports of group 5 (chemicals) has increased by Dh.94 mil-
lion. Imports of this group included paints and cleansing preparations. Group 6 
imports (machinery and transport equipment) increased by Dh.53 million, with 
the most important items including cables, electrical wires and fridges. The value 
of imports of group 8 (miscellaneous manufactured articles) grew by Dh.26 million. 
Imports from this group included jewellery and precious metals. 
As a result of these increases, the share of imports from G.C.C. coun-
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tries in total U.A.E. imports grew from 4 percent in 1987 to about 5 percent in 
1988. Imports from the group of mineral fuels and lubricants have constituted 64 
percent of total U.A.E. imports from the G.C.C. countries in 1988, with the total 
value thereof reaching Dh.627 million. This figure, however, reflects a drop by 18 
percent from the 1987 levels, a development which has resulted from an increase 
in domestic production of these materials in 1988 and is expected to continue 
as a trend over the coming years, considering on-going plans aimed at achieving 
self- sufficiency in this category of materials. The bulk of this group of imports 
originates from Bahrain which supplied 40 percent of the total U.A.E. imports of 
these materials in 1988, followed by Saudi Arabia ( 39 percent) and Kuwait (15 
percent). 
Manufactured goods classified by materials formed 20 percent of total 
U.A.E. imports from the G.C.C. states in 1988. The total value of this group 
of imports has increased by 157 percent, compared to 1987, amounting to nearly 
Dh.291 million. The U .A. E. received 48 percent of its total imports of this group 
from Saudi Arabia, while Qatar supplied 42 percent. Chemicals constituted 19 
percent of total U.A.E. imports from G.C.C. member states. The total value of 
imports of this group reached about Dh.273 million. Some 83 percent of these 
imports originates from Saudi Arabia. 
The rest of the groups form 18 percent of total U.A.E. imports from 
G.C.C. countries. The most significant of these groups are food and live ani-
mals, machinery and transport equipment, miscellaneous manufactured articles 
and crude materials, inedible except fuels. 
U.A.E.'s non-oil exports to G.C.C. countries recorded a marked develop-
ment in 1988, growing in value to Dh.577 million, against Dh, 514 million in 1987-
an annual rate of 12 percent. Accordingly, exports to G.C.C. countries have come 
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Table 6.18: Distribution of U.A.E. Imports from G.C.C. States by 
Country of Origin. ( 1988) 
Country Value(in millions of Dh) Relative Significance(%) 
Saudi Arabia 806 55 
Bahrain 290 20 
Qatar 174 12 
Kuwait 149 10 
Oman 35 3 
Total 1454 100 
Source: U.A.E. Central Bank Bulletin- June 1989. 
to constitute 30 percent of total U.A.E. non-oil exports in 1988. 
Analysis of the commodity classification of exports originating from emi-
rate of Dubai (which form 74 percent of total U.A.E. exports) shows that U.A.E. 
exports to G.C.C. countries were mainly concentrated in the following groups:-
Group-6 (manufactured goods): The total value of exports of in group reached 
Dh.135 million, forming 32 percent of total U.A.E. exports to G.C.C. countries. 
The Sultanate of Oman ranked first among importers of U .A. E. exports in this 
group, with the value of exports to this country reaching Dh. 83 million, and 
Kuwait came second {Dh.20 million). 
Group-3 (mineral fuels and lubricants): The value of exports of this group 
grew from Dh.60 million in 1987 to Dh. 62 million in 1988. Kuwait received the 
lion share of these exports (Dh.34 million), followed by Bahrain. 
Group-5 (chemicals): Total value of exports of this group has increased 
from Dh.50 million in 1987 to Dh.54 million in 1988, forming 13 percent of total 
U.A.E. exports to G.C.C. countries. Exports in this group have included paints, 
detergents, soaps and fertilizers. Bahrain has received the bulk of these exports 
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(Dh.17 million), followed by Qatar (Dh.15 million) and Kuwait. 
Group-O (food and live animals): Whereas exports of most groups have 
increased in value in 1988, the value of exports of this group declined from Dh.61 
million in 1987 to Dh.35 million. million. Exports to Saudi Arabia account for 
this decline, dropping in value from Dh.30 million in 1987 to Dh.10 million in 
1988. Kuwait, however, ranks first among receivers of U.A.E. exports in this 
group, followed by Saudi Arabia. Group-7 (machinery and transport equipment): 
The value of U.A.E. exports of this group grew to Dh.45 million in 1988, 
compared to Dh.26 million in 1987. 
Group-1 (beverages and tobacco): The value of exports of this group 
has increased by 116 percent in 1988, reaching Dh.41 million, compared to Dh.l8 
million the previous year. The Sultanate of Oman received 73 percent of U.A.E. 
exports of this group to G.C.C. countries, amounting to Dh.30 million. 
The geographical distribtution of U.A.E. exports to G.C.C. countries 
shows that the Sultanate of Oman ranks first among major receivers of U.A.E. 
exports. The value of exports to Oman amounted to Dh.177 million in 1988, 
exceeding the 1987level by 72 percent. Exports to Oman has accordingly formed 
31 percent of total U.A.E. exports to G.C.C. countries. Kuwait ranks second, 
with the value of exports increasing from Dh.123 million in 1987 to about Dh.143 
million in 1988 to form 25 percent of total U.A.E. exports to G.C.C. countries. 
Saudi Arabia ranks third, followed by Qatar and Bahrain. 
U.A.E. re-export trade with G.C.C. countries grew by 22 percent in 1988, 
reaching a total value of Dh.3066 million. Re-exports to G.C.C. countries con-
stitute nearly 41 percent of total U.A.E. re-exports and include all sorts of com-
modities. However, re-exports of five major groups may be considered the most 
significant, as they constitute 96 percent of total value of re-exported goods in 
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1988. Saudi Arabia is the major G.C.C. receiver of U.A.E. re-exports, accounting 
for 36 percent. In 1988, however, the value of U.A.E. re-exports to Saudi Ara-
bia dropped to Dh.1090 million, mainly due to the decline in U.A.E. re-exported 
foodstuffs to Saudi Arabia. The most significant re-exported goods to Saudi Ara-
bia include miscellaneous manufactured articles, manufactured goods classified by 
materials, foodstuffs, machinery and transport equipment. Qatar ranks second, 
receiving 32 percent of total U.A.E. re-exports to G.C.C. countries. The value 
of re-exports to Qatar increased to Dh.980 million in 1988 ( up 40 percent, com-
pared to 1987 ). Re-exported items to Qatar included foodstuffs , timber, iron 
and steel pipes, vehicles, and electrical bulbs. Kuwait followed next with the value 
of re-exports reaching Dh.506 million, to constitute 17 percent of total U.A.E. re-
exports to G.C.C. countries. Re-exported goods to Kuwait included foodstuffs , 
miscellaneous manufactured articles and jewellery. Bahrain comes next with value 
of re-exports reaching Dh.378 million ( 13 percent of total re-exports to G.C.C. 
countries ). Re-exports to Bahrain included transportation equipment, light air-
craft, machinery spare parts, men and boys wear and foodstuffs. The Sultanate of 
Oman receives a relatively tiny share of about 2 percent of total U .A. E. re-exports 
to G.C.C. countries. 
6.8 Migration in the G.C.C. Countries 
Labour migration began in the early 1950s, soon after the oil discovery 
and the beginning of its extraction in the Arabian Peninsuila and the Gulf area. 
The flow of this international economic migration increased during the late sixties 
and the early seventies. 
However, the importance of the oil aspect of this region does not only 
consist in these high proportions, it consists particularly in the importance of 
investing these oil revenues, not only in the producing countries, but mainly in 
the advanced capitalist countries, especially the United States, Great Britain, 
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France and Switzerland. 
According to the Economic Bulletin to the G.C.C. Council (1989) the 
non-national population in the G.C.C. Countries in 1986 was 35.6 percent. This 
percentage ranging from 2.6 percent in Saudi Arabia and 33.9 percent in Bahrain 
to 73.0 percent in Qatar and 74.0 percent in United Arab Emirates. This variation 
is due to the scale of migration in each country and to the facilities which each 
country gives to the immigrants, the date in which each country began to receive 
immigrants ( especially in which period oil was discovered in each country ) and 
the size and growth of the national population. 
Table 6.19 shows that Saudi Arabia has had the largest alsolute number 
of non-nationals since 1960, with its share of the GCC total increasing from 46.5 
percent to 50.3 percent in 1980 ( though it decreased to 41.8 percent in 1986 ). 
Kuwait came in second place, with a percentage share rising from 35.0 percent 
in 1960 to 38.0 percent in 1970, but it decreased to 19.3 percent in 1986. Oman 
and United Arab Emirates are the only two countries where the share of the total 
non-national population increased steadily from 1960 to 1986, because they are 
late comers in the development process, while the other countries have nearly 
completed their infrastructure and no longer need more unskilled workers. 
During the 1960's the number of non-national population in the G.C.C. coun-
tries increased about 2. 7 times; in the 1970's this increase was 3. 7 times, and 
between 1980-86 it was 1.4 times. The high increase during the 1970's was due to 
the oil price boom and to high demand for labour in the G.C.C. countries. The 
labour market in the G.C.C. countries was characterized by its large scale and 
the high demand for labour ( especially unskilled workers ), with higher wages in 
the G.C.C. countries comparing with the original countries encouraging people to 
immigrate. The United Arab Emirates had an increase of non-national popula-
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Table {6.19): Available Information on Stoks of Foreign Population 
in G.C.C. Countries {1960-1986) 
Country 1960(1) 
No. Share 
U.A.E 10.7 4.0 
Bahrain 26.8 6.8 
Saudi Arabia 182.0 46.5 
Oman - -
Qatar 30.1 7.7 
Kuwait 136.8 35.0 
Total 391.4 100.0 
Source: 
(1) Carikei, 1987,p.8. 
(2) ECWA. 1986 
1970<1> 
No. Shart: 
110.9 10.3 
37.9 3.5 
451.9 42.1 
8.2 0.8 
67.1 6.3 
397.5 38.0 
1073.5 100.0 
1975<1> 1980(l) 1986(2) 
No. Share No. Shart: No. Share 
313.9 15.6 605.5 17.7 1239.2 22.4 
62.8 3.1 104.4 2.7 139.6 2.5 
894.9 44.5 1977.0 50.3 2314.5 41.8 
105.5 5.2 177.9 4.5 494.0 8.9 
101.5 5.0 167.3 4.3 284.2 5.1 
533.3 26.5 806.8 20.5 1072.3 19.3 
2011.9 100.0 3989.0 100.0 5543.8 100.0 
tion during the period 1960-1986 of 19.2 times, while the non-national population 
in Oman increased 60.2 times. The high percentages here are due to the fact 
that United Arab Emirates and Oman began their major development after there 
independence in 1970. Bahrain has the lowest level of non-national population 
increase during the period 1960-1986 ( 5.2 times ) due to the small area of the 
country and to the small labour market in it. 
6.8.1 Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
There is a higher percentage of males than females in the Gulf, with 
around 60 percent of the region's total population being males. Most of the 
expatriates, especially the large number of unskilled labourers, are single men 
whose families do not accompany them during their stay in the region. The ratio 
of males in the total population differs from one country to another. It is as 
high as 68 percent in the UAE, 65 percent in Qatar, 60 percent in Saudi Arabia, 
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while it is lower in Kuwait and Oman, at around 57 percent. Nationals have a 
more balanced population structure, with the percentage of males close to the 
worldwide average of 50 percent. A common characteristic of high fertility rate 
is observed in the region, especially among nationals, leading to a high birth 
ratio and a very youthful age structure. The average number of children that 
would be born alive per woman in her lifetime ranges for nationals between 5.9 
in Bahrain to 7.5 in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman. The average crude birth rate 
(number of live births per 1,000 persons) is over 40 in all the Gulf countries and 
the average crude death rate per 1,000 population is less than 7 in Kuwait, UAE, 
Bahrain and Qatar, around 15 in Saudi Arabia and 17 in Oman. The high fertility 
and declining mortality rates were responsible for the extremely high growth rate 
of the region's national population, averaging around 3.5 percent for the period 
1975-1985 ( Chapter Two). 
High population growth among nationals has resulted in an age structure 
marked by extreme youthfulness. Almost 50 percent of the national population 
is believed to be under 15 years old and the percentage of those above 65 years is 
around 5 percent. Such a population structure leads to a high dependency ratio 
in the sense that the economically active population has to bear the burden of 
inactive persons which is twice as heavy as in most developed countries. The Gulf 
population is also highly urbanised. More than two-thirds of the total population 
lives in urban areas with much higher percentage (above 80 percent) for Kuwait, 
Qatar, UAE and Bahrain. The phenomenon of primate cities in the region is 
worth noting in this respect, with international migration adding to the cities' 
own demographic dynamics. Literacy rates for nationals have been on the rise in 
the various Gulf countries. In 1986, over 75 percent of national men were literate 
compared to around 55 percent for women. Female illiteracy rates have decreased 
considerably with the advance of education for girls in the various Gulf states ( 
Chapter Two ) . 
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The economic participation rates for Gulf nationals is relatively low rang-
ing between 27.5 percent for Bahrain and 18.1 percent for UAE'. Even male partic-
ipation rates are lower than worldwide averages, reflecting the young age structure 
of the population, with more than 50 percent being too young to enter the mod-
ern workforce. The participation rates of national women, even though they have 
been on the rise with increased female education, are still at extremely low levels 
in certain Gulf countries. These were lowest in the UAE at 1.5 percent in 1986, 
and highest in Bahrain and Kuwait, 11.0 percent and 7.8 percent respectively. 
The total size of labour force in the six G.C.C. states was estimated at 
around 5.5. million in 1986, 62 percent of which were believed to be expatriates. 
Nationals predominate in the traditional sectors of the economy, namely agri-
culture and fishing, especially in Saudi Arabia and Oman, where close to 24 per-
cent and 18 percent respectively of the national workforce are found. Mining is 
another important sector for nationals, as more of them move to occupy positions 
in the oil sector. The proportion of nationals engaged in the community and per-
sonal services sector has also been high, ranging from around 75 percent of the 
total national workforce in Kuwait and U.A.E. to 62 percent in Qatar, 44 percent 
in Bahrain and 32 percent in Saudi Arabia. This sector is especially important as 
it includes public sector jobs, where employment for nationals is almost guaran-
teed, and personal business where many nationals are self employed (e.g. drivers, 
guards, as well as private business). The concentration of expatriates is most 
evident in the manufacturing, construction and trade sectors. The majority of 
workers in manufacturing are non-nationals, the percentage is lowest in Bahrain, 
and Saudi Arabia (64 percent and 73 percent respectively), but highest in Kuwait 
(90 percent), UAE (91 percent) and Qatar (98 percent). The dependence on expa-
triates is even more pronounced in the construction sector, where it is estimated 
that in 1986 more than 85 percent of all construction workers in the Gulf were 
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expatriates. Non-nationals also constitute a majority in the trade sectors of the 
various Gulf states, reaching as high as 46 percent in the UAE and Qatar, 92 
percent in Kuwait and 55 percent in Bahrain. 
Nationals in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have a more balanced distribution 
by economic sector than in the other Gulf states. The dominance of expatriates is 
apparent only in construction and to a lesser degree in manufacturing and trade. 
Nationals of the two countries constitute a majority in the mining sector ( 77 
percent and 79 percent respectively ), in the utilities sectors ( 68 percent and 
70 percent respectively ), in community and personal sectors ( 54 percent and 55 
percent respectively), and 67 percent and 60 percent respectively in the transport 
and communication sectors. 
Considering the economically active population by occupation, the Gulf 
countries' national labour force has been concentrated in three main occupational 
categories: Clerical workers, services workers, and production workers. The lowest 
percentage of nationals is found in such occupational categories as "management 
workers", "professional and technical workers" and, with the exception of Saudi 
Arabia and Oman, in "agricultural workers". The high percentage of clerical 
workers, which ranged from 27.6 percent of total national workforce in Kuwait to 
23.3 percent in the UAE, 21.6 percent in Bahrain, 22.3 percent in Qatar and 8.8 
percent in Saudi Arabia, reflects the expansion of the government sector giving 
priority to the recruitment of nationals. There has been a noticeable rise in the 
percentage of nationals working in professional occupations over the period 1975-
1985. The percentage has also been higher for nationals working in managerial, 
services and sales occupations reflecting a maturing occupational structure of the 
Gulf labour force. 
6.8.2 Changing Demographic and Labour Trends 
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The slowdown in Gulf countries' economic activities in the last few years 
has had a noticeable impact on the number, skill composition and salaries of 
expatriates living in the region. With the completion of major infrastructural 
projects many companies, especially construction firms, have cut staff and reduced 
salaries and employees benefits. Others have started replacing Western expatriates 
by the normally less expensive employees from the Middle East and Asia. 
There are indications of changing immigration trends to the Gulf coun-
tries in the last three years (1985-1988). A large number of unskilled and semi-
skilled construction workers, mainly from Asia have left the region. Other groups 
that have been vulnerable to the current economic slowdown are Arab expatriates 
and above all civil servants. These are precisely the kinds of positions to which 
the Gulf region's youth themselves aspire and where the nationalization of jobs is 
most visible. One of the chief objectives of Saudi Arabia's fourth 5-year plan, for 
example, is the reduction of the expatriate labour force by 600,000 workers, with 
their positions being filled by nationals. 
The trend of replacing Americans and Europeans by equally qualified 
but less expensive Arabs and Asians is believed to have continued as well. A 
lot of Western companies resorted to sending to the Gulf more employees from 
their subsidiaries abroad, such as India, Pakistan and South East Asia, as these 
tend to accept lower remuneration packages. The culture and religion of Arab 
expatriates are similar to those of the Gulf and they consider the region to be less 
of a hardship area than do expatriates from Europe and the United States. 
Even in the lower skilled jobs, workers from certain nationalities who 
are willing to accept a lower pay scale. For example, Korean construction workers 
were replaced by Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, and Filipino house helpers 
by Sri Lankans. 
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There has been a change in the distribution of the non-national popula-
tion by age group and sex over the last ten years. Table 6.20 shows a distribution 
heavily weighted in favour of males in the working age group 15-64 years, as many 
expatriates workers especially the unskilled tend to leave their families behind 
during their stay in the Gulf. 
Table (6.20): Distribution on Non-nationals by Age Group and Sex 
in the Six G.C.C. Countries (%) 
1975 1980 1985 
Age Group Male Female T Male Female T Male Female T 
0-14 17.7 14.8 31.5 10.9 9.4 20.3 16.4 14.3 30.5 
15-64 49.9 17.3 67.2 62.0 15.1 77.1 48.2 19.1 67.3 
65 and above 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.2 2.6 1.1 0.9 2.2 
Total 67.2 32.8 100.0 74.3 25.7 100.0 65.7 34.3 100 
Source: Gulf Economic and Financial Report - A monthly publication of 
Gulf International Bank- Issue No.5 May 1988. Vol.111 
What is noticeable,however, is the rising percentage of migrant workers de-
pendents in the last few years. As more unskilled workers leave the region, the 
pool of transient labour among expatriates is becoming smaller. Those planning 
to stay in the Gulf for more than two years are inclined to bring their families with 
them. Labour market trends point to the continuation of the process of demo-
graphic settling in the region. While in 1980, around 25 percent of non-nationals 
in the G.C.C. countries were females and nearly 20 percent were aged less than 15 
years, in 1985 more dependents (wives and children) of expatriate workers appear 
to have settled in the region. Nearly 30 percent of non-nationals were less than 
15 years old and over 34 percent were females. 
The North American, European and to a lesser extent the non-national 
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Arabs are the most balanced communities in terms of age structure and sex. The 
profiles of these communities reflect either a longer duration of residence than 
in the case of the Arab expatriates (around 80 percent of non-national Arabs 
stay in the region for more than two years), or the extent to which recently 
arrived Europeans and Americans, normally assigned to managerial and technical 
positions, bring their families with them. However, women of these categories 
tend to be present as dependents rather than members of the work force. In 
the case of Asian expatriates, nearly 80 percent of the total are males with the 
majority in the age group 15-35. Some 30 percent of South East Asian females 
are economically active, mainly as nurses or housekeepers. 
Another feature of the changing labour market structure is the general 
decline in the wage levels and remuneration packages that the expatriates can 
expect. Today, the Gulf region is an employer, rather than an employee's market. 
Living conditions are considerably better than a few years ago, and the need to 
pay substantially high wages to attract workers is no longer present. The situation 
has led several labour exporting countries to lower the recommended minimum 
wage of their workers. For example, by the end of 1986 Pakistan announced a 15 
percent wage cut for nationals working in the region so that the minimum wage 
for its unskilled labour is now close to $140 a month. Other labour exporting 
countries (Egypt, India, Bangladesh, Shri Lanka, ets. ), invariably followed suit. 
According to a random sample compiled by the Saudi Gazette, salaries 
for selected expatriate positions in the Kingdom have fallen by up to 50 percent 
in the last three years. The largest drop in monthly salaries was reported for 
general office workers, construction workers, plumbers, messengers, drivers and 
general low skilled labourers. However, salaries for certain highly skilled jobs 
have actually increased during the last three years. There has been a steadily 
growing need for specialists in computers, finance, banking, utilities operations 
240 
and many other specialities required in the up-market industrial, services and 
operations and maintenance sectors. 
6.8.3 Mobilising Gulf Human Resources 
The national development plans of the various Gulf countries and the 
corresponding annual budgets have accorded investment in education and train-
ing a high priority. Saudi Arabia alone has invested more than $32 billion in 
technical education and vocational training during the First, Second and Third 
Development Plans (1970-1985) and the other GOO countries have spent between 
them at least as much. The Kingdom's Fourth Plan (1986-1990) envisages a total 
outlay of SR 35 billion ($9.30 billion) to be allocated to vocational training and 
youth welfare. However, a major constraint to these programmes remains in the 
realm of motivation. The discipline and pace of the industrial and modern services 
sector differ from the experience that nationals acquired in the more relaxed work 
environment of the public sector. The willingness and ability of the indigenous 
population to adapt to the more stringent work condition is a key determinant to 
how fast the region will be able to reduce its dependence on expatriate labour. 
Enrollment in vocational training centres has been on the rise in the var-
ious Gulf countries. In 1986, around 19,500 students were enrolled in vocational 
schools in Saudi Arabia, up from 9,000 in 1983 and 7,000 in 1980. The Kingdom's 
Fourth Development Plan estimated the total number of enrollments in the vo-
cational programmes during the plan period 1985-1990 at 58,200. In Kuwait and 
Bahrain the number of students in vocational schools have also been on the rise, 
reaching in 1986 around 7,100 and 9,800 respectively, and the same applies to the 
other Gulf countries. 
With the spread of education and vocational training, new attitudes are 
developing whereby increasingly more nationals are seeking employment opportu-
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nities in the productive sector of the economy. This trend is further fostered by 
the high incomes that certain technical and blue collar jobs command compared to 
clerical jobs in the public sector. A part from expanding vocational and technical 
training, developing new and more realistic attitudes towards remuneration and 
employment opportunites available and maximising job opportunities for nation-
als, there is a need to implement a programme of mandatory on-the-job training 
by expatriates. There are close to two million skilled expatriates in the six Gulf 
states; this is more than the total number of instructors in the secondary and 
higher education levels by at least fifty to one. The potential to harness expatri-
ate 'know-how' should be available to policy makers. Various institutions could 
be obliged to make provisions for on-the-job training of the national employees to 
be certified upon completion. Fulfilment of this obligation could be monitored by 
governments and tied to future public sector contracts or partially subsidised for 
the additional cost incurred. 
6.8.4 KUWAIT 
6.8.4.1 Introduction 
It has already been observed that the rapid growth in expenditures de-
signed to accelerate the economic development of countries in the region has been 
associated with high levels of migration of workers from abroad.However, migra-
tion has made a great contribution to the rapid social and economic development 
of Kuwait. 
The economic boom and accelerated developmental programmes of Kuwait 
in recent years have created a job market that native Kuwait's have been unable 
to fill. Owing to the inadequacy of local human resources, the majority of jobs 
have been filled by importing workers from other countries. Thus, in the course 
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of the past decade, Kuwait has become one of the countries of the world where 
immigration has facilitated rapid economic growth and it has become a major 
source of concern for the Government because of its wider social, economic and 
political implications. There, it is important to make an anlysis of the magnitude, 
composition and characteristics of international migration, as well as its changes 
over time in order to understand the demographic dynamics of Kuwait and to 
formulate immigration policies. 
6.8.4.2 Levels and Trends of Migration 
Kuwait's economic activities have lone supported significant migrant pop-
ulation. The extent of international migration in Kuwait can be seen from the data 
presented in Table 6.21, which shows the number of non-nationals and proportion 
of non-nationals in the total. 
Table (6.21): Population Growth by Nationality, 1957-1986. 
Year of census Population Incremental growth rate Percentage of Kuwaitis i 
(per year per 100 persons) the total population 
1957 113622 92851 206473 
- - -
55.0 
1961 161909 159712 321621 8.7 13.7 11.1 50.3 
1965 220059 247280 467339 8.1 11.8 10.0 47.1 
1970 347396 391266 738662 9.6 9.6 9.6 47.0 
1975 472088 522749 994837 6.3 6.0 6.1 47.5 
1980 565613 792339 1,357452 3.7 8.7 6.4 41.7 
1985 681288 1,016013 1,697301 3.8 5.1 4.6 40.1 
Source: Population Bulletin of ESCWA Number 32. June 1988 
Kuwait's foreign population increased from 92,851 persons in 1957 to 522, 
749 in 1975 and 1.016.013 million in 1985. This represents an elevenfold increase 
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in a 28 year period. Foreign population, which comprised 45.0 percent of total 
population in 1957, had increased to 53 percent by 1985. The rapid economic 
growth and diversification of the economy after 1975 resulted in an accelerated 
increase in the total number of foreign workers. Between 1975 and 1985 the total 
number of foreign workers increased from 212, 738 to 543, 944 (256 percent), while 
the total foreign population increased from 522, 749 to 1,016,013 (194 percent). 
Consequently, the proportion of foreign population in the total increased from 53 
percent in 1975 to 60 percent in 1985, while for the labour force, the proportion of 
foreign workers rose from 69.8 to 81.1 percent. Thus, most of Kuwaiti's population 
increase is now generated by the foreign migration that has come in response to 
the country's rapid and successful economic development and modernization. 
6.8.4.3 Age-Sex Pattern of Migrants 
In Kuwait, as is generally the case, the first international immigrants were 
predominately male. For instance, over 78 percent of the immigrant population 
in 1957 were males. Between 1957 and 1975, however, the number of non-Kuwaiti 
females arriving in Kuwait rose sharply. While there were only 274 non-Kuwait 
women per 1,000 non-Kuwaiti males in 1957, the number rose to 374 in 1961, 423 
in 1965, 601 in 1970 and 702 in 1975. Nevertheless, males dominated the non-
Kuwaiti population, with a male to female ratio of about three to two. Associated 
with this increase in non-Kuwaiti women was an increase in the number of young 
children. By 1975, 16.6 percent of the non-Kuwaiti population was under the 
age of five, compared with less than 9 percent in 1957. There appears to have 
been a trend towards adjusting the age-sex balance by means of family migration 
during the period 1965-1975. Between 1975 and 1985, the ratio of females to 
males decreased to 597 non-Kuwaiti women per 1,000 non-Kuwaiti males in 1980, 
before increasing to 622 in 1985. The imbalance in the sexes among immigrants 
was more acute in the 25-29 age group, where there were two to three males for 
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every female. The reversal in the trend of sex ratios that was unfavourable to 
females after 1975 may be explained by measures taken by the Government to 
discourage the immigration of dependants. 
In 1985, the age group 15-64 comprised over 70 percent of the total 
non-Kuwaiti population, while the proportion of those under 15 and 65 years of 
age and over reached only 28.9 and 0.6 percent respectively. Also, there was 
a heavy concentration of non-nationals in the economically - active age groups, 
which are made up of immigrants between 20 and 39 years of age. For example, 
the proportion of non-nationals to nationals was 46.0 percent, as compared with 
26.6 percent in 1985. The selective age-sex distribution of recent immigrants 
has altered the age-sex structure of the total non-national population in Kuwait. 
Males in the age group 15-64, who formed about 64 percent of the total male 
migrant population in 1975, exceeded 70 percent in 1985. At the same time, 
the proportion of children under 15 years of age declined significantly from 39.7 
percent in 1975 to 28.9 percent in 1985, while the overall sex ratio for non-nationals 
decreased from 142 males per 100 females in 1975 to 161 in 1985. Such imbalances 
in the age-sex structure can have serious consequences for many of the significant 
life activities of the population. 
6.8.4.4 Ethnic Composition and Origin of Immigrants 
There has been a significant shift in the composition of the influx of 
immigrants by country of origin since 1975 ( see Table 6.22). In 1975, about 
80 percent of the total immigrant population came from Arab countries, and 
nearly 19 percent came from Asian countries. Within the Arab group, the largest 
community was that of Jordanians/Palestinians, who at that time comprised 39 
percent of all non-Kuwaitis. The combined Egyptian, Iraq, Syrian and Lebanese 
communities accounted for approximately 33 percent, while Indians and Pakistanis 
together formed nearly 66 percent of the total non-Kuwaiti population. 
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Table (6.22): Composition of The Non-Kuwaiti Population by Na-
tionality Group. 1975-1985. 
Nationality group 1975 1980 1985 
Number % Numbei % Number % 
Arabs 419,187 80.2 574.495 72.5 642,814 63.2 
Asians 97,813 18.7 204,104 25.8 355,974 35.0 
Africans 440 0.1 1,601 0.2 2,039 0.2 
Europeans 4,280 0.8 9,984 1.3 11,908 1.1 
Americans 814 0.2 1,997 0.2 3,142 0.3 
Others 47 - 158 - 163 -
Not stated 168 
- - -
- -
Total 522,749 100.0 792,339 100.0 1,0160,13 100.0 
Source: 
(1) Population Bulletin of ESCWA. Number 32, June 1988 
(2) Kuwait, Central Statistical Office, Population census of 1987. 
The most striking change since 1975 has been the large increase in people of 
various Asian nationalities, who formed 18.7 percent of the non-Kuwaiti popula-
tion in 1975 and 35 percent in 1985. Consequently, the ratio of Arab nationalities 
fell from 80.2 percent to 63.2 percent during that 10 year period. Further, it can 
be noted that the number of immigrants from the Far East, namely Philippine, 
Korean and Sri-Lanka nationals, increased significantly during the last decade. 
One of the reasons for this shift was the rapid increase in the rate of development 
after 1975, which found the traditional Arab labour exporting countries increas-
ingly unable to send more workers abroad. Thus, the shortage of available Arab 
labour on the one hand, together with the abundant supply of skilled and cost-
efficient Asian labour on the other, forced Kuwait to bring an increasing number 
of immigrant labourers from the Far East and Indian sub-continent. 
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6.8.4.5 Employment and Educational Characteristics of Immigrant Labour 
Expatriates dominate all sectors of economic activity at all occupational 
levels. In 1985, Kuwaiti nationals accounted for only 18.9 percent of the total 
work-force. Rapid economic growth and the diversification of the economy re-
sulted in an accelerated increase in Kuwait'slabour force between 1975 and 1985. 
During this period, the native labour force increased from 91,844 to 126,410, while 
the non-Kuwaiti work force rose from 212,738 to 543,944 representing percentage 
increases of 38 and 156 respectively. At the same time, the share of nationals in 
the total number of persons employed declined from 30.2 percent in 1975 to 18.9 
percent in 1985. This decline in the proportion of employed Kuwaitis was largely 
owing to the low participation of Kuwaiti women in the work-force and to the 
failure of Kuwaiti nationals adequately to meet the demand for skilled labour. 
The position of the immigrant work-force is further enhanced by the 
fact that their activity rates are higher than those of the national population. 
In 1985, the crude activity rate for migrants was 53.5 percent, in comparison 
with 18.6 percent for nationals. This disparity was apparent in both sexes. The 
male activity rates for Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis were 30.0 and 69.7 percent 
respectively. It is interesting to note that the participation rate of non-Kuwaiti 
women was nearly four times that of Kuwaiti women. The major reason for 
the very low participation of Kuwaiti women in the labour force is a social one: 
traditional society in Kuwait restricts women from participating in the modern 
economy. 
Besides the small size and young age of the national population, one of 
the major reasons for Kuwait's dependence on a foreign labour force is the low 
educational attainment of the Kuwaiti labour force. In spite of the huge expan-
sion of educational resources in the last two decades, the quality and quantity of 
education is still low in Kuwait. In 1985 approximately one quarter of the native 
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labour force was either illiterate or had no formal education. Some 13.2 percent 
of the Kuwaiti labour force successfully completed primary school, while 24.9 per-
cent completed intermediate school, 24.4 percent completed secondary school, and 
only about 12 percent had university degrees. 
Table(6.23}: Percentage Distribution of the Labour Force Accord-
ing to Educational Attainment, 1985. 
Educational attainment Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
lliiterate 17.0 2.5 14.2 24.8 24.4 24.7 
Basic literacy 12.6 1.9 10.5 26.4 33.1 27.7 
Elementary school 15.3 4.4 13.2 7.7 2.6 6.7 
Intermediate school 25.8 21.1 24.9 11.2 4.3 9.8 
Secondary and post-secondary 19.5 44.8 24.4 18.1 21.7 18.8 
University 9.8 25.3 12.8 11.8 13.9 12.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Population Bulletin of ESCWA. Number 32, June 1988. 
Table 6.23 shows that Kuwait has a critical shortage of high level man-
power. This is illustrated by a comparison of the number of migrants (65,809) and 
Kuwaitis (15,793) who have university degrees. Thus, the number of foreigners 
with unversity degrees was more than four times that for the native population, 
while as holders of secondary school certificate, foreigners out numbered Kuwaitis 
more than three to one. At the same time Table 6.23 shows that the bulk of the 
foreign labour force (nearly 52 percent) had no formal education. 
It may be noted that the level of education of the female labour force 
was much higher than that of the male labour force for both Kuwaitis and non-
Kuwaitis. A high proportion of Kuwaiti females had completed primary, interme-
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diate and secondary school. If the social barriers that restrict the full participation 
of women were to be removed, Kuwaiti women could fill many of the jobs that 
currently suffer from a shortage of national manpower (Al-Essa 1981). 
In 1985, the largest single area of economic activity for both Kuwaitis and 
non-Kuwaitis was community and personal services. As employment in the gov-
ernment sector is attractive, Kuwaitis tended to cluster in social and community 
services, where they constituted over 75 percent of the work-force. In contrast, 
only 43 percent of non-nationals worked for the Government. A relatively high 
proportion of non-nationals were employed in the construction, trading and man-
ufacturing sectors. Although non-nationals predominated in all sectors of the 
economy, their employment was almost absolute in construction (98.8 percent), 
trading (92.0 percent) and manufacturing (90.8 percent). It is evident from Table 
6.24 that most of the economy would not survive without the presence of a foreign 
work-force. 
The distribution of employment by sex showed that over 90 percent of active 
non-Kuwaiti females worked in the services sector. For males, however, nearly 
one third {32 percent) were employed in services, 28 percent in construction, 15 
percent in trade, hotels and restaurants, and 10 percent in manufacturing indus-
tries. An analysis of economic activity by nationality shows that Arabs and Asians 
were concentrated in the services and construction sectors, while Westerners were 
concentrated in mining and quarrying. 
The occupational structure of the national and non-national work-forces 
shows a very different pattern. Nearly one-third of all indigenous workers were en-
gaged in service occupations. An additional 28 percent were employed in clerical-
related occupations and another 21 percent in professional and technical occu-
pations. In contrast, a relatively large proportion of active non-nationals were 
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Table (6.24): Distribution of the Economically- Active Population 
by Sex and Major Industiral Groups, 1985. 
Economic activity Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti %of Non-Kuwait" 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Agricult ure,hunting 
and fishing 2.8 0.3 2.3 2.2 - 1.8 78.0 
Mining and 
quarrying 2.5 0.2 2.0 1.0 0.3 0.8 64.3 
Manufacturing industries 4.6 0.6 3.8 10.4 1.1 8.6 90.8 
Electricity, gas 
and water 1.5 0.2 1.3 1.4 - 1.1 79.1 
Construction 1.4 0.1 1.2 28.0 1.1 22.8 98.8 
Trade, hotels 
and restaurants 6.0 0.6 4.9 15.3 3.2 13.0 92.0 
Transport, storage 
and communications 6.9 3.5 6.2 6.5 1.2 5.5 79.4 
Financial, investment 
and insurance 3.2 2.8 3.1 3.2 2.5 3.0 81.0 
Community and 
other services 71.1 91.7 75.2 32.0 90.6 43.4 71.6 
Source: Population Bulletin of ESCWA. No.32, June 1988. 
employed in production-related work ( 40 percent) and services (28 percent). How-
ever, both these groups cover a wide range of skill levels. Of all Kuwaitis who 
worked as professionals in 1985, almost one quarter were employed in jobs that 
generally required a science or mathematics -based university degree. 
About 37 percent of all Kuwaitis worked in unskilled occupations that 
required no special education or training, and about three and half times more 
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Kuwaitis were engaged in skilled and semi-skilled occupations involving office and 
clerical work than in skilled and semi-skilled manual occupations. About 15 per-
cent of all active Kuwaitis were engaged in sub-professional and technical occupa-
tions, while nearly two thirds ( 66 percent) were teachers. 
Among non-Kuwaitis, nearly 70 percent of those engaged in professional 
occupations were in jobs that usually required a science or mathematics degree. 
Approximately two thirds of the expatriates engaged in skilled and semi-skilled 
occupations were in manual jobs, while only one third were in occupations related 
to office and clerical work. About 39 percent of non-nationals were engaged in un-
skilled occupations. Only about 10 percent of active non-Kuwaitis were engaged 
in sub-professional and technical occupations, 46 percent were teachers. In con-
trast, non-Kuwaitis were relatively under-represented in administrative, clerical 
and teaching occupations, presumably because nationals were available in large 
number for jobs that required less education and training. Non-Kuwaitis were also 
over-represented in the categories of skilled and semi-skilled manual occupations, 
which shows the relative level of the skills of migrant labour. 
Clearly, two categories of migrants can be distinguished. First is the bulk 
of migrants with few or no skills, who work primarily in the private sector, con-
struction, manufacturing and domestic services. The second category of migrants 
is composed of skilled and professional workers who work for both government 
and private employers. 
6.8.4.6 Development and Immigration Policy 
Migration has undoubtedly made a great contribution to the rapid social 
and economic development of Kuwait. However, it has also given rise to a number 
of social and political problems, including the fear of numerical and cultural dom-
ination and an overdependence on expatriate labour. While the Government has 
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not adopted an official population policy, policy makers accorded high priority to 
the population issue in the Third Five-Year Development Plan 1985-1990. The 
major policy concern of the Government is to achieve a balance between the size of 
the national and expatriate populations by the year 2000, or earlier, by reducing 
the role of the foreign work-force in the development process. In an attempt to 
achieve these objectives, the following approaches have been adopted: 
(a) The reduction of mortality and maintenance of high fertility rates in order to 
achieve a high rate of natural increase and reduce the country's dependence 
on immigrants. 
(b) A reduction in the rate of growth of the foreign population by controlling 
the flow of migration into the country in the following ways: requiring the 
rational use of expatriate immigration, mechanizing the development and 
reconstruction of services, utilizing advanced technology and scaling down 
projects that are labour-intensive and make no substantial contribution to 
development. 
Recent measures adopted by the Government concerning immigration 
include the following: 
(i) Stricter regulations on the immigration of family members. 
(ii) A preference for contractors who bring their own workers and who do not 
encourage workers to settle in the country. 
(iii) Stricter control of clandestine immigrants. 
(iv) Amendments limiting the validity of residence and work permits of non-
nationals to two years. 
(c) A rationale for the utilization of the national labour force and its develop-
ment. 
(d) The intensification of efforts to develop the national labour force and up-
grade their skills through educational and training programmes that respond 
to the country's development needs. 
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(e) Encouraging the female population to join the labour force, especially in 
those areas of activity that fit in with the prevailing tradition of the Arab 
world. 
(f) The encouragement of investment in labour-abundant Arab States and the 
integration of product and labour markets through international trade. 
In conclusion, one of the most striking population features of Kuwait was 
the high rate of foreign migration, which came in response to rapid and successful 
economic development and modernization. In spite of this high rate of migration, 
there was an acute shortage of qualified manpower in many crucial sectors during 
the late 1970's and early 1980's. To some extent this was alleviated by migrants 
from outside the country. 
Although the period of the oil boom has now ended, the tasks of diversify-
ing and consolidating the economic base and maintaining a high rate of economic 
growth still remain. A number of development projects have to be completed 
and services have to be maintained. These objectives cannot easily be achieved 
without a regular flow of workers from outside the country. 
Therefore, international migration will continue to play a significant role 
in the foreseeable future by filling the gap between the demand and supply of 
manpower. Workers, however, may increasingly come from Asia rather than from 
the Middle East. 
6.9 Cooperation in Trade and Migration Sector 
6.9.1 Trade : 
Cooperation in the area of commerce first focused, following Articles 1-7 
of the EA, on the removal of intra-GCC trade barriers and the adoption of a 
CET. This was a logical and necessary stating point for the GCC states, as intra-
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GCC trade was negligible and, therefore, would not bring large-scale commercial 
interest into conflict. Also, a CET would among other things serve to insulate the 
emerging industries in the GCC. A unified trade position would also do much to 
assist the GCC in its task of negotiating access to foreign markets for export by 
its member states. 
All intra-GCC customs duties on animals, agricultural products, natu-
ral resources, or manufactured goods of member state origin were eliminated in 
principle on 1 March 1983, in accordance with Article 1 of the EA. It is highly 
instructive, though, that even in this first stage of economic integration between 
the GCC states, the flexibility built into the EA was tested. Oman, owing to its 
economic circumstances, opted to advance reservations on specific commodaties 
under Article 24 of the agreement, under which "any member state may tem-
porarily exempt itself from applying such provisions as may be necessitated by 
temporary local situations in that state or specific circumstances faced by it". In 
the remainder of the GCC, however, compliance to the free trade provisions was 
relatively uniform soon after the 1 March deadline had passed. 
Agreement was also reached on a number of secondary measures designed 
to strengthen the trade provisions of the EA, such as the establishment of common 
border customs stations, the creation of customs institutes in the member states, 
and a central customs data bank at the GCC Secretariate General. Moreover, the 
member states reached consensus on a certificate of origin in order to ensure the 
viability of intra-GCC trade, which entailed the exchange of specimens of official 
customs stamps and signature of authorized custom personnel. 
The process of adopting a CET was also more gradual than expected, 
though the delay in implementation reflected the considerable administrative and 
other adjustments that were necessary in each of the member states. In accordance 
with the resolution of the Ministerial Council on 18 May 1983, a CET of 4-20 
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percent was to become effective on 1st September 1983. Yet by the target date, 
only Bahrain and Kuwait had changed their customs system to conform with 
the ruling, presumably because their duty levies were in adherence with those 
established by the GCC. Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia required additional 
time to take the necessary administrative steps. The U AE encountered more 
fundamental obstacles; various parts of the commercial community feared that 
the CET would further aggravate their already difficult economic circumstances. 
All seven emirates, however, formally adopted the CET by the time of the fourth 
Supreme Council meeting in Doha on 6 November 1983. As of 1988, however, 
there are still areas of noncompliance to the CET provisions of the EA, most 
particularly in the domain of the ceiling of tariffs on luxury items. At the seventh 
session of the Supreme Council in Abu Dhabi, the GCC heads of state agreed 
that the remaining unification of customs duties and procedures regarding all 
foreign goods would be acheived in a period of two years. Specific mention of that 
decision was made in the economic declaration issued at the Supreme Council's 
eighth session, together with a reaffirmation of the importance attached by the 
GCC leaders to such unification. 
Another important landmark in the GCC economic integration process 
was the decision of the ministers of economy and finance on 11-12 October 1983 
to allow GCC individuals and other business entities the right to market prod-
ucts throughout the GCC area. Also resolved was the right of GCC nationals to 
engage in hotel, restaurant, maintenance, pharmaceutical, and craftsman activi-
ties, subject to licensing and other host country regulations. These resolutions, 
which were subsequently reaffirmed by the Ministerial Council and approved by 
the Supreme Council, are gradually being brought into effect in the member states 
through the adoption of relevant national legislation or decree. 
The GCC has also been the forum in which the member states have 
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determined collective positions in negotiations with external elements. The EA 
contains explicit language in this respect: "member states shall coordinate their 
commercial policies and relations with other states and regional economic group-
ings and blocs with a view toward creating balanced trade relations and favarable 
cicumstances and terms of trade therewith". 
Discussion of potential negotiating positions has included measures and 
strategies designed to protect local industries, such as cement, iron and steel, 
asbestos, and aluminum enterprises. The GCC ministers of commerce agreed 
during their meetings on 1-2 May 1984 and 6-7 November 1984 to establish a 
technical committee in order to assess the benefit of specific protectionist measures 
in these areas. Though neither protectionist tariffs nor any other nontariff trade 
barriers have yet been imposed, the GCC constitutes an important avenue through 
which such measures could be taken if necessary. 
Moreover, the member states have agreed to designate the GCC as their 
representative in certain trade negotiations with third parties. Such representation 
by the GCC is provided for in the EA, Article 7 of which states that the GCC 
states will "conclude economic agreements collectively when and if the common 
benefit of the member states is realised" and "work for the creation of a collective 
negotiating force to strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis foreign parties 
in the field of importation of basic needs and exportation of major products". 
The GCC has been engaged in trade discussions with the EEC, Japan, and the 
USA with the objective of opening new markets for the petrochemical and other 
exports of its member states. There is the hope in the GCC that free trade areas 
will eventually be established with each of the industrial markets mentioned. 
What GCC trade negotiator Mahmoun al-Khourdi has referred to as 
"substantial progress" has been acheived in negotiations with the EEC since dis-
cussion began in October 1984, though many hurdles remain to be overcome. The 
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process of agreeing on a trade structure was all but derailed in June 1984, however, 
when the EEC decided to impose a 13.5 percent tariff on Saudi methanol exports. 
The situation was further complicated in 1986, when the EEC expanded its trade 
barriers to include some additional GCC petrochemical exports. By the end of 
1987, negotiations with the EEC were apparently at a virtual standstill, though a 
new set of proposals was anticipated to be considered by the parties. In order to 
accelerate the process of negotiation, the Supreme Council, in its Riyadh meeting 
in 198 7, instructed the Ministerial Council to carry out "official negotiations" on 
behalf of the GCC with the EEC. 
The GOO negotiations with the EEO are vital not only because of the 
size and importance of the EEC markets but also because the GOC views the 
European initiative as a vehicle with which it can open relations with the USA 
market. Al-Khourdi is of the opinion that once a trade arrangement with the EEC 
is in place, the USA "will be induced to move into a new phase" of negotiation 
with the GCC. 
But, as with the EEC, it cannot be expected that USA policymakers 
will facilitate the introduction of large-scale imports from the GCC, particularly 
in view of difficulties associated with the chronic USA trade deficit and growing 
protectionist tendencies. Questions regarding the state ownership of GCC enter-
prise are likely to be another element that will complicate the development of 
a structured GCO-USA trade relationship. There is also the additional problem 
of broader political obstacles involving the Arab-Israeli conflict that could also 
arise in the context of GOC-USA trade negotiations. In light of these constraints, 
discussions, are likely to continue to focus on dispute settlement proceedures, ex-
change of data, investment (i.e.GOO investment in USA energy industries), more 
general energy policies and issues, and more contentious matters relating to the 
Arab boycott and the USA anti-boycott legislation. In spite of these probable dif-
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ficulties, the GOO hopes to capitalise on "an arrangement in which USA interests 
are also served" based on discussions not "exposed to non-relevant factors". 
The GOO is also engaged in discussions with Japan, which in the 1980's 
has become a major trade force in the GOO states. The Japanese position in 
the region is vividly demonstrated by the fact that it eclipsed the USA as Saudi 
Arabia's chief trade partner in 1986. Because the level of Japanese investment 
is lower than those of Europe and the USA, talks have focused on increasing 
Japanese direct investment in the GCC area. Another area of discussion between 
the states is the potential in Japan for the imposition of duties and taxis on crude-
oil and gasoline imports. That potential sparked the Supreme Council during its 
Riyadh meeting in 1987 to "express its concern" over the "protectionist policies 
which Japan intends to apply". 
Especially in light of the economic contraction that has gripped the region 
in the 1980's, the GOO states are less inclined to accept the continuation of 
large-scale importing without some measure of reciprocity by foreign states. This 
attitude is already prevalent in the national economic policies of most of the GOO 
states. The initial obstacles encountered by the GOO states in exporting products 
to the European, USA, and Japanese markets may be a precursor of more profound 
friction in trade matters unless some resolution is reached. Without doubt, trade 
negotiations will continue to be high on the GCC's list of economic priorities. 
The GCC has also sought to enhance its trading position through the 
establishment of arbitration rules had been drafted for the commercial cooperation 
committee. The rules would serve as the basis for the GOO's current focus of 
setting up an office at the GCC Secretariat General for the purpose of commercial 
arbitration. 
The advantages associated with bulk purchases of imports by the GCC 
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states are obvious, and efforts have focused on trade arrangements providing for 
GCC-wide purchase of staples such as rice, sugar, and wheat. Depending on 
the initial results of such efforts, a GCC-wide approach could be adopted in a 
number of other economic fields (such as financing). The development of a collec-
tive position was set out in explicit terms in the Unified Industrial Development 
Strategy, in which the member states pledge "to adopt a collective international 
industrial policy based on encouraging their exports, and to consider adding new 
terms to foreign aid and trade agreements ... to promote their industrial exports". 
The strategy also calls for the coordination between the GCC states on "loan 
agreement terms offered by foreign and international financial establishments as 
well as supplier facilities agreements" and "management and marketing contracts 
concluded with foreign companies". 
As might be anticipated, because of the regional economic contraction 
and the small size of intra-ace commerce in general, the data indicate that, 
despite the imposition of a free trade area and a CET, the percentage of trade 
between the ace states has remained constant or decreased on the whole after the 
ace was established. In this regard, it would be implausible to identify the degree 
of inter-ace trade as an index of the success of the overall ace programme, for 
two principal reasons. First is the extent to which revenues dropped together with 
the price of oil. Also, the economic mea.sures tha.t in the states ha._ye been identified 
but not yet implemented. Therefore, additional time is necessary before intra-
ace trade levels assume greater importance in assessments of ace economic 
performance. 
6.9.2 Labour 
The March 1985 statement on Objectives and Policies of Development 
Plans in the GCC States provides a number of goals for development in the ace 
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region. Predictably, the statement calls for enhanced educational opportunities, 
better health standards, better work conditions, and augmented economic op-
portunities. Likewise, the statement calls for the correction of "the population 
imbalance, whereby the proportion of aliens in the GCC states is reduced and 
their presence is confined to what the state determines is consistent with eco-
nomic necessities". These are the two principal avenues of the labour programme 
under the GCC framework. 
The GCC ministers of labour have also met regularly to explore the 
mechanics of providing equal treatment for GCC nationals in fulfillment of the 
various provisions of the EA. The decision to make such treatment available to all 
nationals was formally made by the ministers during their third meeting in Riyadh, 
culminating a process of standardizing terms of reference and structures that had 
begun a year earlier. The ministers have also recommended the formation of a 
organisation designed to study how unified GCC labour laws can be reached and 
have sought to intensify ongoing professional and vocational programmes between 
the GCC states. 
6.10 Summary 
The countries of the Gulf have long been affected by flows of goods and 
people so the creation of the GCC might be expected to have a significant impact 
on these movements. In relation to trade, changes in the size and nature of 
the Gulf markets in recent years have had important consequences for foreign 
suppliers. Shifts have taken place in the balance between demand for capital 
and intermediate goods and demand for finished consumer goods, largely as a 
result of industrialization. With the completion of the massive infrastructural 
schemes of the 1970s, the demand for construction- related items has declined. 
Most new projects, with a few notable exceptions, are on a much smaller scale. 
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At the same time, however, demand is growing for replacement items, because 
of the need to maintain the new industries and basic infrastructure. Since such 
items are required for existing projects, rather than new schemes, issues such as 
compatibility have became much more crucial. A further change has involved the 
methods of conducting business, especially now that price is no longer a secondary 
consideration to the quality of the specification. The Gulf market today is far more 
competitive than it used to be. 
Despite the changes brought about by the recess10n m the Gulf, the 
economies of the region are still quite open to trade and have a few import re-
strictions either in the form of tariffs or quotas. Export earnings comfortably 
covered all import payments during the last decade, and although there are some 
balance of payments pressures due to the drop in oil prices, there is a reluctance 
to restrict imports through the imposition of controls. Gulf openness to trade 
has deep-seated cultural roots, as well as being necessitated by the nature of the 
region's resource base. For example, there is no need for protection to safeguard 
employment as labour shortages are still the major constraints for development. 
Diversification away from the dependence on exports of a single com-
modity will be of prime significance in the region's development strategy. The 
Gulf countries will continue to look to their traditional trading partners to pro-
vide them with the necessary imports and technological knowhow. However, the 
scope for sustaining, let alone expanding exports to the GCC region, will be gov-
erned to a large extent by the trading partner openness to processed Gulf goods. 
This is more of an issue to the EEC which has been following a protectionist 
policy against GCC petrochemical products. While EEC exports enter the GCC 
countries at very low custom duties, and in many cases duty free, the community 
imposes tariffs on petrochemical exports from the Gulf once the relatively low 
duty free amounts are exceeded { which normally happens in the first weeks or 
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months of any particular year ) . 
The bearish outlook for the world oil market in the coming years does 
not promise a major resurgence of oil revenues. The Gulf countries need therefore 
to maintain their policy pf import substitution and economic diversification. The 
growth in imports will continue to be restrained and more emphasis will be put on 
maintenance and the efficient utilization of resources. Protective tariffs selectively 
provided for locally- produced commodities may be needed together with other 
incentives to encourage domestic investments. The rise in exports of petrochemical 
products, aluminium and natural gas among others may offset to a large extent the 
drop in oil revenues. The region is expected to maintain its historic trade surplus, 
albeit with some deterioration in the respective countries of export-import ratios. 
The deficit in the balance of invisibles and transfers will have to shrink 
further to firmly place the region's current account deficit on a declining trend. 
Invisibles credit, representing mainly the income from foreign investments, are 
forecast to fall in line with the running down of foreign assets. However, this 
could, to a large extent, be offset by the decline in invisibles, debit-services and 
workers remittances. These are expected to assume a downward trend, now that 
major contracts have been completed and the demand for foreign labour is on 
the decline. The combined deficit in the current account position of the six Gulf 
states is not expected to widen much in the coming few years and it could very 
well start to shrink. Accordingly, the drawdown on foreign reserves may continue, 
albeit at much lower rates than seen before. 
As has already been indicated, trade between countries in the GCC region 
is very limited in scope, and involves mostly the re-export of goods imported from 
abroad ( Table 6.18 ). The reason is simple: the countries are basically very 
similar; they extract and export their reserves of oil wealth and import almost 
everything else. Hence the possibility of trade within the region, other than that 
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involving re-exports, depends on the development of domestic industries. While 
it is likely that such trade has increased in recent years as the national economies 
have become somewhat more diversified, it remains the case that trade with the 
rest of the world overwhelming dominates trade within the region. 
Within the regional ring, efforts need to be directed towards intensifying 
the mobility of goods, capital and people. The multiplicity of different local cur-
rencies complicates trade and investment within the region. A single currency area 
might foster the expected increase in intra-regional trade and investment. A GCC 
Payments Union should be considered as a means to strengthen the institutional 
mechanisms accommodating regional economic interactions. 
The other major flow affecting the region is that of migration. The 
Gulf region's over-dependence on expatriate workers has been due mainly to the 
dramatic growth in the region's economy over the past two decades, the small 
size of the indigenous population and the lack of sufficient managerial, technical 
and operational skills needed in the current development stage. The potential 
domestic supply of labour is also reduced by cultural traditions that discourage 
higher participation of the female population in the labour force. Furthermore, 
there are certain types of manual jobs that nationals prefer not to perform, either 
because they are socially unacceptable or the pay levels are too low. Non-nationals 
are now employed in almost every sector and in most Gulf countries they comprise 
the majority of the labour force. 
Although government officials in the various Gulf countries have given 
a great deal of emphasis to the importance of hiring nationals, the process of 
nationalizing the labour force has not been extended to the private sector at large. 
Aside from certain clerical jobs (messengers, drivers, government relation officer, 
etc. ) the employment of nationals in the private sectors has been rather limited. 
In Kuwait for example, figures for 1989 show that the government remained the 
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main employer of Kuwaiti manpower, accounting for about 92.7 percent of the 
national labour force with only 7.3 percent working in the private sector. In 
Bahrain, while 50 percent of the economically active population are non-national, 
the dependence of private industrial campanies on expatriates reaches 90 percent. 
In Saudi Arabia, it is estimated that only 9.5 percent of the Saudi labour force is 
gainfully employed by the private sector. 
The main and most common complaint of private sector industrialists is 
that, even disregarding problems of attracting nationals to technical posts, the 
costs involved are so high as to be prohibitive. They claim that the average cost 
of hiring and training a national graduate of a technical school is much higher 
than of employing a trained expatriate workers. Many private sector employers 
who are guided by the principle of maximizing profits and minimizing costs are 
resigned to continued dependence on imported labour until nationals acquire more 
skills and adjust their wage expectations. 
Originally, the expatriate workforce in the Gulf was envisaged as a tem-
porary phenomenon, with the bulk expected to leave following the completion of 
the region's infrastructure. However, the recent changes in immigration trends 
and labour- market structure have lengthened the average duration of stay of the 
non-nationals with the bulk becoming perpetual residents. 
The decline in economic activity in the past few years limited the need 
for additional migrant workers, but there has been no mass exodus of expatriates. 
The GCC states have found themselves hosts to a more settled non-nationals 
population where many expatriate workers are joined by their dependents and 
increasingly more non-nationals are born in the region. Policy makers were sur-
prised by the pervasiveness and capacity of migrant workers to remain in residence 
and to adapt to the new working environment where remunerations are generally 
lower than in the boom years of the 1970s and early 1980s. The GCC governments 
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are only now appreciating the true cost of providing health and social services for 
a large immigrant community with close to 20 percent of their annual oil revenues 
being remitted abroad by expatriates working in the Gulf countries. 
The economic slowdown experienced in the region and the ongoing pro-
cess of modernization has engendered a gradual transformation of attitudes and 
aspirations on the part of the national population towards technical and blue collar 
jobs. Nowhere is this more obvious than in Bahrain, where a sizeable percentage 
of the labour force is found in the manufacturing sector, working mainly for the 
government- owned companies and in certain occupations that were considered 
less socially acceptable in the past. This contradicts the conventional view that 
GCC nationals will not work in manual and industrial occupations. In other Gulf 
states, however, attitudes have not yet changed to the same extent. Nationals do 
not generally seek employment opportunities in the industrial sectors, preferring 
instead the less physically demanding and usually better paying opportunities in 
the fields of commerce, trade and government. Besides, the presence of migrant 
workers makes certain occupations socially unattractive, especially where the pay 
levels are too low. Certain policies will have to be implemented to make manual 
and technical jobs more attractive to the indigenous workforce and to encourage 
private sector enterprises to employ more nationals. This is especially the case in 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman where unemployment among the youth started 
to surface and may become more visible in the 1990s. 
The challenge ahead lies in the ability of the national workforce to develop 
and acquire those skills needed in the current development stage. Young men and 
women should try to benefit from the skills of their expatriate counterparts and 
strive to acquire the needed expertise that would help them take over more senior 
responsibilities in the future. 
The pre-occupation with growth-related investment, industrialisation and 
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economic diversification should not be given priority over development-related hu-
man resources issues. Furthermore, the pressing need to a.ccommodate demands 
for more highly skilled national manpower should not lead in the process to the 
negligence of the region's culture and values. This in effect calls for the imple-
mentation of population and manpower policies aimed at harnessing the region's 
indigenous human resources and fostering values of hard work, discipline, accep-
tance of change and professionalism consistent with the fabric of the Gulf culture. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 A Review of Progress 
It can be argued that the emergence of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
has had a variety of effects on the development of the economies of its member 
states. In 1981 the six Gulf countries, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, Oman 
and Saudi Arabia, agreed to establish a new entity among themselves and called 
it the Gulf Cooperation Council. Although the overall aims of the Council are 
too diverse to be considered in great detail in the present research, the economic 
integration strategies adopted by the Council and their potential implications 
on the agricultural, industrial, services and trade sectors have been examined in 
depth. 
The importance of the study is defined in chapter one, where it was 
argued that the Council could serve as the medium for achieving a higher degree 
of coordination, integration and cohesion in all fields and for forging closer links 
between its members in various spheres. Through the GCC, the member states 
have taken deliberate and substantive steps toward the realization of a free trade 
area and a customs union, and are taking those further steps necessary to make 
the GCC into one solid economic entity on the basis of long-term institutionalized 
cooperation. 
Hence, a descriptive analysis was introduced in the second part of the 
research. The Gulf region is very rich in oil resources, and its geographical location 
makes it an international artery for petroleum wealth. The six states, if considered 
individually, represent only a small area, but taken together, they cover a relatively 
large sized territory which can support an integrated economic structure. 
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The agriculture sector has grown relatively in recent years and the GCC 
countries have mounted an ambitious campaign to improve their agricultural sec-
tor which so far has played a limited role in the region's economy. It has been 
found in the third chapter that the contribution of the sector to GDP is still 
very low, ranging from 4 percent in Oman to less than 0.04 percent in Qatar. 
The reason for such a marginal role includes deficiencies in the soil, scarcity of 
irrigation water, climatic conditions of the desert (including low annual rainfall) 
and the limited supply of manpower trained in agriculture. Despite these limita-
tions, efforts are now being intensified to improve agricultural performance and 
cultivate a new image for the agricultural sectors. A recent study (1988), by the 
Federation of Gulf Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture warns of a 
serious shortage of food in the Gulf region if no immediate measures are taken 
to achieve self-sufficiency. The study recommends reclamation of additional land, 
encouragement and incentives to the private sector, increased use of advanced sci-
entific methods to deal with the region's harsh climate, and establishment of local 
fertilizer and insecticide industries. The study expects that by the end of the cen-
tury, the countries of the region would have achieved, as a group, self-sufficiency 
in wheat, maize, poultry and other various agricultural and dairy products. The 
GCC common agricultural policy ( Appendix. B ) makes explicit reference to the 
ultimate aim of GCC activity in this regard - namely, the agricultural integration 
of the GCC states on the basis of reciprocal and balanced benefits to the coop-
erating parties. In addition, the policy seeks to maximize resources, secure the 
greatest possible degree of self-sufficiency (particularly in basic food commodities). 
These factors underline the explicit reference of food security in Article 
7 of the Economic Agreement, which stipulates that the member states will make 
arrangements to coordinate policies for building up strategic food stocks. Mea-
sures under the aegis of the GCC to provide a measure of regional food security, 
therefore, have been a focus of GCC activity. The GCC ministers of agriculture, 
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during their 1983 meeting agreed to examine options regarding the food security 
issue. Among other things, they recommended that agriculture be given priority 
in regional investment decisions and resolved to continue the national efforts to 
development food production capabilities. 
As a consequence of the nature of the GCC's economies, where oil and 
natural gas are widely available, the industrial sector has received greater atten-
tion than the agricultural sector, and contributed more to the GDP. Moreover, 
Article 13 highlights the need for the member states to play special attention to 
the establishment of joint ventures in industry. Many of the specifics of these 
more general objectives were articulated in the more recent industrial develop-
ment strategy, the GCC Unified Industrial Development Strategy, adopted by 
the member states in 1985 (Appendix. C ). The importance of the harmonizing 
and codifying regulations relating to industry was echoed by the GCC ministers 
of industry during their first meeting in Riyadh in 1980. In order to establish 
a common base for such a codification process, however, action to standardize 
the various measures and procedures in the GCC industries was necessary. The 
GCC has agreed to the establishment of a range of common institutions aimed 
at positive integration. Among these institutions is the Gulf Investment Corpo-
ration (GIC), established by the Supreme Council during its meeting in Doha in 
19_82. Capitalized initially at U.S._$2.1 billion, OW_ne_d equally by the GCC member 
states, and controlled by a board of directors consisting of two representatives 
from each GCC country, the Kuwait-based GIC seeks to identify feasible projects, 
evaluate them, structure them and participate with the public and private sec-
tor in bringing them to fruition. Rather than constituting a loan-syndication or 
soft-loan institution, it is in effect a commercial financial institution aimed at 
promoting development of the productive sectors in the GCC economies. The 
GIC has reached an advanced stage of commitment with five projects, includ-
ing the modernization of aluminium Bahrain, the expansion of the production 
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facilities of the Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company, and equity participation 
in the establishment of the Jubail based National Wire Drawing and Products 
Company, together with the National Industrialization Company of Saudi Arabia 
and partners from Europe. In the future, the GIC could be an effective vehicle 
for economic diversification in the GCC arena, as well as for other cooperative 
efforts, such as a unified GCC stock exchange. In terms of economic cooperation 
then, the GIC represents an important component of positive GCC integration 
by virtue of its centralized planning and implementation character and the size of 
its capitalization. 
The GCC has also institutionalized its cooperation in the area of stan-
dardization and measures. The necessity of unifying standards, measures, and 
procedures to the gradual development of an integrated regional economy. At 
the Doha meeting of the Supreme Council in 1982, the GCC leaders approved 
the transformation of the existing Saudi Arabian Standards Organization into 
the Gulf Standards and Measures Organization ( GSMO ). At that time, work 
began on the respective systems of standardization in the GCC member states, 
which numbered 460 in Saudi Arabia, 250 in Kuwait, 100 in Oman, and some 50 
in Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE. GSMO operations have been conducted from 
SASO headquarters in Riyadh with SASO staff and facilities, though it is hoped 
that a GSMO organization independent from SASO will emerge in the next five 
years. Such a process implies a greater financial commitment by the GCC to 
the organization, as the GSMO's 1987 financial budget was limited to approxi-
mately U.S.$850,000. The accomplishments of GSMO since its inception include 
the agreement among the GCC member states to 53 standards on items rang-
ing from systems of measurement and calibration, foodstuffs, canned food labels, 
common electrical appliances, performance of motor vehicles, and environmental 
production. 
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The Unified Economic Agreement also calls on the member states to co-
operate in the provision of services. This issue had been examined in chapter five, 
where it has been found that the importance of the efforts toward integration of 
the financial systems was stressed by the GCC leaders in the economic declara-
tion issued after the eighth Supreme Council. This blessed the efforts toward the 
adoption of a fixed common index of the GCC currencies as an important step 
within the framework of coordination of financial and monetary policies and the 
realization of a Gulf common market. In 1988, the GCC ministers of transport 
and communication approved a proposal to establish an executive committee of 
civil aviation directors. The committee has since agreed to a new inter-Gulf flight 
schedule and the unification of airline ticket structure. In terms of electricity and 
water, a parallel effort has led to the standardization of electricity and water rates. 
Cooperation in education has been frequently cited as a major goal of 
the Council. However, it is interesting to note that the first meeting ever of the 
GCC ministers of education was not held until September 1985. At the conclusion 
of their meeting, the GCC Minister of Education adopted the following general 
policies regarding education:- 1. Teaching is a specialized vocation, and only those 
who are highly qualified should be employed in it. 
2. Illiteracy must be completely eradicated from the GCC states. 
3. Higher education at university level must be Arabized in all of its disci-
plines and branches. 
4. Citizenship, obedience, and the ability to defend one's homeland should 
also be nurtured through military education schools. 
Cooperation in trade and migration has been discussed in chapter six, 
where it has been found that the intra-GCC customs duties on animals, agricul-
tural products, natural resources, or manufactured goods of member states origin 
were eliminated in principle and in practice on 1st March 1983, in accordance 
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with Article 1 of the EA. Agreement was also reached on a number of secondary 
measures designed to strengthen the trade provisions of the EA, such as the estab-
lishment of common border customs stations, the creation of customs institutes 
in the member states, and a central customs data bank at the GCC Secretariat 
General. Moreover, the member states reached a consensus on a certificate of 
ongm m order to ensure the viability of intra-GCC trade, which entailed the 
exchange of specimens of official customs stamps and signatures of authorised 
custom personnel. 
Regarding migration, the GCC ministers of labour have met regularly to 
explore the mechanics of providing equal treatment for GCC nationals in fulfill-
ment of the various provisions of the EA. The decision to make such treatment 
available to all nationals was formally made by the ministers in 1985. The min-
isters have also recommended the formation of an organization designed to study 
how unified GCC labour laws can be reached and have sought to intensify ongoing 
professional and vocational programmes between the GCC states. 
In the field of political coordination and defence cooperation the GCC 
has achieved little, compared with the economic field, therefore, the GCC will 
have to work harder to achieve its goals in the political and defence field. 
Finally, if economic adjustment to lower oil revenues and the uncertainties 
created by the Gulf war were the main constraints to growth in the 1980s, economic 
diversification and generating productive employment opportunities to a growing 
population are the challenges of the 1990s. With the end of the war and a gradual 
surge in the world's demand for oil, the Gulf region is positioned to experience a 
decade of renewed economic growth. The return of confidence to the Gulf market 
will translate into expansionary business and investment plans. Higher population 
growth in the six Gulf states will continue in the 1990s, albeit at slower rates than 
before, which together with an increase in the percentage of those in the age group 
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15 and above and a more settled expatriate population should boost demand for 
real estate, housing, social services and consumer products. 
Development priorities of the forthcoming decade have already been iden-
tified. In short, these include mobilizing private sector resources, economic diver-
sification and creating jobs for the growing number of young Gulf nationals coming 
into the labour market from universities and school. The role of the governments 
in directing the economies of the region remains, but the private sector will be 
called upon to build on the foundations laid by previous, as will as future public 
sector expenditures. A lot of emphasis is put on nationalization of employment 
opportunities, especially in the private sector. However, demand for certain skills 
will exceed indigenous supply for many years to come and expatriates will continue 
to have a clear role to play in 1990s. The critical obstacle to increasing employ-
ment of Gulf nationals in certain occupational categories remains the mismatch 
between educational qualifications and skill requirements. 
7.2 Evaluation 
The actual effect of these cooperation activities on the economic devel-
opment of the GCC states has been limited. For example, the implementation 
of most provisions of the Unified Economic Agreement has varied between ex-
tremely slow and nonexistent. Businessmen in different GCC countries have yet 
to feel the impact of the Unified Economic Agreement, particularly in regard to 
the exemption of national products from tariffs. Similarily, no coordination has 
actually occurred regarding expatriate labour, either. Yet all economic studies, 
long-term and short-term, have pointed to expatriate labour as the major issue 
facing the Gulf states over the next two decades. Certainly, there is a growing 
gap between the expectations created in the early years of the Council and the 
economic achievments apparent to ordinary citizens. Several of the reasons for 
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these have been established during the sectoral studies and they can be brought 
together in an overall evaluation of the contribution of the GCC to the economic 
development of the region. Some of the reasons are specific to the Gulf but others 
appear to be features of supranational organisations in general. To highlight the 
latter before discussing the specific reasons for the limited success of the GOO, 
we should look at the experience of the EEO as a supranational organisation and 
the lessons that GOO could possibly learn from the EEO experience. 
7.2.1 Lessons from the European Community 
By 1992, Europe is expected to turn into a unified market of the 320 mil-
lion consumers, 350 if EFTA ( the six European Free Trade Association countries 
of Austria, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Switzerland ) is included, a 
market which is larger than the US ( 246 million people) and Japan ( 122 million 
). A free market of this size with a purchasing power slightly larger than that of 
the US and 1.5 times that of Japan will be a dynamic entity for intra-European, 
as well as global growth. Some estimates suggest that the formation of the EO 
in 1957 added 2 to 4 percentage points of growth to the world's total during the 
1960s. 
A custom union ( elimination of internal custom tariffs and the introduc-
tion of common external tariffs for third countries ) had already been completed 
20 years ago. Since its foundation in 1958, this custom union helped raise intra-EO 
trade from 37 percent to 58 percent in 1987. The EO has enlarged its membership 
from six to twelve and the European Monetary System (EMS ), which has been 
in existence for almost ten years now, helps dampen fluctuations in the exchange 
rates of the European currencies. Despite these achievements in European eco-
nomic integration, there are still 12 segmented markets of insufficient size, with 
trade flows hindered by non-tariff barriers and flows of labour and capital across 
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boundaries not completely free. The goal of 1992 is to create a common market 
similar to the one existing in the USA. This means that trade in goods and ser-
vices and the movement of labour and capital would be just as free between the 
EC members as it is in one state. 
The ip1pact on economic growth in Europe and world-wide is projected to 
be considerable. The EC commission estimates a potential for additional growth 
in the community's GDP of 5 percent over a period of some five years after 1992, 
generating economic gains of around $250 billion and creating two to five mil-
lion new jobs. Furthermore, intra-EC trade is expected to increase after 1992 
through a comprehensive programme which includes removing frontier controls 
to the movement of goods and people, adopting common standards for indus-
trial products, harmonizing rates of value added tax and freeing the movement of 
capital and the provision of financial services. 
For the business sector, the opening of European markets will provide the 
advantage of lower unit costs of production as markets are supplied with uniform 
products. Unit cost of distribution will drop when border controls are abolished 
and European companies will enjoy a larger domestic market than their Ameri-
can and Japanese competitors. The biggest single markets in the EC, Germany 
with some 70 million people, France and Britain with about 55 million each, are 
relatively small compared to the domestic market of Japan and the US. 
The impact on non-EC countries is equally important. The steps towards 
a common market by 1992 will help consolidate Europe's position as the world's 
single largest trading bloc. The EC is both the world's largest exporter and its 
biggest importer. It accounts for just over 25 percent of world trade or 40 percent 
if intra-EC trade is included. Therefore, the expected growth stimulus from the 
single market will immediately spread world-wide. However, the impact of a single 
market on non-EC countries will depend on the Community's future trade policies. 
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The expansion of intra-regional trade may lead to the strengthening of external 
EC trade barriers, effectively offsetting the increase in imports generated by higher 
European growth prospects. There is also the possibility that the EC may give 
special consideration to certain industries considered sensitive ( e.g. automotive, 
textiles, petrochemicals and electronic industries ) when the Community is going 
through a critical period of re-organization. 
In the financial sphere, the establishment of a single EC market by 1992, 
would allow all EC credit institutions to offer cross-border services throughout the 
Community. Moreover, branching out will be greatly facilitated. The Treaty of 
Rome, upon which the EC was founded, did provide for freedom of establishment 
( to set up branches and subsidiaries ) in banking throughout the Community, but 
it did not provide banks with the ability to sell services across national frontiers. 
This deficiency was addressed in the second Banking Directive of January 1988. 
In essence, this introduced the concept of the " Single Banking Licence " whereby 
a subsidiary of a bank licenced to operate within any EC country will, by 1992, 
be free to operate within all member states under the rules prevailing in its home 
country. Furthermore, it now appears that the securities business will be included 
in the core business of commercial banks. The international cometitiveness among 
the leading financial centres will intensify owing to these developments. This 
suggests some erosion of the London ba.sed Euro-markets after 1992, in so far 
as European borrowers or security issuers who presently choose London to raise 
money may find it equally efficient to use their liberalized domestic markets. 
Non-EC financial institutions represented by a subsidiary in any one of 
the 12 EC member countries will also benefit from the single banking market after 
1992. In this context many non-EC firms who would like to enter the Community 
market place to benefit from equal treatment and equal opportunities are coming 
to the conclusion that they should establish a presence now. To benefit from 
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the right of establishment, a non-EC company must meet two conditions. First, 
there should be complete reciprocity from the home state to all EC members, and 
second it must have its registered office, its central administration or its principal 
place of business within the Community. 
Various comments from EC officials suggest that the principle of reci-
procity will be strongly adhered to. Prospective new entrants, whether by estab-
lishment or acquisition, will be permitted to enter an EC country only if reciprocal 
rights exist in their country for the banks of all EC countries. In other words, if 
an institution from one EC country is refused a licence by a non-EC state, all EC 
countries will refuse new licences to institutions from that country. Furthermore, 
reciprocity if strictly applied would essentially allow a firm from a non-EC country 
to undertake only those activities in the EC markets that EC firms can undertake 
in the foreign country. 
The relative success of the EC compared to the GCC, is largely because 
the EC has adopted long-term plans, through which member states could define 
the most important economic and social goals, allowing scope and freedom of 
public participation in public affairs, and freeing economic policies from undue 
political considerations. The best example of an indicator of integration that 
captures this in coordinated action is the number of people involved in the EC 
policy-making machinery. The civil servants employed by the Commission and 
other EC institutions have rapidly increased in number: with the Commission 
staff growing from 1000 to 15000 between 1960 and 1988. ( In the same period 
the total number of civil servants in the countries of the EC 12 rose from 4 to 8 
million persons ). The meeting of the Council of Ministers, its working parties, 
and experts of the Commission also have become more and more frequent. New 
lobbying groups were regularly established, and older ones have increased their 
efforts to influence European policy and decision making by extending their mem-
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bership and consolidating their presence in the centre of EC decision- making ( 
Molle,1990 ). In other words, the European countries have a democratic approach 
to supranational planning, which means there is no decision to be taken without 
the approval of the parliament in each country of the EC and the European Parlia-
ment. While in the GCC countries there is no democracy, that means the people 
do not have the right to participate in any decision. I consider that this is one 
of the main reasons for the failure of the GCC's approach to integration. In my 
opinion, without the participation of the people in the decisions, the GCC will 
never achieve its goals. Therefore, I am strongly recommending that the GCC 
more towards the decision-making structures of the EC ( while aware that these 
too have limitations ) . 
7.2.2 Specific Features of GCC 
Regarding to the specific reasons, the first two reflect the internal and 
external organisation of the GCC states and the other three indicate a failure of 
the GCC to tackle issues that are vital to long-term development. 
Bureaucracy and Development: People responsible for the management of 
the development process must have the ability to shape policy and define goals; ini-
tiate and innovate! face major situations; effect change 1 change administratively; 
make informed and objective decisions competently and effectively. In fact, the 
management of the development process in the GCC states lacks the ability to do 
most, if not all, of the above internally, let alone in international collaboration. 
Furthermore, to achieve a truly cooperative development programme, several con-
ditions must be implied : the will to develop; clearly defined goals and policies; a 
competent administration; a qualified and adequately trained workforce; genuine 
political support; and a productive economic base. 
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Again, the researcher argues, the conditions do not seem to exist in the 
GCC states. Development in the oil states seems to involve the importing of the 
superficialities of civilization from the developed countries - tall buildings, big cars, 
and technological luxuries for amusement. It also seems that policy- makers in 
the Gulf states are primarily concerned with the economic aspects of development; 
the social and administrative aspects of development occupy a much lower level 
in thinking. Political development is none:xistant. What some see happening in 
the Gulf is not development but growth of a certain sort. 
Effective planning is almost completely lacking in the oil-producing coun-
tries, even in those countries that profess to have development plans. Gulf states 
lack a clear social and economic vision that can be translated into specific na-
tional or cooperative goals and objectives. The states must accept the efficacy of 
comprehensive planning in all of its aspects, economic, administrative, political, 
and social. For proper management of development also, they must coordinate 
their planning efforts through the GCC mechanisms. Coordination in this area is 
the first step to break the cycle of economic dependency. Indeed, many examples 
of coordination existed in the Gulf prior to the establishment of the GCC, yet 
economic dependency continued to prevail. 
The GCC might play a better role in the achievement of regional co-
ordination in development if the question of long-term development is given top 
priority. First and foremost, a regional development plan must be established 
for the six GCC states. Secondly, in the context of this plan, a regional popula-
tion policy must be adopted, to be followed by regional education and training 
manpower plans. Basically, comprehensive planning in the GCC should include 
the following areas : oil production; investment of oil revenues; industrialisation; 
education; training; manpower; and agriculture. 
Bureaucracy in the Gulf states has expanded tremendously but has failed 
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to produce modern state institutions. Two factors have contributed to this growth 
: the lack of a meaningful plan, and the abundance of oil revenues. Compared 
with the public services of more developed countries, Gulf bureaucracies suffer 
from certain disabilities, both structural and behavioural. Gulf bureaucracies re-
main tribal in nature. That is, they attempt to solve current problems using 
a tribal approach. Bureaucracies in the Gulf states expanded rapidly in the late 
1960s and early 1970s without any specific plans and without any real administra-
tive reform. In addition, bureaucracies in the Gulf states contain a relatively high 
percentage of uneducated or poorly educated government employees, both indige-
nous and expatriate. In terms of higher education, a large percentage of university 
degree holders in the bureaucracy are expatriates. The administrative reform in 
government bureaucracies in GCC counries has been disappointing for several rea-
sons : the inability of foreign experts to understand the political realities in these 
countries; the tendency to emulate models based on the developed countries; the 
inability of responsible government agencies to introduce reform; the bureaucratic 
opposition to administrative reform; administrative reform programmes lack po-
litical support; a weak feeling of institutional belonging on the part of government 
employees; the social educational environment; and bureaucratic corrupion. 
Without an effort to improve the internal administration of the countries, 
GCC cooperation plans will remain ineffective. 
International Division: The Arab world in general may be renowned for 
its fractured communities and divided loyalities, but it is the small states of the 
Arabian Gulf which best epitomise it. This may in part be due to the more 
overtly tribal and kinship orientated nature of their politics and of their society; 
it may also owe much to the difficulties of establishing common goals, aims and 
loyalities, even though these states are much smaller than their cousins elsewhere 
in the region. This " international division " is problematic for the GCC on 
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two levels. First, it makes the forging of closer internal coordination much more 
difficult. Second, it encourages external states, especially those with strategic 
interests in the region, to exploit these internal divisions by playing off members 
against one another, and indeed, within member states, by exploiting factional 
tension. Ultimately the presence of such a fractured political culture makes the 
development of a more coherent, integrated body extremely difficult to attain. 
For all the publicity associated with high level GCC meetings, diplomatic 
coordination among the six appears to be spasmodic. A good example of this was 
the issue of formal diplomatic relations with Moscow, the six resuming ties with 
the Soviet Union in a piecemeal fashion over the course of a member of years. 
One of the central reasons for the establishment of the GCC was to 
enable the six member states, which tend to be small and relatively weak by re-
gional standards, to assume a stature to which they could not aspire individually. 
The GCC as a multilateral body offered the promise of diplomatic and military 
economies of scale. Yet it is remarkable in retrospect how little the six have acted 
as a corporate body on the diplomatic stage. The publication of periodic mem-
oranda and conference communiques appears to have been the end of it. The 
individual member states continued to be the main vehicles for the formulation 
and execution of foreign, as well as, economic policy. During the Iran-Iraq war 
the GCC would merely delegate diplomatic functions, such as assigning the U AE 
as the main conduit for dialogue with Iran. The approach helped to neutralise the 
diplomatic efficacy of membership of a regional organisation, while projecting an 
impression of its marginality. After the conflict ended in the ceasefire of August 
1988, the GCC seemed to become even less important, either as a focus for its 
member states, or as a forum in which important multilateral decisions could be 
taken. For instance,Saudi Arabia choose to conclude a separate Non-Aggression 
Pact with Iraq in spring 1988, without reference to the GCC. Kuwait, which did 
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not have such an arrangement, was made more vulnerable in its relations with 
Iraq due to the absence of an overall GCC role. Another example, the latest 
dispute between Qatar and Bahrain over the shallow island of Fasht Dibal which 
flared up in May 1986, is only a recent example. The GCC itself proved unable 
to do anything about this dispute and it was left to Saudi mediation to shelve the 
problem. In this respect the GCC countries face a historical choice if this organ-
isation has any future at all. Either they have to accept the borders drawn up 
by the British, and accepted by the countries concerned as their political bound-
aries on accession to independence, or they totally refuse to accept them, falling 
back on the old tribal system recognising no borders and accepting no imaginary 
lines drawn on sand. If ever this second choice is taken, the whole political map 
of Arabia will have to be redrawn. The GCC as we know it today would have 
to accept that change if it wants to remain viable as a regional organisation, ( 
Pridham, B.1988 ). 
Although the GCC has started to tackle the obvious features of economic 
cooperation, it is also clear that it has failed to even consider other aspects of long-
term significance. The first of these is population. 
Population and Development: First, in the Gulf states, population data 
are treated as a sensitive topic bordering on being a state secret. Accordingly, 
- --
population estimates in these states vary, depending on the source, which makes 
planning impossible. Second, the indigenous labour is less than half of the total 
labour force. Third, the population in the Gulf countries increased enormously in 
the 1970s, primarily due to the influx of expatriate labour. Fourth, the nature of 
population and concomitant population policy are directly linked to development. 
Fifth, there is a serious population problem in the GCC states, quantitatively and 
qualitatively, which will have a far-reaching effect in all other aspects of these 
societies, including security and the quality of life in general. Sixth, no serious 
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population policy has been introduced either in the states themselves or through 
the GCC to address this problem. 
A particularly serious problem centres on the absence of women's par-
ticipation in the development process. Women constitute half of the population. 
Therefore, the talk about increasing citizen participation in the labour force re-
mains hypocritical and meaningless unless the question of female participation in 
the labour force is addressed. 
Education and Development: Education is, of course, at the heart of national 
policy regarding development, yet the GCC has made minimal impact in creating 
cooperation. 
Education plays a crucial role in the Gulf countries, particularly because 
of the small population, the influx of expatriate labour, the lack of natural re-
sources, other than oil, and the relatively new education system. Five specific 
educational objectives must be realised : providing a minimum level of educa-
tion for all; nurturing intellectual independence and developing creative abilities; 
strengthening values and productive tendencies; linking secondary and university 
education to development requirements and the labour market; and developing 
scientific research and establishing a technological base. 
The process of development requires a broad base of educated people. 
Massive efforts should be spent on expanding education, eliminating illiteracy, 
encouraging females to get more education, and preparing competent and com-
mitted teachers. 
Education must also encourage productivity and the values of physical 
labour. However, there still exist in Gulf societies negative attitudes, based on 
tribal and clan status, which denigrate manual labour. The general treatment of 
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people is also affected by their social status and tribal origins. All Gulf societies 
suffer from these attitudes to some degree, a situation that will not change without 
a complete social and economic reform. 
A revision of the educational curiculum, particularly in higher education, 
must be a top priority. Such a revision must aim at making the university respon-
sive to the needs of development through preparing generations of productive, 
competent, and capable people. Second, Gulf states must revise their whole atti-
tude toward college degrees and college graduates. Presently, Gulf states guaran-
tee their college graduates a job in government regardless of qualifications, which 
has resulted in inflated national budgets and inefficient administration. 
Any new curiculum must tighten course requirements, as well as admis-
sion requirements to universities. Professors must be expected to keep up with 
their disciplines, and students must be advised to go into the sciences, technologi-
cal fields, and other professional areas. Most officials agree that the policymakers 
in the political system must lead the reform movement and supervise the imple-
mentation of reform. 
The researcher attributes most of the educational problems in the Arab 
world, and in the Gulf states in particular, to the educational system itself. The 
fifth annual meeting of Naduat al-Tanmiya, held in Abu Dhabi in January 1984, 
started to address this issue. 
Seven major problems were identified in educational administration : 1. 
weak administrative ability . among school principals and assistant principals; 2. 
failure to provide a comfortable school environment that would allow for student 
partcipation; 3. authoritarian tendencies; 4. school administrators heavily in-
fluenced by government bureaucracies in other areas; 5. strong centralization in 
finance and in policy making even on the local school level; 6. decisions frequently 
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made without adequate studies of the potential results of such decisions; 7. a gap 
between declared goals and policies and the actual imlementation of policy. 
Another fact is that the teaching profession does not attract many people 
with strong abilities. High school students have cited several reasons for their lack 
of interest in a teaching career : low salaries, limited opportunity for promotion, 
limited incentives and a lack of respect by society. Therefore, the educational 
system should attempt to attain certain specific objectives : 1. To create an Arab 
individual capable of giving and receiving criticism and of handling problems. 2. 
To nurture love and respect for work and self-reliance and to encourage initia-
tive, creativity, and a positive attitude toward labour and vocational training. 
3. To reduce the general offering in the curiculum and to concentrate instead 
on Arabic and English languages and on the sciences and technological fields. 
4. To strengthen citizenship education and the feeling of national belonging. 5. 
To develope an aptitude for thinking, meditation, and reflection rather than rote 
memory and regurgitation. 6. To encourage students to pursue self-education. 7. 
To provide an atmosphere of academic freedom that would allow for independent 
scholarly recearch and exchange of ideas without fear of retribution. 8. To en-
courage women to go into teaching, at least on the elementary level, in order to 
solve the manpower problem. 
All these objectives should be addressed both by the states themselves 
and by the GCC collaborative machinery of future economic development is to be 
arrived. 
Ineffective Defence Policy: We can see further evidence of the lack of coop-
eration in the case of defence policy. 
The central question of the extent to which individual members or the 
corporate body should or did take responsibility for policy also manifested itself 
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in the defence sphere. As with economic policy and diplomacy, the six states 
of the GCC were unwilling to transfer the substance of defence from themselves 
to the organisation. Consequently, the GCC forces as such remained small in 
number, even by regional standards.Some states, notably Oman, only maintained 
a token presence in this force. Coordination over defence procurement, an obvious 
form of economic cooperation, only proceeded slowly. Limited commitment also 
existed in the areas of internal security and counter- intelligence. Differencies also 
existed over the severity of punishments which should be meted out for crimes of 
subversion and sabotage. 
The greatest failure of the GCC states will be regarded as the inability 
to stop Iraq from invading Kuwait. Of course, it was never intended that the 
defence economies of scale of the GCC would establish parity with states like Iraq 
in terms of military capability. However, in view of the vastsums spent on state of 
the art weapons procurement, the members should have possessed some deterrent 
capability. The external defence strategy appears to have been to hold up any 
invading force for long enough to permit the regional and international diplomatic 
machinery to come into play to limit any conflict. The military competence and 
political will necessary to execute such a strategy was always in doubt. The 
shortcomings of the latter were in evidence during the Iran-Iraq war, when the 
GCC as a whole refused to post its milita.cy force to Kuwait in the wake of the 
fall of Faw to the Iranians, despite the requests of the emirate. The Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait showed, firstly, that there was no broader GCC commitment to the 
defence of an individual member. It indicated, secondly, that the Kuwaiti armed 
forces were unable to hold off the Iraqi for sufficiently long to enable diplomatic 
pressure to build on Baghdad to stop its invasion. 
Finally, the Gulf Cooperation Council is a relatively young organisation, 
the first of its kind in the Arab world, but it faces major challenges. Once the 
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GCC is transformed into an organisation in which the Gulf citizen can nurture 
his aspirations for a life of dignity and economic prosperity, then it will become a 
major regional organisation, and it will endure for many years. 
7.3 Suggestions for Further Consideration:-
Manpower Issues:-
(1) The pre-occupation with growth-related investment, industrialization 
and economic diversification should not be given priority over the development 
of the related human resources. Furthermore, the pressing need to accomodate 
demands for more highly skilled national manpower should not lead to the neglect 
of the region's culture and values. This in effect calls for the implementation of 
population and manpower planning policies aimed at harnessing the GCC's in-
digenous human resources and fostering values of hard work, discipline, acceptance 
of change and professionalism, consistent with the fabric of the Gulf culture. 
(2) Gulf nationals should come to terms with the realities of the post-
oil boom era and seek those job opportunities that are available in the market 
place. New entrants to the labour force should not set pre-conditions as to the 
type of job, working hours and salary demanded. Instead they should change 
their expectation, adapt to the more stringent work conditions of the private 
sector, be ready to work longer hours and accept salaries commensurate with 
their responsibilities and level of competence. 
( 3) A logical extension of this concept is the idea of corporate spon-
sored technical programmes in such fields as banking, computers, import - ex-
port, telecommunications, accounting and management among others. Such pro-
grammes would help eliminate the social stigma which vocational training has 
inherited and bridge the gap between academia and the corporate world. Re-
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gional training centres in the whole of the GCC's would mobilise all resources 
and facilities within one area of technology or vocation and may provide a higher 
quality of training at lower cost to the corporations involved. 
(4) Women are the Gulf countries' unutilized human reserve, capable of 
contributing to the processes of growth and development. If the region succeeds 
in tapping a large share of its female labour force, this could significantly increase 
the indigenous supply of labour, reduce to some extent the level of dependence 
on expatriate labour, save on social over-head costs of immigration and make 
the population more homogeneous. The fact that so many young women are 
getting education today at all levels from school to university, must result over 
the coming decade in a much larger female labour force participation, especially 
in certain public sector services (chapter two). The experience of Bahraini woman 
who constitute around 11 percent of the national labour force, is an indication of 
what could possibly develop in other Gulf states. 
(5) Apart from expanding vocational and technical training, developing 
new and more realistic attitudes towards remunerations and employment oppor-
tunities available and maximising job opportunities for nationals, there is a need 
to implement a programme of mandatory on-the-job training by expatriates. The 
reserve of qualified non-nationals in the region to serve this function is enormous. 
The potential to harness expatriate 'know-how' is readily available to policy mak-
ers. Various institutions could be obliged to make provisions for on-the-job train-
ing of their national employees to be certified upon completion. Fulfillment of 
this obligation could be monitored by governments and tied to future public sec-
tor contracts or partially subsidised for the additional cost incurred. 
Economic Restructuring:-
(1) The bearish outlook for the world oil market in the coming few years 
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does not promise a major resurgence of oil revenues. The Gulf countries need 
therefore to maintain their policy of import substitution and economic diversifica-
tion. The growth in imports will continue to be restrained and more emphasis will 
be put on maintenance and the efficient utilization of resources. Protective tariffs 
selectively provided for locally produced commodities may be needed, together 
with other incentives to encourage domestic investments. The rise in exports of 
petrochemical products, aluminium and natural gas among others, may offset to 
a large extent the drop in oil revenues. 
{2) It has become evident that for industrial strategy to succeed, it should 
take into consideration the need to develop manpower, services, financial and capi-
tal markets, engineering, maintenance, consultancy and research and development 
facilities. Only those projects that do not require long-term subsidies and pro-
tection to become commercially viable should be considered. A comprehensive 
strategic outlook for industrial development at both the national and regional 
level needs to be drawn up and implemented, encompassing such fundamental 
decisions as import substitution or export oriented industries. A sliding scale 
protective tariff formula directly proportional to the ratio of value added of an 
industry to total value needs to be implemented, with infant industries benefitting 
from higher tariff rates and for a specific period of time only. Industries applying 
for protection should adhere to certa.in levels of specifications and standards aud 
be able to compete in price and quality in the local markets. High prices of indus-
trial products could harm the consumers and dampen future export potentials. 
{3) Furthermore, governments in the six GCC states could help tenders 
drawn out in such a way as to favour locally processed products and part of Gulf 
governments' foreign aid might be provided in kind, which will then consist of 
domestic industrial products. Trading companies should be encouraged to take 
charge of part of the marketing responsibilities, so far assumed by the industrial 
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units. 
The Next Step 
Progress toward greater GCC economic integration has been slow, but 
the six GCC countries are gradually moving towards common standards and reg-
ulations in areas ranging from customs and ship registration to banking and en-
vironmental protection. A common external tariff and free trade within the GCC 
are scheduled to be implemented by 1992. With these developments, a GCC com-
mon market could soon become a reality. Together, the G.C.C. countries have 
a population of more than 16 million ( projected to reach 27 million in the year 
2000 ) and a GDP of roughly $150 billion, growing towards $250 billion by the 
turn of the century. This will undoubtedly constitute the largest collective market 
outside the 0 ECD and the Eastern European block that could provide the depth 
required for promoting industries in the region. 
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APPENDIX. A 
The States of United Arab Emirates 
State of Bahrain 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Sultanate of Oman 
State of Qatar 
State of Kuwait 
Being fully aware of their mutual bonds and special relations, common 
characteristics and similar systems founded on the Creed of Islam. Based on their 
faith in the common destiny and destination that link their peoples. In view of 
their desire to effect coordination, integration and cooperation among them in all 
fields. Based on their conviction that coordination, cooperation and integration 
among them serve the higher goals of the Arab nation. In order to strengthen their 
cooperation and reinforce their common links. In an endeavour to complement 
efforts already begun in all vital fields that concern their peoples and realize their 
hopes in a better future on the path to unity of their states. In conformity with 
the Charter of the League of Arab States which calls for the realization of closer 
relations and stronger bonds. In order to channel their efforts to reinforce and 
serve Arab and Islamic causes Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE ONE 
Establishment of Council 
A council shall be established hereby to be named "The Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf," hereinafter referred to as the "Cooper-
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ation Council." 
ARTICLE TWO 
Headquarters 
The Cooperation Council shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia. 
ARTICLE THREE 
Cooperation Council Meetings 
The Council shall hold its meetings in the state where it has its head-
quarters, and may convene in any member state. 
ARTICLE FOUR 
Objectives 
The basic objectives of the Cooperation Council are: 
1. To effect coordination, integration and cooperation between member states 
in all fields in order to achieve unity among them. 
2. To deepen and strenthen relations, links and scopes of cooperation now pre-
vailing between their people in various fields. 
3. To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following: 
a. Economics and finance 
b. Commerce, customs and communication 
c. Education and culture 
d. Social and health affairs 
e. Information and tourism 
f. Legislation and administrative affairs. 
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4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, 
minerology, agriculture, water and animal resources; to establish scientific 
research centers; to implement common projects, and to encourage coopera-
tion by the private sector for the good of their peoples. 
ARTICLE FIVE 
Council Membership 
The cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that partici-
pated in the Forein Ministers' meeting held at Riyadh on February 4, 1981. 
ARTICLE SIX 
Structures of the Cooperation Council 
The Cooperation Council shall have the following main structures: 
1. Supreme Council to which shall be attached the Commission for Settlement 
of Disputes. 
2. Ministerial Council. 
3. Secretariat-General. 
Each of these structures may establish branch organs as necessary. 
ARTICLE SEVEN 
Supreme Council 
1. The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the Cooperation Council 
and shall be formed of heads of member states. Its presidency shall rotate 
alphabetically according to the names of the member states. 
2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year. Extraordi-
nary sessions may be convened at the request of any member seconded by 
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another member. 
3. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the territory of member states. 
4. A Supreme Council meeting shall be considered valid if attended by two 
thirds of the member states. 
ARTICLE EIGHT 
Supreme Council's Functions 
The Supreme Council shall endeavour to achieve the objectives of the 
Cooperation Council, particularly concerning the following: 
1. Review matters of interest to the member states. 
2. Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the basic lines 
it should follow. 
3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common projects submit-
ted by the Ministerial Council for approval. 
4. Review reports and studies which the Secretary-General is charged to pre-
pare. 
5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and international organiza-
tions. 
6. Approve the rules of procedure of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes 
and nominate its members. 
7. Appoint the Secretary-General. 
8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council. 
9. Approve the Council's Internal Rules. 
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat-General. 
ARTICLE NINE 
Voting in Supreme Council 
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1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote. 
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council on substantive matters shall be carried 
by unanimous approval of the member states participating in the voting, 
while resolutions on procedural matters shall be carried by a majority vote. 
ARTICLE TEN Commission for Settlement of Disputes 
1. The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called "Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes," which shall be attached to the Supreme Council. 
2. The Supreme Council shall form the Commission for every case separately 
based on the nature of the dispute. 
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementation of the Charter and 
such dispute is not resolved within the ministerial Council or the Supreme 
Council, the Supreme Council may refer such dispute to the Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes. 
4. The Commission shall submit its recommendations or opinion, as applicable, 
to the Supreme Council for appropriate action. 
ARTICLE ELEVEN 
Ministerial Council 
1. The Ministerial Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers of the member 
states or other delegated Ministers. The Council's presidency shall rotate 
among members every three months by alphabetical order of the states. 
2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months and may hold 
extraordinary sessions at the invitation of any member seconded by another 
member. 
3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its next session. 
4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by two thirds of the 
member states. 
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ARTICLE TWELVE 
Functions of the Ministerial Council 
The Ministerial Council's functions shall include the following: 
1. Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at 
developing cooperation and coordination among member states in the various 
fields and adopt required resolutions or appropriate recommendations. 
2. Endeavour to encourage, develop and coordinate activities between member 
states in all fields. Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be referred to 
the Ministerial Council for further submission, with recommendations, to the 
Supreme Council for appropriate action. 
3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate policies 
whereby the Cooperation Council's resolutions may be put into action. 
4. Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between the various pri-
vate sector activities, develop cooperation between the member states' cham-
bers of commerce and industry, and encourage flow of working citizens of the 
member states among them. 
5. Refer any of the various facets of cooperation to one or more technical or 
specialized committees for study and presentation of relevant proposals. 
6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter and submit appro-
priate recommendations to the Supreme Council. 
7. Approve the Ministerial Council's Rules of Procedure as well as the Rules of 
Procedure of the Secretariate-General. 
8. Appoint the Assistaant Secretaries-General, as nominated by the Secretary-
General, for a renewable period of three years. 
9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations related to 
administrative and financial affairs proposed by the Secretary General, and 
submit recommendations to the Supreme Council for approval of the budget 
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of the Secretariat General. 
10. Make arrangements for the Supreme Council's meetings and prepare their 
agendas. 
11. Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council. 
ARTICLE THIRTEEN 
Voting in Ministerial Council 
1. Every member of the Ministerial Council shall have one vote. 
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council on substantive matters shall be carried 
by a unanimous vote of the member states present and voting, and on the 
procedural matters by a majority vote. 
ARTICLE FOURTEEN 
Secretariat-General 
1. The Secretariat-General shall be composed of a Secretary-General who shall 
be assisted by deputies and a number of staff as required. 
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the Secretary-=General, who shall be a 
citizen of one of the Cooperation Council states, for a period of three years 
which may be renewed for one time only. 
3. The Secretary-General shall nominate the assistant secretaries-general. 
4. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat-General's staff from among 
the citizens of member states and may not make exceptioons with the ap-
proval of the Ministerial Council. 
5. The Secretary-General shall be directly responsible for the work of the Secretariat-
General and the smooth flow of work in its various organizations. He shall 
represent the Cooperation Council with other parties within the powers 
vested in him. 
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ARTICLE FIFTEEN 
Functions of the Secretariat-General 
The Secretariat-General shall undertake the following functions: 
1. Prepare studies related to cooperation and coordination, integration and pro-
grams for member states' common action. 
2. Prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation Council's work. 
3. Follow up the implementation by the member of states of the resolutions and 
recommendations of the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council. 
4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council or Ministerial 
Council. 
5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial regulations commensurate 
with the growth of the Cooperation Council and its expanding responsibili-
ties. 
6. Prepare the Cooperation Council's budgets and accounts. 
7. Make preparations for meetings, prepare agendas and draft resolutions for 
the Ministerial Council. 
8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the convening of 
extraordinary sessions of the Council whenever necessary. 
9. Perform any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council or Ministerial 
Council. 
ARTICLE SIXTEEN 
The Secretary-General, the assistant secretaries-general and all members 
of the Secretariat-General's staff shall carry out their duties in complete indepen-
dence and for the common interest of the member states. 
They shall refrain from any action or behavior that is incompatible with 
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their duties and from divulging the secrets of their jobs either during or after their 
tenure of office. 
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN 
Privilege and Immunities 
1. The Cooperation Council and its organizations shall enjoy on the territories 
of all member states such legal competence, privileges and immunities as 
required to realize their objectives and carry out their functions. 
2. Representatives of the member states on the Council and the Council's em-
ployees, shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are specified in agree-
ments to be concluded for this purpose among the member states. 
3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 2 above are pre-
pared and put into effect, the representatives of the member states in the 
Cooperation Council and its staff shall enjoy the diplomatic privileges and 
immunities established for similar organizations. 
ARTICLE EIGHTEEN 
Charter Implementation 
1. This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is signed by the heads of 
the six member states named in this Charter's Preamble. 
2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with Saudi Arabia's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs which shall deliver a true copy thereof to every 
member state, pending the establishment of the Secretariat-General at which 
time the latter shall become depository. 
ARTICLE TWENTY 
Amendments to Charter 
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1. Any member state may request an amendment to this Charter. 
2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary-General 
who shall refer them to the member states at least four months prior to sub-
mission to the Ministerial Council. 
3. An amendment shall become effective if it is approved unanimously by the 
Supreme Council. 
ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE 
Closing Provisions 
No reservations may be voiced with respect to the provisions of this 
Charter. 
ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO 
The Secretariate-General shall arrange to deposit and register copies of 
this Charter with the League of Arab States and the United Nations, by resolution 
of the Ministerial Council. 
This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic at Abu Dhabi City, United 
Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajah 1401 corresponding to May 25, 1981. 
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APPENDIX. B 
Common Agricultural Policy of the GCC States, February 1984. 
l.The Task 
This paper presents a draft GCC common agricultural policy. The policy 
is placed within the framework of its premises and basic assumptions, the param-
eters for joint action, and the elements or functions within such parameters that 
are necessary to put the proposed policy into effect. 
This paper was prepared pursuant to the resolution adopted by the GCC 
ministers of agriculture on 10 January 1983, which stated: 
In order to achieve agricultural integration among the GCC states in accor-
dance with a uniform strategy based on the optimum utilization of available water 
resources, and to provide for food security from national sources, the Secretariat 
General is hereby charged with drafting a common agricultural policy based on 
self development, increasing production, and encouraging joint projects in which 
the private sector participates. 
II. Fundamentals of the Common Agricultural Policy 
The aforementioned ministerial resolution laid down a number of premises 
and assumptions for a common agricultural policy, which may be defined and its 
objectives broken down as follows: 
1. The policy must be based on a uniform strategy that may be defined as a 
uniform set of directives (policies and legislations that give them effect) and 
local development enterprises (plans and projects), as well as joint agriculture 
development plans that supplement and support the local effort, all of which 
together seek to accomplish specific social and economic objectives within a 
specified time frame. With this in mind, the strategy should be the practical 
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expression of a common agricultural policy. 
2. A common agricultural policy would seek to achieve, through a uniform 
strategy, the agricultural integration of the GCC states, which may be de-
fined as a state of a functional relationship (or coordination) between the 
means and objectives of agricultural development in the GCC states on the 
one hand, and a state of organic relationship (or integration) between the 
human, financial, and natural resources and capabilities that are required 
for a common agricultural development program, on the other. The strat-
egy should be selected with a view to supplementing and supporting, and not 
supplanting, local efforts, and would be based on securing reciprocal and bal-
anced benefits to the cooperating parties. Agricultural integration therefore 
would seek, through coordinating local efforts and supporting them by joint 
complementary efforts, to trigger and expedite the growth of agricultural 
production and to make such efforts more efficient. 
3. This policy must seek the optimum utilization of the available natural re-
sources (particularly irrigation water). This would require the intensification 
and rationalization of both local and joint efforts in two areas: (a) completing 
survey and exploration work for these resources and establishing efficient or-
ganizations for their ultilization; and (b) a series of technical and regulatory 
measures that are required for rationalizing the utilization and conservation 
of such resources. 
4. The policy must also seek to realize the highest possible level of self-sufficiency, 
particularly in regard to basic food commodities. The existing information 
on the available natural resources, both presently exploited or exploitable in 
the future, and on present and potential production levels, indicates that the 
GCC states can obtain a high degree of self-sufficiency in vegetable produc-
tion and fish, and a limited one in fruits. The GCC are expected to attain 
self-sufficiency in the not-too-distant future. It should be noted, however, 
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that this growth was in fact based on changing from the importation of fin-
ished products to the importation of primary and secondary products (feed, 
breeding hens, and equipment). The GOO states may maintain the present 
level of diairy production (about 25 percent of consumption). The growth 
being experienced by this sector (albeit less than in poultry production), how-
ever, is dependent on the increased import of milch cows, concentrated feed, 
and the dried milk powder and fat that are used for reconstituting milk and 
other dairy products by most dairy plants in the GOO states. An improve-
ment is expected in the level of self-sufficiency this season. The production 
of rice and maize will remain low, however (about eight percent fro maize 
and nil for rice). A common agricultural policy that seeks a satisfactory and 
acceptable level of food security must therefore have the extra dimension of 
devising suitable formulae for cooperation between the GOO states and be-
tween the GOO states and the other Arab countries, particularly the adjacent 
ones. 
5. An object of common agricultural policy should be to underscore and pro-
mote the role of the private sector in agriculture and related and comple-
mentary fields, such as the production input industry and the manufacturing 
and marketing of agricultural products. Such a policy must be based on the 
following considerations: 
a. Responsibility for agricultural production and related and complementary 
production activity must be borne in the private sector except in certain 
cases, phases, and areas where the private sector is unable to provide the 
cash flow needed for achieving the stated objective. Even in such cases, 
entry by the public sector into most such investments must be temporary 
and until the rise of objective conditions that would enable the private sector 
to cover these investments. 
b. The task of the states and their public sector investments, exercised throught 
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their local and joint efforts under the uniform strategy, is to concentrate on 
providing the foundation and structural support needed for encouraging pri-
vate initiative to adopt modern production methods, and for developing and 
modernizing traditional methods. This task involves a long series of ac-
tions that include providing the material infrastructure for production and 
crop marketing, and providing the basic needs of rural inhabitants. Foun-
dation support included providing easy financing, price support, vocational 
training, technology creation and transfer, discovery of natural resources and 
protection from abusive exploitation, protecting the environment from pol-
lution and, finally, regulating production relationships, including ownership, 
in such a way as to provide incentives and guarantee continuous attractive 
and fair returns for the efforts of producers. 
c. The policy of supporting the private sector must seek to balance and inte-
grate modern and traditional methods of production whenever such circum-
stances obtain. 
Areas where such balance and integration are needed in the GCC states 
are the production of fish and livestock. A large traditional sector exists 
in both these areas in the form of professional fishermen and momadic and 
semi-nomadic herdsmen. Both these areas, moreover, have become the arena 
for new investment in the form of trawler fleets, animal husbandry, and dairy 
production. In addition to the importance of maintaining a balance in the 
growth of the traditional and the modern sectors, good possibilities exist for 
them to be mutally complementary and supportive. 
III. Perimeters of Joint Common Agricultural Policy Action 
In order to transform the common agricultural policy into a strategy, the 
main programs of common action and their components must first be defined, for 
they form collectively the basis on which a uniform agricultural policy stands. This 
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necessarily requires achieving balance and consonance between the implementing 
features of each program. The joint action program for a uniform strategy involves: 
( 1) a joint program to coordinate local agricultural plans and policies; ies 
(2) a joint program for agriculture and food production 
(3) a joint program for surveying, exploiting, and conserving natural al resources 
( 4) a joint program for agricultural research and technology development. ment 
1. Joint Program for Agricultural and Food Production 
This program seeks to achieve a long-term view of the conditions of agri-
culture and food in the GCC states. It examines projected demand and the 
possibility of producing various agricultural commodities. It also seeks for the 
GCC states to prepare their development plans and agricultural planning and co-
ordination of agricultural policies. To realize this end, the program should contain 
the following: 
(a) Projections. Such studies, by adopting a sound scientific methodology, seek 
to project demand and production of agricultural commodities over a long 
period (A.D. 2000) and over specific intervals (e.g. every five years), as well 
as the possible alternatives available to each GCC state. Demand projections 
will take account of the growth of population, per capita income, consumer 
spending, and changes in eating habits. Production porjections will take 
into account the available natural resources, production capacity, technolog-
ical level, crop yields, and the influence of agricultural policies on prodding 
production. One result of such studies is estimating production inputs that 
are necessary for achieving a limited rate of growth, such as natural and fi-
nancial resources, material production input, labor, and infrastructure. Such 
studies would obviously provide a scientific foundation for agricultural devel-
opment planning on both the local and the common levels, and hence provide 
the basis for a uniform strategy. 
(b) Uniform Agricultural Planning Methodology. Projecting future supply and 
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demand for agricultural commodities would require local agricultural plans 
to share a common methodology and time frame. This would permit coor-
dination, monitoring accomplishments, defining obstacles, and determining 
the policies and procedures necessary for achieving the stated goal. In other 
words, such a unification would permit the use of a common language for the 
formulation and evaluation of such plans. Studies of several agricultural plans 
in Arab countries reveal a great diversity in the methodology employed, their 
data base, and the extent of their coverage of various aspects of agricultural 
and rural development. As an immediate measure preparatory to devising 
a standardized methodology, it is recommended that an analytical assess-
ment be made of existing agricultural development plans. Such a study may 
provide a scientific bases for the proposed standardized methodology. Re-
course for guidance may be made to the study being prepared by the Arab 
Organization for Agricultural Development. 
(c) Coordinating Agricultural Policies. The coordination of local agricultural 
plans that are formulated within the framework of the uniform strategy would 
depend on the coordination of the agricultural policies employed. This, in 
turn, would require a comprehensive study of such policies (and their im-
plementing legislation). Such a study would uncover the gaps in the policy, 
the extent of success in achieving stated goals, and ways of developing it 
into a more effective policy. Agricultural policies may be divided into two 
groupmgs: 
(i) Economic and financial policies. These include development financing, in-
vestment financing, and agricultural credit as well as pricing, supporting 
agricultural products and production inputs, and protecting local produc-
tion from foreign competition. 
(ii) Technical policies. These include: 
Policies regarding the use and conservation of such natural resources as 
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water, soil, grazing grounds, forests, and livestock, checking desertification, 
and protecting fisheries and the environment from pollution. . Policies re-
garding agricultural production that relate to crop yields and the role of the 
traditional and modern sectors and the public and private sectors, as well as 
the policy of state support with respect to the role of the state in the creation 
and the transfer of technology, vocational training, and providing inputs for 
modern production methods .. Policies that govern production relationships, 
the most important of which are land and crop ownership, labor productiv-
ity, returns from agriculture in comparison with other economic sectors, the 
provision of basic necessities to rural communities, and incentives to persons 
working in agriculture. . Policies regarding marketing and manufacturing, 
the extent of interconnection between marketing and manufacturing, the role 
of manufacturing and marketing in stabilizing and invogorating agricultural 
production, and the role of the private and public sectors. 
2. Joint Program for Agricultural and Food Production 
Pursuant to the policy of promoting the role of the private sector in agricul-
ture and in other related and complementary profitable investment (produc-
ing and manufacturing production imports, marketing, and manufacturing), 
this program seeks to provide material and organizational support for the 
traditional and modern sides of the private sector with a view to increasing 
investment in this field and making it more efficient, and the creation of ob-
jective conditions necessary for its stability and confidence. This, however, 
should not exclude the public sector from participation in such investments 
when such participation serves the public interest and does not discourage 
private initiative. The objectives of the unified strategy would require the 
entry of the public sector in certain endeavors, phases, and areas where the 
private sector is unable or is reluctant to enter because of lack of experience 
or because such endeavors do not realize attractive financial returns in their 
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early stages. 
Opportunities for joint ventures in the GCC states are avaialabe in the 
following fields: 
(a) Manufacturing and marketing of fish production. 
(b) Agriculture and industry-based production inputs for agriculture. e. 
(c) Manufacture of imported primary agricultural materials. 
It should be pointed out in this connection that in view of such features 
of agriculture in the GCC states as the scarcity of natural agricultural resources 
(except for fish in the territorial waters of some states) on the one hand, and the 
abundance of financial resources in most of the states on the other, the opportuni-
ties, for joint-venture financing in the fields of agriculture are necessarily limited 
and hence opportunities mainly lie in the three above fields of endeavor. 
The opportunity for fish production is basically avialable in some GCC 
states, while the opportunity for marketing exists in the other states and perhaps 
in several other Arab countries. 
In regard to production inputs for agriculture, the prelminary informa-
tion availble indicates the existence of good joint-venture opportunities, most 
sigificatnly in: 
(1) Industrial-based: chemical fertilizers, insecticides, and agricultural imple-
ments. The last category includes fishing boats, nets, and equipment; such 
farming structures as cow sheds, chicken coops, grain silos, cold stores, ir-
rigation machinery and pumps, plastics used for shielded crops, etc. It is 
believed that the rise of such industries in the GCC states is economically 
and technically feasible due to the availability of cheap power sources and 
raw materials from petroleum and petroleum products. Cooperation by the 
GCC states in such industrial fields is expected to lead to the rise of a broad 
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range of industries to meet the demand in said states as well as Arab and 
non-Arab markets for such products. 
(2) Agriculture-based: The production of improved seed and seedlings, poul-
try hens, artificial insemination of livestock, and veterinary vaccines. It is 
believed that there are good opportunities in such fields for joint-vetnure 
investments and marketing in the GCC states. 
Finally, and in view of the dependence of the GCC states on a large num-
ber of agricultural imports, it is possible to reduce the financial burdens involved 
through expanding the industry that utilizes imported primary agricultural prod-
ucts instead of importing manufactured goods. This already occurs in such fields 
as flour, dairies, meat, vegetable oils, and feed. It seems that large opportunitees 
for expansion in this field still exist, especially in such areas as cotton and woolen 
textiles, tanning, and a number of food industries. Specifying joint venture op-
portunities in the area of agricultural production would obviously require detailed 
studies. 
3. Joint Program for Surveying, Exploiting, and Conserving Natural Resources 
resources 
This included water resources (both surface and underground), land an soil, 
natural grazing grounds, flocks, wild animals, forests, and fishing grounds. 
The prevailing conditions with respect to most agricultural resources in 
the GCC states require upgrading the present limited efforts geared toward study-
ing, surveying, conserving, developing, and rationalizing the exploitation of such 
resources. 
It is believed that sufficient objective justifications exist for the joint 
performance by adjacent GCC states of many of these tasks. This is because either 
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some resources are shared by more than one state (as in the case of underground 
water basins) or because of their characteristic movement or the movement of 
influencing factors, such as grazing livestock, the spread of animal and plant 
diseases and plights (e.g., desert locust and bovine pox), and the movement of 
sand dunes and schools of fish in marine fishing grounds, environmental pollution, 
etc. Local efforts in most such fields obviously cannot achieve positive results 
unless they are fully coordinated with similar efforts in other GCC states. 
The most significant opportunites for joint ventures in the field of natural 
resources are: 
(a) Upgrading, developing, and completing surveys of water resources, land, soil, 
marine fisheries,x natural grazing grounds, grazing livestock, and wildlife by 
scientific foundations or local universities. 
(b) Undertaking joint projects to monitor the condition of these resources and 
changes occuring thereto by reason of natural factors (e.g. climate), or human 
action (e.g., environmental pollution and abusive exploitation), and carrying 
our joint projects (or coordinated countrywide projects, as the case may be) 
to check the negative impact of such influences. 
4. Joint Program for Agricultural Research and Technology Development. 
1. This is one of the most important aspects of coopertaion between the the 
GCC states in the field of agriculture. This is: 
(a) Because agriculture technology, as opposed to toehr economic deomains, 
must be derived from the environment in which it is employed, be it a natural 
or socio-economic environment. It therefore cannot be imported, and even 
what can be imported must first be subjected to adjustment experiments. 
(b) And because a number of prevailing natural environmental factors impose 
severe conditions on agricultural production in the area. Among the most 
important of such factors are the scarcity and salinity of water, widespread 
desert soil, aridity, heat, and strong winds. Socio-economic factors that have 
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an impact are the scarcity and high cost of manpower and the widespread 
nomadic grazing system of animal products. 
The factors collectively would require a great emphasis on agricultural re-
search and the creation of a special technology for this area that can successfully 
interact with all the prevailing natural and socio-economic factors. 
In view of the great similarity of the agricultural environment in the GCC 
states and the large technical and financial requirements for carrying out effective 
agricultural research, coopertaion among the GCC states in this field, which is 
essential for the optimum utilization of scarce resources, should realize greater 
efficiency at a probably lower cost. By having a well articulated agricultural and 
livestock research program that is based on general regional (not local) consid-
erations, it may be possible to link local research centers to the regional centers 
for feedback on research results. The functions of local centers under this pro-
gram would be confined to adjustment experiments and tests, and to spreading 
the newly created technology in their respective states. 
2. The effective transfer of technology created in research institutes es would 
require the rise of joint vocational training programs for agricultural advi-
sors who would transfer the technology to the arena of practical application. 
Such programs would also provide technical training for producers and their 
workers in various plant, animal, and fish specialities. This would require 
a study of the conditions of existing local and regional research centers and 
institutes with a view to developing them to meet future demands. 
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APPENDIX. C 
Unified Industrial Development Strategy for the GCC States 
The ministers of industry (Industrial Cooperation Committee), convinced 
of the necessity of pursuing the economically feasible industrial choice, not only to 
vary the sources of revenue but also to create an industrial society which is aware 
of the importance of industrialization in the life of nations, a society whose citizens 
are quick to acquire and grasp technical know-how and to use it flexibly to allow 
continued economic growth and prosperity for the citizens of the GCC states; and 
taking into consideration the Gulf region's conditions and nature; have decided 
to adopt the following basic principles as a strategy for industrial development in 
the GCC states. 
I. Basic Aims of the Unified Strategy The basic aims of the GCC unified 
industrial development strategy are: 
1. Promote industrial development in all GCC states on an integral and bal-
anced basis suited to the potential and conditions of each state. 
2. Increase the contribution of the conversion industries sector to the GNP to 
the highest level possible. 
3. Increase the contribution of local labor to the industrial sector. 
4. Narrow the industrial development gap between the GCC member states. 
5. Realize an acceptable level of self-sufficiency in the production of industrial 
goods in the GCC states. 
6. Provide an indigenous base for research and applied sciences and technology. 
7. Integrate between the oil-gas sector and other economic sectors, particularly 
the industrial sector. 
8. Create profitable opportunities for investing the surpluses and financial sav-
ings of the GCC states in the development of the conversion industries sector. 
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9. Develop the region's available natural resources and improve the efficiency of 
its industrial utilization. 
10. Encourage the settlement of conversion industries in the countryside and in 
slow-growth areas. 
II. Priorities of the Unified Strategy Special emphasis is placed at this stage 
in general on the following industries: 
a. Industries which rely on expoiting and developing local natural resources, 
including industries geared to foreign markets. 
b. Industries which meet urgent Gulf market demands, including food indus-
tries. 
c. Development of small and medium-sized industries which meet local market 
demands and prepare for the conversion of the Gulf society technically and 
psychologically to an industrial society. 
With due regard to environmental protection requirements and the con-
servation of water resources, projects related to these industries shall receive pri-
ority in studies as well as preferential treatment in implementation, plus incentives 
and facilities in accordance with the following standards and criteria: 
1. Industries currently in existence in the GCC states. 
2. New industries which help improve the chances of success of existing GCC 
industries, especially basic industries, such as upstream and downstream in-
dustries related to iron, steel, aluminium, copper, petrochemicals, cement. 
3. Advanced capital intensive industries which utilize locally available energy. 
4. High quality export industries. 
5. Strategic goods industries and industries of importance to security. 
6. Import-substituting volume-reducing industries using raw materials available 
in the GCC states. 
7. Industries jointly owned by the GCC governments, citizens, or both. 
8. Capital goods industries aimed at Gulf and foreign markets, particularly 
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Arab and Islamic markets. 
III. Policies and Requirements of Implementing the Unified Strategy 
1. Strategy implementation policies. Implementation of this unified strategy of 
industrail development is based on two main principles: 
a. Encouragement and guidance provided by governments of the GCC states to 
private sector initiatives in establishing viable industrial projects. 
b. Actual participation by governments of the GCC states in establishing viable 
industrial projects to supplement private sector efforts. 
Encourage and Guide Private Sector Initiatives. The governments of the 
GCC states aim at encouraging, promoting, and guiding private sector efforts in 
pursuing industrial trends which are consistent with the priorities of the Unified 
Industrial Development Strategy by employing the following techniques: 
a. Offer the incentives necessary for industrial projects, including foreign invest-
ments projects, which are consistent with strategy priorities. 
b. Expand the scale of the basic infrastructure provided for industrial projects 
which are consistent with strategy priorities. 
c. Provide and improve the general economic environment and the administra-
tive and social environments suitable for motivating industrial movement in 
the GCC states. 
d. Take the legal and administrative steps necessary for ensuring the success of 
the private sector's efforts in promoting industrialization in the GCC states. 
Incentives. Incentives which may be offered by governments of the GCC 
states to Gulf industrial projects include the following: 
a. Technical guidance and assistance in selecting, constructing, planning, and 
administering industrial plants. 
b. Provide utilities to industries at nominal rates. 
c. Exempt machinery and raw materials needed for industries from customs 
duties. 
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d. Tax exemptions. 
e. Provide easy loan terms. 
f. Give priority in government purchases to products of national industries 
which meet standards of quality, price, and timely delivery. 
g. Promote industrial exports by various means including helping establish and 
develop centers devoted to the promotion of these goods in foreign markets. 
h. Provide help in the training and skills development of national cadres. 
These incentives may be given to projects on a preferential basis to reflect 
the priorities of the strategy. 
Basic infrastructure. The infrastructure which the GCC governments aim 
at providing to industrial projects in the GCC states on a larger scale include: 
a. Larger cities and industrial estates equipped with all the services and utilities 
needed by industry. 
b. Dynamically improving and developing support sector services, foremost of 
which are road networks, ports, communication networks, banking services, 
insurance services, and commercial services. 
Suitable industrial climate. The GCC governments are to provide a suit-
able industrial climate by giving special attention to the following areas: 
a. Importance of developing industrial data systems for the GCC states. 
b. Continue to develop and improve government apparatuses related to the in-
dustrial sector. 
c. Patronize and reward inventors and industrial pioneers in their role as leaders 
of industrial development in the GCC states. 
d. Prepare and publish studies on industrial investment opportunities and pro-
mote industrial projects expected to succeed especially in areas of slow de-
velopment. 
e. Encourage qualified nationals to engage in industrial projects, especially in 
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leading technical and administrative centers. 
f. Spread industrial consciousness in the GCC states. 
Administrative and legal measures. These measures include efforts ex-
erted by the GCC governments to organize industrial work in general, in addition 
to efforts made by said governments to channel their educational and technical 
training policies to serve the aims of industrial development and expedite the 
settlement of industrial movement in the GCC states. 
a. General organizational efforts. These include efforts of the GCC governments 
in the following major fields: 
1. The attempt to standardize periods of economic development plans in the 
GCC states and to re-design those plans and coordinate their programs in 
the light of this unified strategy. 
2. Improve the competitiveness of local industrial products in the GCC states 
vis-a-vis similar foreign goods. 
3. Attract foreign investment to participate with national investment in indus-
try, especially in industries consistent with the priorities of this strategy. 
4. Develop and standardize industrial licensing procedures in the GCC states 
and agree on minimum conditions for licensing industries in the GCC states. 
5. Develop and standardize approved specifications and measures for Gulf in-
dustrial products. 
6. Ensure the application of unified GCC specifications and measures to im-
ported industrial products. 
7. Gradual standardization of industrial incentives and facilities, especially with 
regard to joint projects, provided that industrial specialization is observed. 
8. Aim at standardizing and developing industrial legislation and at adopting 
and publishing such legislation. 
9. Ensure further coordination in the establishment and operation of basic in-
dustries for foreign markets, and form a collective GCC negotiating center 
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for marketing the products of such industries in international markets and 
for securing their needs from these markets. 
10. Support and develop financial institutions devoted to financing industrial 
projects in member states and ensuring balanced industrial development in 
all the GCC states. 
11. Encourage the establishment of corporations and industrial investment com-
panies, and the broadening of their ownership base. 
12. Strengthen and broaden the roles of GCC chambers of commerce and in-
dustry in providing data, revealing opportunities for industrial investment, 
promoting industrial projects throughout the GCC states, and helping Gulf 
industries overcome the difficulties they face. 
13. Plan and adopt a suitable fiscal and monetary policy capable of ensuring 
sufficient and continuous demand for products of national industry. 
14. Member states are to adopt a collective international industrial relations 
policy based on encouraging their exports, and should consider the possibility 
of adding new terms to foreign aid and trade agreements concluded with 
industrialized and developing countries to promote the industrial exports of 
the GCC states. 
15. Coordinate between the GCC states regarding loan agreement terms offered 
by foreign and international financial establishments, as well as suppliers 
facilities agreements. 
16. Coordinate between the GCC states regarding managements and marketing 
contracts concluded with foreign companies. 
17. Coordinate between joint GCC and Arab projects to avoid duplication, con-
flicts, wasting of financial and human resources, and competition for markets. 
18. Channel GCC foreign investments toward Arab, Islamic, and friendly coun-
tries, so that investments may be made in areas which serve to support 
the success of GCC industries, by ensuring markets for these industries, and 
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buying important raw materials for them, or supplying suitable technological 
requirements. 
b. Channel educational, technical training, and labor policies. 
1. Population policies are to be consistent with requirements of industrial poli-
cies in the GCC states. 
2. Emphasis at universities and various professional training institutes and cen-
ters should be on specialties in technical skills needed by industry and on 
coordination between the GCC states in this area. 
3. Coordinate pay scales, benefits, incentives, and employment agreement terms 
in the industrial sector among the GCC states. 
4. Tie educational, training, and research plans with industrial development 
plans. 
5. Emphasize the importance of technical and intermediate education and de-
velop middle management cadres. 
6. Increase the trading of expertise and training methods between the GCC 
states, and coordinate between them in developing the necessary training 
programs for the various industries. 
7. Establish a unified policy for science and technology and increase research 
allotments in general budgets of industrial companies. 
8. Tie research and technological centers to universities and industrial projects 
in the GCC states to enable these institutes to grasp, originate, and develop 
technology. 
9. Help develop existing research centers and consulting offices in the GCC 
states and assist the countries which do not have such centers to establish 
them. 
10. Tie research centers in the Gulf states with one another, set research priori-
ties, and channel them towards applied research in industry. 
11. Stress the importance of establishing and encouraging the establishment of 
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centers for production efficiency, industrial research, and research on the 
development of production techniques aimed at finding scientific solutions 
for industrial problems. 
12. Support scientific laboratories and institutes capable of applying research 
and invention to industrial work. 
13. Support and develop production technology support research such as research 
on marketing, wrapping, and packing. 
14. Channel foreign investments of the GCC member states to foreign compa-
nies which have transferable technologies so that they may help in industrial 
development. 
15. Establish a regional office for the registration of patents. 
16. Encourage the establishment of national engineering design offices to help 
industry. 
17. States should coordinate their policies for the import of industrial manpower, 
provided that priority is given to Arab manpower whenever possible. 
Actual participation in establishment of industrial projects. To empha-
size concern for expediting Gulf industrial development, the GCC states shall try 
singly or collectively, in collaboration with the private sector, to expedite industri-
alization by establishing industrial projects and participating in the establishment 
of joint projects within the following guidelines: 
a. Projects of basic or heavy industries which are characterized by high capital 
requirements or high risks. 
b. Industrial projects which are of importance to the security of the GCC states. 
c. Industrial projects in which the private sector is reluctant to invest despite 
their importance in supplying basic needs for the citizens of the GCC states. 
d. Advanced technology projects suited to regional conditions such as solar en-
ergy projects. 
e. Industrial projects which play an important role in strengthening and inte-
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grating the member states. 
f. Selection of industrial projects for location in less developed areas. 
In all cases, the GCC states shall do their utmost to encourage private 
sector participation in these projects. As a general rule, the GCC governments 
will try to allot a certain part of their share in these projects for the private sector 
as soon as such projects prove to be successful. Special importance shall be given 
to foreign participation in projects of advanced technology or projects owned by 
monopolies. 
2. Strategy Requirements. The GCC states shall, singly or jointly, apply this 
strategy by taking its recommendations into consideration when making their 
development plans, with special emphasis on the following main points: 
a. Improve the capabilities of government departments involved in industrial 
development in each GCC state and develop their work procedures to grasp 
and apply the mechanics required for the implementation of this strategy. 
b. Improve and support the capabilities of the GCC's Secretariat General, es-
pecially the group in charge of industrial development, to enable it to handle 
the additional tasks resulting from the implementation of the strategy. 
c. Seek the help of applied research institutes and centers, universities, spe-
cialized Gulf and regional establishments for the purpose of preparing the 
studies and surveys necessary to guarantee the successful implementation of 
the strategy. 
d. Ensure the private sector's high response and its firm belief in the importance 
of implementing this strategy. 
e. Ensure sufficient financing for the preparation of studies, surveys, and the 
implementation of projects resulting from these studies and surveys, in ac-
cordance with the priorities of the strategy and the requirements of follow-up 
and revision work in each of the phases of implementation of this strategy. 
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